REPORT OF THE
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY
INQUIRY INTO ANTISEMITISM

FEBRUARY 2015
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP AGAINST ANTISEMITISM
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO ANTISEMITISM

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London

“We don’t know what to expect in the future, whether Jews will be able to live in Europe”
— Jewish teenager speaking to the Inquiry

“This parliamentary report is a plan for action, it must be implemented without delay”
— John Mann MP

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Foreword:

This All-Party Parliamentary Report was commissioned by John Mann MP, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism.

The terms of reference for the report were:

1. To consider the events of July/August 2014 and the causes and consequences of the highest-ever recorded number of antisemitic incidents during that period

2. To consider this in the light of the 2006 All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism report

3. To review the situation in the UK in the light of similar events in Europe and draw any lessons that can be learnt

4. To identify and review the effectiveness of existing legal and other frameworks for addressing antisemitism in the UK, with a view to avoiding the extreme anti-Jewish violence in Europe that resulted from the conflict

5. To identify models of best practice for guaranteeing intercommunal cohesion and Jewish communal welfare at times of increased tension.
The parliamentary team that undertook the policy review and authored the report included:

- Guto Bebb MP, Conservative, Aberconwy
- Graham Brady MP, Conservative, Altrincham and Sale West
- Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP, Conservative, North East Bedfordshire
- David TC Davies MP, Conservative, Monmouth
- Rt Hon Lord Dholakia OBE, Liberal Democrat
- Rt Hon Dame Tessa Jowell DBE MP, Labour, Dulwich and West Norwood
- John Mann MP, Labour, Bassetlaw
- Lord Mendelsohn
- Ian Paisley MP, DUP, North Antrim
- Baroness Richardson of Calow OBE, Crossbench
- Rt Hon Sir Andrew Stunell OBE MP, Liberal Democrat, Hazel Grove
- Rt Hon Hazel Blears MP, Labour, Salford and Eccles

Parliamentarians that accompanied inquiry visits, provided additional input to the report or joined regional community meetings that contributed to the evidence gathering process included:

- Lord Beecham
- David Burrowes MP
- Luciana Berger MP
- Louise Ellman MP
- Mike Freer MP
- Lilian Greenwood MP
- Rt Hon Dominic Grieve QC MP
- Ivan Lewis MP
- Matthew Offord MP
- Eric Ollerenshaw OBE MP
- Lord Sacks
- Rt Hon Theresa Villiers MP

Whilst all the members of the investigatory team were parliamentarians and numerous meetings were held in parliament, the investigation held no official powers and the report is not an official parliamentary report. The parliamentarians involved in the project had widely varying outlooks on the conflict and were not selected on the basis of those views.

The focus of this report is predominantly on the UK, however lessons and evidence were drawn from other European countries. The report was announced on 28 July 2014 and inquiries carried out between August and November. The report was written in the period following.
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Overview

Antisemitism is not a new phenomenon but one that constantly mutates and finds new ways to infect society. Over the past ten years, we have developed and implemented national frameworks and local strategies to address anti-Jewish hatred and in the main these have been effective and in some cases exemplary. However, during the Israel-Gaza war of July and August 2014 we witnessed a surge in incidents which highlighted areas in which more can be done and further steps that must be taken.

The aims of our inquiry were: to review the state of antisemitism in the UK specifically in light of anti-Jewish hatred emanating from the Middle East conflict, to analyse the effectiveness of existing measures and make recommendations for further action rooted in national and European good practice.

In the introductory chapter, we seek to establish some basic facts and history about antisemitism and discuss the various definitions of the term. We introduce one of several sub-reports that were commissioned to assist our deliberations and discuss our approach to the research. In addition, we emphasise the centrality of free speech to British life and the accompanying responsibilities. We also highlight that, as has been proven since the last report into antisemitism, the benefits in tackling anti-Jewish prejudice are almost never solely felt by the Jewish community but rather all victims of hate crime.

Any serious analysis must begin with establishing facts and so chapter two begins with an overview of incident figures and statistics. We were pleased that the police had improved their data capture and analysis in recent years and that their numbers broadly tally with those of the Community Security Trust (CST), a key Jewish communal security organisation which records antisemitic incidents. We look at patterns in crime and incident figures nationally, regionally, and locally and establish that whilst there is a mixed picture, undoubtedly spikes in tension in the Middle East lead to an increase in antisemitic events. We also consider perceptions of antisemitism and uncover both reassuring and worrying data. We found that most British Jews feel a strong sense of belonging to the United Kingdom but that certain issues and events, particularly in relation to the Middle East conflict, can serve to undermine this.

Since 2006, significant steps to combat antisemitism have been taken by government, parliament and civil society and we detail quite extensively the constituent parts of that body of work, covering ten different themes and make a specific recommendation about interfaith work. Separately, we analyse responses to cyber hate which was a major concern during the summer and finally review the role of prosecuting authorities and the law, making recommendations about regular reporting structures and effective communication.

In chapter three, we provide an evaluation of those incidents that took place in July and August 2014 and the requisite responses. We begin by looking in a more targeted fashion at the incident figures relating to the summer months and subsequently seek to detail the nature of the incidents that occurred, which ranged from straightforward abuse to political protests and cultural boycotts.
It was a marked feature of the evidence we received that members of the Jewish community were profoundly affected by the example set by public figures and we review some of the most troubling cases which occurred across the parties. We also reveal worrying trends in social media that require further research, which we recommend.

Having outlined the nature of the incidents, we move to addressing them. Specifically we look at the role of police and the adequacy of the law and find that whilst thorough, there are elements of training, guidance and procedure that could be improved. We make recommendations, for example, about the identification of flags and symbols and how police can be best equipped and informed in advance of major political protests. We also look at prosecuting authorities and the suite of tools available to them. We make recommendations about better data segregations and analysis, arrangements for the referral of cases to specialist prosecutors, the development of additional guidance on social media as regards religious and racial hatred and the suitability of the judicial bench book. We also seek to set out the limitations of the criminal justice process in addressing antisemitism.

There are a number of other relevant themes which we consider in the chapter. These include the political responses to the conflict, the impact of cultural boycotts and the responsibility of local authorities to bring people together. On that theme, we review the response of the Jewish community and interfaith bodies to the summer’s events and the importance of reassuring messages being communicated by communal leadership.

In the final section of the chapter, we look at the role of the media and the importance that consumers have confidence in and a proper understanding of the frameworks for complaint that exist. We look again at social media and what can be done to address cyber hate including the applicability of prevention orders, the role of volunteers and the importance of third-party reporting structures.

As part of our inquiry process, panel members visited a number of European countries to identify existing best practice and learn the lessons of the summer. After broadly assessing our efforts in Europe, we review visits that took place to Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam and Dublin and the variances of approach to combatting antisemitism. We seek to draw out the lessons of the visits and whilst identifying good practice in the field of Holocaust education in Britain, make recommendations for its continued strength and improvement. We also identify a considerable gap in appropriate guidance for teachers about sensitive discussions of the Middle East conflict in the classroom.

Looking at political institutions, we make recommendations for the UK Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism and the approach of our Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to building intelligence about global antisemitism. Finally, we seek to draw out lessons about policing from, in particular, the Dutch and French approaches and make recommendations for exporting British best practice.
In the final substantive chapter, we analyse antisemitic discourse, developing some of the themes first raised in the 2006 All-Party Report into Antisemitism. We categorise and seek a better understanding of the various themes of the discourse that emerged during the summer months. These include Nazi and Holocaust analogies, accusations of dual loyalty and segregation of Jews into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ types. We recommend that further research is needed, with a view to developing an enhanced definition and understanding of antisemitism.

The UK has earned a reputation as a world leader in combatting antisemitism. If we are to continue to play a leadership role, we must continually review and update our approach to and methods for fighting this ancient prejudice. It has been said that the health of a society can be divined from the condition of its Jewish community. We hope that taken together our recommendations will ensure not only the Jewish community but all minority communities continue to thrive in Britain.
1. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

1.1 The Report
1.2 An Overview of Antisemitism
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1. Introduction and Background

1.1 The Report

1. On 28 July 2014 the chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism, John Mann MP, announced his intention to instigate a parliamentary inquiry into the lessons that could be learned from the reported upsurge of anti-Jewish incidents emanating from increased tensions in the Middle East conflict. In the process of compiling this report we have examined evidence from various sources, held community meetings, undertaken foreign visits and commissioned expert research. Collectively, we have determined that there is cause for concern.

2. The main aims of this report are as follows:

- To review the state of antisemitism in the UK, with particular reference to anti-Jewish prejudice emanating from the Middle East conflict
- To analyse the effectiveness of the measures already in place to tackle antisemitism
- To make recommendations for frameworks and action to prevent and address antisemitism.

1.2 An Overview of Antisemitism

3. Antisemitism is a scourge of civilised society and an indicator of wider societal problems. As the Community Security Trust (CST) explains¹, antisemitism at its heart is hostility, phobia or bias against Judaism or individual Jews as a group. It should be of concern not just for the Jewish community but for all of us, when antisemitism is on the rise. Whilst overt antisemitism has become somewhat of a taboo since the Holocaust, it would be a mistake to consider the phenomenon inert. Antisemitism has mutated in form throughout time from religious to ethnic and racial-biological to nationalist.

4. Whereas racial abuse tends to be anchored in a perception of the victim as primitive, lowly, inhumane and worthless, anti-Jewish hatred conversely portrays the victims as all-powerful and duplicitous rulers. Therefore historically, antisemitism has been rooted in allegations of Jewish cunning, conspiracy, immorality, wealth, power and hostility to others. It is that perspective which can still resonate within mainstream discourse about the Middle East conflict in relation to ‘Zionists’ or the ‘Jewish Lobby’ and is more difficult to divine than say, attacks on a synagogue or visibly Jewish people. However, any theory which relies upon stereotypes of Jewish cunning or wealth and alleged control of media or politicians is antisemitic.

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5. Disturbingly, antisemitism both physical and verbal has increased not just across mainland Europe but also in the UK. Only in recent years and as a result of the last All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism, have the police disaggregated antisemitism from other hate crime figures. According to the incident statistics of the CST, whilst there was a dip in incidents between late 2009 and 2013, numbers have approximately doubled since the late 1990s. CST also points to a distinct global pattern in which “overseas events (primarily, but not exclusively, involving Israel) trigger sudden escalations in local antisemitic incident levels”. It is precisely because of the most recent increase in antisemitism that we are writing this report and our hope is that when implemented, our recommendations may help to avert future spikes in incidents.

6. That antisemitism exists and has been heightened in recent times is not disputed but we are aware that the precise definition of antisemitism has been the subject of significant debate.

1.3 Defining Antisemitism

7. The All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism report included a section on defining antisemitism\(^2\). It stated:

“We take into account the view expressed in the Macpherson report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry that a racist act is defined by its victim. It is not acceptable for an individual to say ‘I am not a racist’ if his or her words or acts are perceived to be racist. We conclude that it is the Jewish community itself that is best qualified to determine what does and does not constitute antisemitism.”

“Broadly, it is our view that any remark, insult or act the purpose or effect of which is to violate a Jewish person’s dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for that person is antisemitic. This reflects the definition of harassment under the Race Relations Act 1976. This definition can be applied to individuals and to the Jewish community as a whole”.

8. We believe this was the right approach at that time but do however note that there have been developments since 2006. In a paper commissioned to help inform our deliberations\(^3\), Professor David Feldman of the Pears Institute for the study of Antisemitism, Birkbeck, University of London, discussed various approaches to defining antisemitism and set out some of his recommendations with a view to analysing public discussion of the Middle East conflict.

9. The first All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism report recommended the formal adoption by government of the European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and

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3 Feldman, D., 2014, Sub-Report for the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism,
Xenophobia Working Definition of Antisemitism⁴. This was designed as a basic guide for data collecting agencies in the European Union which highlighted possible examples of antisemitism, taking into account the wider context. There has been scholarly debate⁵ about the EUMC working definition which we do not intend to re-ignite. As Professor Feldman explained to us, the definition was found useful to some but it “rapidly became a topic of controversy rather than consensus.”⁶

10. In the 2007 government response to the All-Party Inquiry, the then Labour administration noted that in the EUMC’s evidence to the inquiry it had stated that the definition was a work in progress and had not been recommended to member states⁷. The government undertook to re-examine the definition should the successor Fundamental Rights Agency make such a recommendation. In its 2010 paper, the coalition government said that Jewish partners were on board with “the current hate crime definition – ‘A hate crime is a criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on person’s race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender’”⁸.

11. It is clear that the EUMC definition of antisemitism will not be adopted formally until the FRA makes a proposal for governments to do so. In addition, there is little if any pressure from the established representative bodies in the Jewish community to pursue the adoption of the definition. It continues to serve a useful purpose as an explanatory tool for police and the judiciary and we are pleased it has been included in the College of Policing Manual for investigating hate crime⁹ but we will not be proposing further action.

12. With specific reference to the antisemitic discourses that were prevalent throughout the summer months, Professor Feldman proposed to us two “distinct but complementary definitions” for the purpose of analysis¹⁰. One is based on the discourse in question whilst the other focuses on discrimination. For the first, Professor Feldman cites Dr Brian Klug who has contended that ‘antisemitism is a form of hostility to Jews as Jews, where Jews are seen as something other than what they are.’¹¹ And so Jews are depicted not as they are, but as “malign stereotyped figures”. Professor Feldman’s second definition focuses on discriminatory practices which disadvantage Jews arising in social and institutional practices. To that end,

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6 Feldman, D., 2014, Sub-Report for the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism
10 Feldman, D., 2014, Sub-Report for the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism,
Discrimination against Jews need not be accompanied by discursive antisemitism, even though in many cases they have been. In order to reflect the oral and written evidence accumulated by the Inquiry, not all usages of the term ‘antisemitism’ in the pages that follow adhere strictly to these definitions. The section on addressing antisemitism explores these matters in further detail.

As the 2006 inquiry into antisemitism rightly established, it is not our role to take sides in a debate over what is and isn’t Israel criticism – just to raise it and in so doing, emphasise that our concern lies with the effects of anti-Jewish prejudice and hostility. There are those that either unknowingly or wilfully employ antisemitic language when talking about the conflict, so too there are those that wrongly label, what they might consider unfair, criticism of Israel as antisemitism. We have set out quite clearly in an earlier paragraph our concerns about anti-Jewish themes being employed in debate around the Middle East conflict. Placards displayed at rallies boasting slogans such as ‘Hitler was right’ are unacceptable, targeting Jewish-owned businesses or individuals is unacceptable and antisemitic outbursts on social media are intolerable. To dismiss these concerns as “jumping on the antisemitism bandwagon” is a sop to antisemites. There are legitimate fears being expressed from within the Jewish community and they require an appropriate parliamentary and societal response. In finding appropriate solutions to the problem, we expect and hope that the benefits will not be felt by the Jewish community alone but by all the victims of hate crime, as has been the case following the previous All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism.

1.4 Free Speech

Free speech is and remains a vitally essential and rightly guarded tenet of our British life. It is important that a multitude of voices are heard in the debate on the Middle East or indeed any other conflict. Free speech is however inextricably bound together with a set of responsibilities which if abandoned can lead to abuse of this inalienable freedom and encroachment on the rights of others. The legal limits to free speech must be obeyed and freedom of speech held in equal measure with other fundamental principles such as religious and racial tolerance. The All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct set out a series of principles relating to free speech and electoral conduct, the most relevant of which have helped to guide our deliberations.

2. ANTISEMITISM IN THE UK

2.1 Incident Figures: Statistics, Sources and Perceptions
2.2 Governmental, Parliamentary, Local and Civic Society Responses
2.2.1 Responses to Cyber Hate
2.3 Prosecuting Authorities and the Law
2. Antisemitism in the UK

15. Antisemitism is thankfully a rarity for British Jews\textsuperscript{13}. There is general agreement that our race relations laws are sound\textsuperscript{14} and in public life, parliamentarians and others have worked across party lines through the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism and other forums to ensure that the UK is leading the world in the fight against anti-Jewish hatred. However, there remains an upward trajectory in antisemitic incident figures\textsuperscript{15} and whilst providing a number of exciting and positive advancements, developing technology allows for the proliferation and dissemination of antisemitic and other forms of hate. It is important that we retain our global reputation as a leader in the field of countering antisemitism. In doing so, we will ensure that our nation which thrives on its diversity, will continue to allow people from all faiths and backgrounds to live and work together whilst embracing their own and our national identity.

2.1 Incident Figures: Statistics, Sources and Perceptions

16. It was a notable and welcome development that since the 2005 All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism process and report of the following year, the police had a firmer grip on antisemitic incident and hate crime numbers and that those figures are published through the True Vision website\textsuperscript{16}.

17. Evidence we received from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) explained that “whilst there had been earlier local data collection in individual police areas, the national collection of antisemitic crime data began in April 2008 in response to a request from government in response to the 2006 APPG report”\textsuperscript{17}. Since that point ACPO have recorded: 703 crimes in 2009, 488 in 2010, 440 in 2011, 385 in 2012/13 (data publication was changed from calendar to business year) and 318 in 2013/4. These figures, which apply to all police forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, relate to ‘recordable crimes’ under Home Office recording rules which means that the victims or other persons have perceived an offence as a hate crime. The data however excludes non-crime antisemitic incidents which are recorded and monitored locally and which some forces provided to us.

18. For London, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) explained to us that in order to aid understanding and to improve consistency of service it has in line with ACPO, supported the

\textsuperscript{14} Mathews, R. and Milner, J., 2015, Addendum consideration of law and prosecution-related issues
\textsuperscript{15} CST Written Submission
\textsuperscript{17} Association of Chief Police Officers Written Submission
adoption of common definitions for ‘monitored hate crime’ used across the Criminal Justice System\textsuperscript{18}. These are separated into definitions for hate crimes and hate incidents as follows:

“Hate crimes involve any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a personal characteristic. Hate crime can be motivated by disability, gender identity, race, religion or faith and sexual orientation.”

“Hate incidents involve any non-crime incident which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a personal characteristic. Hate incidents can be motivated by disability, gender identity, race, religion or faith and sexual orientation.”

19. In the data it provided to us, the MPS showed that where there was a significant Jewish population the antisemitic incident rate was higher and that analysis of a sub-sample had shown that most incidents took place at identifiably Jewish locations such as synagogues or schools. Tackling these incidents is a particular issue for the MPS as an estimated two-thirds of all Jews in the UK live in Greater London and the surrounding counties and have done so in a relatively stable fashion since the mid-nineteenth century\textsuperscript{19}.

20. The data shared with us by the MPS showed that across the London Boroughs, from April to November 2014, there had been 306 antisemitic incidents and 236 offences with a combined total of 542\textsuperscript{20}. In a graph provided to us of antisemitic crimes and incidents reported to the MPS since 2006, it was clear there had been spikes in 2009 and 2014, which of course related to an escalation of violence in the Middle East. In addition, the MPS pointed out to us that the number of incidents that occur during the Jewish High Holy Day period (typically September and/or October) are commonly higher than average, due to the increased numbers of identifiably Jewish people seen in public. This point was reflected in the graphical representations of the data.

21. Data shared by the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) showed a similar pattern to the MPS in respect of the Middle East conflict, with 177 crimes being recorded in 2009 and 135 in 2014. Since 2005, GMP efforts have led to 144 individual summonses/charges, 54 cautions, one penalty notice for disorder and 43 matters have been subject to ‘Community Resolution’. We were informed that the “bulk of offences” were public order incidents and many were either abusive language, frequently shouted from vehicles where it was difficult to obtain details, or offensive graffiti which is not witnessed. In many cases it is therefore difficult to apprehend offenders.

22. The Manchester City Council and City of Manchester Partnership also provided evidence relating to GMP’s figures on antisemitic and other hate crimes recorded between January

\textsuperscript{18} Metropolitan Police Service Written Submission
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid
2005 and September 2014 but included details of antisemitic incidents too\(^{21}\). They outlined for us that a total of 1681 antisemitic hate incidents and hate crimes have been committed in Greater Manchester since January 2005 and in the main had been within the jurisdiction of three police divisions. Again, data showed 2009 and 2014 being particularly problematic years with 230 incidents and crimes for the former and over a nine month period, 217 in the latter.

23. Whilst the overall number of antisemitic hate incidents and hate crimes across Greater Manchester has increased by 10% over nine years, a greater proportion of that increase constitutes ‘lower-level’ incidents, which have doubled and so in the first nine months of 2014, 217 antisemitic hate crimes and incidents were committed with 54% constituting crimes and 46% incidents. There is a similar trend for the City of Manchester. Salford Community Safety Partnership\(^{22}\) also provided us with specific details of events there, where there have been similar peaks in incidents when Middle East tension has been high.

24. The Scottish Government has for some time collected data on Religiously Aggravated Offending. Evidence from the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) prosecution statistics relating to cases of religious hatred, consistently indicates that, although small in number there are disproportionately many charges for “conduct derogatory to Judaism”\(^{23}\). For 2013-14 figures show that in comparison to Christians, Jews are nearly eight times and Muslims nearly three times as likely to be a victim of religious hatred. According to the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS), “...fear of hate crime escalates dramatically in those who share with an immediate victim, the same group identity that has made a victim a target.”\(^{24}\) Therefore such incidents for the Jewish community may be classified as Critical Incidents given “the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family, or the community”.\(^{25}\)

25. The Welsh Government stated that there were very few antisemitic hate crimes or incidents reported across Wales with no CST incidents reported in Wales for 2013 and a single incident in 2014-15 to the National Hate Crime Report and Support Centre. That centre is funded by the Welsh Government and run by Victim Support Cymru. The Welsh Government told us that “hate crimes committed because of a person’s religion or belief continue to be one of the lowest reported hate crimes in Wales with only 76 cases in 2013-14”\(^{26}\).

26. The CST which has a longer data record told us that since about the year 2000, incident figures have been gradually increasing\(^{27}\). Critical incidents, it says, are becoming closer in frequency which does not allow for incident levels to ‘recover’. Between 2009 and 2013 however, there had been a fall in incident figures which until 2014 had returned to the level

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\(^{21}\) Manchester City Council, City of Manchester Partnership Written Submission

\(^{22}\) Salford Community Safety Partnership Written Submission


\(^{26}\) Welsh Government Written Submission

\(^{27}\) CST Written Submission
of the early 2000s. CST added that throughout this time there has been a continuous threat of terror attacks against the Jewish community both in the UK and abroad.

27. The sources of antisemitism according to most respondents are broadly similar to those outlined in the 2006 antisemitism report and we do not intend to repeat the in-depth analysis offered in that document. Antisemitism continues to emanate from Islamist extremists, far-left and far-right groups. Notably, the organised far-right has somewhat disintegrated since the last report but violent splinter groups remain a serious concern.

28. CST set out for us data which showed that when trigger events involving Israel occur, perpetrators of antisemitism reported as South Asian, Arab and North African increase. We were also told that in years where there is no particular trigger event, antisemitism tends to be more anti-social and criminal than politically motivated.

29. As regards perceptions of antisemitism, most of the reputable data analysis undertaken in this area has been carried out by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR) sometimes in partnership with others at home or abroad. The most recent data on perceptions of antisemitism gathered by the JPR, was in association with Ipsos MORI, for a study commissioned by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). JPR separated out the UK findings in their report “The Exceptional Case?”

30. That report explains that at least in regard to the comparative data from the FRA survey, “Britain remains a considerably more tolerant and accepting environment for Jews than certain other parts of Europe”. Furthermore, in the conclusion section of that report, the JPR posits that “Jews in the United Kingdom are split nearly evenly on the extent to which they regard antisemitism to be a problem in the country or not” with many concerned about the economy and wider issues facing the state. Thankfully most British Jews are said to feel “a strong sense of belonging to the UK”.

31. However, there is some critical data which helps us to understand what serves to undermine that sense of belonging and feeds Jewish communal angst. In relation to the Middle East conflict, the data suggests that Jewish respondents did have an appreciation that anti-Israel criticism is not simply antisemitism but nonetheless, there are very real concerns about Nazi analogies in relation to Israel and indeed proposed boycotts. It is important to note that slurs relating to the Holocaust are a particularly sensitive point for the community as are claims that Jews are “exploiting victimhood for their own purposes”. One fundamentally significant conclusion is as follows:

“The Arab-Israel conflict clearly affects how safe Jews feel in the UK, albeit to varying degrees, but only one in ten respondents maintained that it has no impact on their feelings of safety in Britain. Furthermore, almost 80% of respondents said that they have felt blamed


by non-Jews, at least occasionally, for the actions of the Israeli Government, purely on the basis of their Jewishness”.

32. According to World Zionist Organisation data that we have obtained, between January and November of 2014 there were 573 immigrants to Israel from the UK, which was a rise of 17% on the previous year. Specifically, in relation to the conflict, there wasn’t a particular rise in outward emigration from the UK but there was a rise in numbers of those starting the inquiry process about moving to Israel.

33. This is a critical point and one borne out by the responses we received. We were told there was an “unprecedented level of fear and anxiety during summer” with people said to be “worried, depressed, and unable to sleep” and having “avoided colleagues and neighbours to forestall aggressive attempts to draw them into argument about Gaza”\textsuperscript{30}. In a report we commissioned to aid our deliberations, Dr Ben Gidley, Associate Professor and Senior Researcher at COMPAS, University of Oxford explains that the fear of antisemitism does not necessarily correspond with incident statistics, in the same way that crime and the fear of crime might not necessarily correlate\textsuperscript{31}. However, he is clear that subjective experiences and feelings must be taken seriously. Dr Gidley also argues that the media bear a particular responsibility to handle reporting of antisemitism carefully so as not to “amplify insecurity”. We will return to the concerns and fears of the Jewish community in our analysis of the conflict-linked antisemitism but it should be a concern for us all.

34. There is a broader concern to which we kept returning throughout our deliberations and that is the growing feeling of insecurity amongst many British Jews in recent post-conflict months. As the JPR explained:

“There is little question that many Jews in the UK feel rattled by murders at Charlie Hebdo and the kosher supermarket in Paris. If anyone was in any doubt about the threat posed by Islamist extremism in Europe, the realities were laid bare by the attacks, and it is perhaps inevitable that Jews across Europe will feel less secure in their aftermath. The fact that the attacks came just a few months after a significant spike in the number of antisemitic incidents was observed in the UK and across Europe in the context of the summer war in Gaza only adds to that sense of insecurity. Certainly, the temperature of debate has risen significantly in Jewish circles in recent months, and the future of European Jewry is being discussed in a way that was not the case before the summer”\textsuperscript{32}.

35. In order to better understand the growing anxieties of British Jewry, a number of polls were commissioned. A Survation poll undertaken for the Jewish Chronicle found that whilst 88% of Jews had not considered leaving the UK many thought the situation had deteriorated.

\textsuperscript{30} SCoJeC Written Submission
\textsuperscript{31} Gidley, B., 2015, 50 Days in the Summer
\textsuperscript{32} JPR, 2015, Researching Antisemitism, available at: http://www.jpr.org.uk/newsevents/article.1012
As a result of events in Paris, 73% of those polled had increased concerns about their safety. A separate poll, carried out by YouGov, focussed on the general population and attitudes towards Jews. The interpretation of that survey data, delivered to the media, was that 45% of British people believed at least one of seven negative statements about Jews presented to them. This reading of the results was fundamentally queried by JPR but it was suggested that the existence and passion of the campaign group that commissioned the poll reflected Jewish communal discourse.

36. It is worrying that the nature of the summer’s and subsequent events has served to make the Jewish community feel so threatened and insecure. We should seek to avoid the apparent loneliness and isolation felt by French Jewry that has forced so many of them to leave that country. In good times or bad, we want to ensure that British Jews both feel and are confident in the knowledge that their country and fellow citizens will not let them stand alone. We make recommendations about this now and in a later chapter.

37. There is a requirement for further reputable quantitative and qualitative research about the concerns of British Jewry, UK antisemitism and the interplay with the Middle East conflict. We recommend that the government direct funds to appropriate organisations to undertake such research.

38. Campus antisemitism remains a matter of concern for members of the Jewish community across the country, as became clear during the town hall meetings that we held in order to gather evidence for this inquiry. The last report to carefully analyse Jewish campus life was the JPR’s 2011 National Jewish Student Survey. The introduction to that paper proposed that:

“...for these Jewish students, there is nothing new about the ‘new antisemitism.’ The notion that antagonism towards Jews may be expressed in some way through antagonism towards the State of Israel has been a constant theme of recent Jewish discourse. Whether or not they have witnessed or experienced it, Jewish students will almost certainly recognize the concept, and be alive to the possibility that antisemitism may surface in the guise of criticism of Israel.”

39. The authors found that in line with results from 2010 obtained in relation to Jews under 30, 42% of student respondents had experienced an antisemitic incident since the beginning of the academic term in which they answered. Despite this high incidence, just 4% said they were ‘very worried’ about antisemitism at university. In addition, the JPR found that the respondents who identified as ‘very positive’ about Israel were more likely to have experienced antisemitism than those who are ‘fairly positive’. Respondents in Scotland were said to have been most likely to have experienced antisemitism with those in London least likely.

33 Jewish Chronicle, 2015, JC poll reveals 88 per cent of British Jews have not considered leaving UK available at: http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/128162/jc-poll-reveals-88-cent-british-jews-have-not-considered-leaving-uk


In Scotland, the Scottish Council of Jewish Communities (SCoJeC) which is the representative body of all the Jewish communities in Scotland, has undertaken some important research. Between 2012-13 SCoJeC carried out an inquiry funded by the Scottish Government about the experience of ‘Being Jewish in Scotland’. In its findings, SCoJeC explained that “most participants spontaneously raised the subject of antisemitism”. Comments related to us included “much as I like living here, it’s not a good place to be Jewish” and “I wouldn’t wear a kippah [skullcap] in the street because I’ve seen what happens to people who do, and that would be asking for it.” This was in spite of several respondents saying they had never experienced antisemitism or asserting there was none in Scotland and most reporting that being Jewish in Scotland was primarily a positive experience. There is concern that these views have markedly shifted over the summer period.

SCoJeC also inquired into people’s view of the sources of antisemitism which it says have not changed since 2005 but “increased in intensity”. This is something which as we note in a later section, has happened in Germany in particular. Amongst the various sources noted are Christian-related antisemitism, Israel-related antisemitism and social media.

Returning to the JPR report on UK antisemitism, it was interesting to note that those that are visibly Jewish are more prone to discrimination, harassment or assault. Given the growth of the Orthodox Jewish community, JPR suggested that “increasing numbers of Jews may be more vulnerable to attack.” However, the report continued that “paradoxically, any casual observer of Jews in Britain would note an increase in self-confidence among British Jews in recent decades, evidenced by the growing number of kippot [skullcaps] worn in public places and the prominence of major Jewish events and rallies in the public sphere”. The report concluded that antisemitism in Britain “remains rather a conundrum”. “It continues to be one of the top issues on the Jewish communal agenda, and efforts to combat it generate substantial funding. At the same time, British Jews have arguably never before been so confident about their Jewishness, and so open about displaying it in public”.

This is a useful reminder and perhaps reflects well on some of the work to combat antisemitism that has been undertaken since the 2006 inquiry.

2.2 Governmental, Parliamentary, Local and Civic Society Responses

In 2006, the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism reported and set out 35 recommendations for parliament, civil society and for government. In March 2007, the then Labour government responded with a formal Command Paper, followed by a progress

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update in May 2008\textsuperscript{40}. In 2010, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government laid a third paper\textsuperscript{41} and subsequently a departmental report in late 2014\textsuperscript{42}.

44. When tabling the third paper, the then Communities Minister set out the government’s position as believing “the best way to tackle antisemitism is through effective implementation of strong legislation against racial and religious discrimination and racially and religiously motivated crime. This must be underpinned by policies and strategies which support an integrated society where people are able to take part in society to the full; get on well together and are treated fairly”\textsuperscript{43}. There continues to be strong political and parliamentary opposition to antisemitism and most parties offer plans for enhancing and improving communal relations and tackling hate crime, terrorism, extremism and bullying.

45. The activities of both the coalition government and the Labour government before it, in relation to countering antisemitism, are welcome and admirable. The 2014 coalition report on antisemitism\textsuperscript{44} sets out in detail the work of government in tackling antisemitism. Rather than repeat the particulars of that paper, we have sought to summarise the many frameworks or initiatives that have been implemented in order to combat antisemitism not just by government but by parliamentary groups and from within civic society. There has been considerable progress and some notable achievements, a number of which were inspired by the 2006 All-Party Parliamentary Report on Antisemitism.

46. It was explained to us that many of the efforts to combat antisemitism at a governmental level have been co-ordinated both for the previous government and the current one by the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism which meets quarterly and brings together civil servants and members of key Jewish communal organisations. Secretariat to the group is provided by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) which also funds the Cross-Government Hate Crime Programme. That programme in turn leads on a number of activities including development of the ‘True Vision’ online portal\textsuperscript{45} which seeks to provide support and information to victims and to practitioners and allow the public to report hate crime online.

47. The Department for Communities and Local Government, which leads on much of the counter-antisemitism work, provided us with extensive detail about the efforts of government to combat antisemitism over nearly a decade. There are more than ten different areas in


\textsuperscript{43} Hansard, 2010, Anti-Semitism Inquiry (Government Response), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm101215/wmnstext/101215m0001.htm#10121523000173

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid

which progress has been pursued and we review these in the paragraphs that follow, starting with police data.

48. We were informed that agreement had been reached for all police forces to record antisemitic hate crimes and that publication of disaggregated statistics had commenced from 2009\(^\text{46}\). Work on hate crime data, we were told, has continued and since 2011 this improved data has been included in the National Crime Statistics and published annually\(^\text{47}\). The disaggregated antisemitism statistics are now available through the ‘True Vision’ web portal\(^\text{48}\) and in our view ensure that between the police and the CST, the UK has one of the most accurate sets of data in the world. In addition, we have noted that the Scottish Government has produced figures on religiously aggravated offending for some time and continues to do so\(^\text{49}\).

49. In addition to improved data sets, we heard that provision for the security of Jewish schools in the state sector has improved. This is in part the result of a grant of two million pounds per year, introduced by the coalition government in 2010 and confirmed until 2016\(^\text{50,51}\). Her Majesty’s Official Opposition has made a public undertaking to continue this funding if elected to govern\(^\text{52}\). This again points to the success of the cross-party approach established by the previous All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism.

50. Whilst the security of primary and secondary schools has been a worry, the Jewish community also registered their concerns with us about campus antisemitism. We heard that, inspired by the previous All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism, the Higher Education sector’s Equality Challenge Unit undertook a major project on Religion and Belief in Higher Education and specifically reviewed the experience of Jewish students\(^\text{53}\). That paper, published in 2011 was followed by further work on good relations\(^\text{54}\). Universities UK, the key umbrella body for universities has undertaken a significant amount of work on countering extremism and antisemitism. This includes producing guidelines on hosting external speakers in higher education institutions\(^\text{55}\), an issue about which the National Union of Students (NUS) has also


produced excellent guidance. We were also informed that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has some ten special regional advisers who seek to advise universities on speakers and other matters pertaining to extremism. Lastly, the Home Office supported the publication of a guide to antisemitism for students developed by the CST.

51. Academic boycotts of Israel were roundly condemned in the 2006 parliamentary antisemitism report. The coalition government and the Labour government before it, set out quite clearly and repeatedly that there is no academic boycott of Israel in place in the UK and that it is fully supportive of academic freedom and firmly against academic boycotts of Israel or Israeli academics. Legal advice from the University and College Union (UCU) to its members from 2007, which was drawn to our attention, suggested that an academic boycott of Israel would be unlawful and in contravention of equality legislation.

52. Work on campus and elsewhere to commemorate the Holocaust has been a source of particular inspiration over the past ten years or more. As our report went to print, the Prime Minister was due to announce the outcome of his Holocaust Commission and DCLG submitted detailed accounts to us about other Holocaust commemoration and education.

53. We were reminded that the Holocaust is a compulsory subject on the curriculum in England at Key Stage 3 and can be taught in other subjects. The Holocaust Educational Trust (HET) in its evidence, outlined how successive governments have supported its work, so that the organisation can take school children to visit Auschwitz and engage them in learning about their experience. Amongst the other initiatives which receive government funding and were detailed for us by DCLG were: the Institute of Education’s Holocaust Education programme which helps to train teachers to deliver effective Holocaust education, the Anne Frank Trust’s programmes on tolerance and respect which will soon have reached 35,000 young people
and the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust’s Memorial Day events which in 2014 numbered some 2400 local activities. The ‘Holocaust Explained’ website also receives public funds and has received 1.6 million visitors since 201167.

54. Government funding has also been awarded to the Auschwitz-Birkenau Foundation’s restoration fund and to the Weiner Library in relation to the International Tracing Service Archive which contains over 50 million records from the Nazi era. We were also informed that the ‘British Heroes of the Holocaust’ award has been established and recognises British citizens who had gone beyond the call of duty to save Jewish people during the Holocaust. Our national record on supporting Holocaust education and commemoration is one of which we can rightly be proud, as can those organisations which have made it possible.

55. The All-Party Antisemitism Inquiry of 2006 recommended that the UK adopt a similar approach to the United States of America in appointing a special envoy on combatting antisemitism68. Whilst this recommendation was not followed, we were told that in 2010 the Foreign Secretary appointed Sir Andrew Burns as the UK Envoy for Post-Holocaust issues69. Sir Andrew’s goal has been to enhance, improve, streamline and develop the UK’s approach to international discussions and our role in the various Holocaust education and remembrance organisations of which we are a member. He continues to do an excellent job in this regard.

56. As the DCLG report submitted to us made clear70, the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism has inspired other countries to run their own all-party inquiries and to establish programmes of work. This has led to similar inquiries into antisemitism in Germany71, Canada72, and Italy73 between 2010 and 2013. More broadly, the UK is heavily involved with the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) although we explore this in a later chapter.

57. Whilst we have sought to export national best practice and indeed learn of good practice from others, so too we were told, there have been efforts to keep the worst exponents of antisemitic views from entering Britain. Since 2010, over 150 people have been excluded from entering the UK for not being conducive to the public good and in some of these cases, antisemitic action or rhetoric has been an aggravating factor.

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58. Challenging hate in elections is of course a global requirement but was a focus of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct\(^\text{74}\). Commissioned by the APPG Against Antisemitism following frustration at the lack of progress against one of the recommendations in the 2006 antisemitism report, the Electoral Conduct inquiry looked at discrimination in the round. The report of that inquiry, published in October 2013 was welcomed by the Prime Minister, the Speaker, representatives of many political parties and other stakeholders\(^\text{75}\). The report called for action including: cross-party agreement on a framework for reporting discrimination during campaigns, agreement by parties to a voluntary code of practice for political advertising across all media, enhanced and improved training, data collection and communication from the police and improved candidate training, amongst other measures. The Law Commission, Electoral Commission, Equality and Human Rights Commission and the police have all committed to actions against the recommendations of the report according to its authors\(^\text{76}\).

59. We have learned that there has also been progress in relation to matters not considered in the 2006 antisemitism report. For example, there has been a marked improvement in efforts to combat antisemitism in football. The Football Association (FA) has signalled to managers and players that it will not tolerate antisemitism – as evidenced by its approach to the Anelka\(^\text{77}\), Balotelli\(^\text{78}\), Assou-Ekotto\(^\text{79}\) and Whelan\(^\text{80}\) incidents. At the urging of the APPG Against Antisemitism the FA worked to respond in a timely fashion to John Mann’s antisemitism and islamophobia report\(^\text{81}\), improved preparedness plans for the Euro 2012 tournament and held a special conference to highlight their work on antisemitism and address concerns\(^\text{82}\). At that meeting it was revealed that for the 2012/13 season there were ten disciplinary cases involving antisemitism in both the professional game and at grassroots and nine resulted in action but were not well publicised.

60. In addition to those measures already outlined, the FA has introduced Strict Liability for clubs regarding fans’ behaviour which prevents clubs from arguing a due diligence defence

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in the case of, for example, racist chanting\textsuperscript{83}. The FA has said it will punish clubs if there are two offences involving the same club within 12 months. So too individual clubs have on occasion shown their intention to punish antisemitism. Liverpool Football Club reportedly planned to take an uncompromising approach to those individuals that tweeted antisemitic responses to the club’s Jewish New Year message.

61. We also note that the leading anti-racism group ‘Kick It Out’ have helped to improve reporting of incidents in football and the Premier League is now working with the British Council to run cultural awareness programmes for footballers and will be running equality training for youth teams\textsuperscript{84}. These are welcome developments in football. The FA should be congratulated for its improved leadership role in stamping out antisemitism in football and encouraged to continue in the path it is set. So too, football clubs should act immediately and publicly to discipline fans or players engaging in antisemitic activity.

62. Football and other sports serve to bring people together. In its evidence to us, the Department for Communities and Local Government reviewed the various interfaith initiatives it supports although of course, there are many more across the country both small and large that continue to operate by their own means and they are to be congratulated.

63. Centrally, support is given to the Interfaith Network which working together with local authorities, faith communities and others, leads on interfaith week activities of which there were 350 in 2013\textsuperscript{85}. There is some crossover with intra-faith initiatives such as the impressive ‘Mitzvah Day’ and ‘Big Iftar’ and we are told that good practice has been shared internationally where possible and particularly at EU and Commonwealth level. Other initiatives highlighted to us included the “Together in Service” programme administered by FaithAction\textsuperscript{86} which celebrates social action in various communities and offers small grants to kick start new initiatives. In addition, funding has been offered to the Church Urban Fund to support the ‘Near Neighbours’ programme\textsuperscript{87} which offers small grants to local groups that look to bring neighbours together to improve their community. Nearly 700 projects have been funded.

64. Somewhat separate but on a related point we received details of a series of road shows which have been touring the UK with the aim of providing details of official efforts to create the conditions for integration. The forums are used to gather feedback on integration strategies but have also involved local police and CPS representatives\textsuperscript{88}.

65. In the evidence it submitted to us, the Scottish Government stated that it “values the important role that the Jewish community plays in enriching Scotland”\(^{89}\). It affirmed a commitment to combatting antisemitism and to supporting communities. We were informed that Scottish Government Ministers meet frequently with Scotland’s Jewish community and other Jewish representatives in a range of settings and have sponsored community exhibitions in the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Government told us it has provided more than nine million pounds worth of funding to institutions dealing with various equalities issues including racism and religious intolerance during 2012-15. In addition, it takes pride in being a leader in the field of interfaith activity, it funds the ‘Interfaith Scotland’ organisation, created a Working Group on Religion and Belief Relations and funded some good practice guidance on developing such relations.

66. The Scottish Government also explained for us that it provides funding for the ‘Lessons from Auschwitz’ project run by the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET) and works in partnership with Interfaith Scotland and the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (HMDT) to deliver Scotland’s National Holocaust Memorial Day event each year. Government Ministers support the day and have increased its funding for 2015. Specifically in relation to the Jewish community, the Scottish Government funded a “Being Jewish in Scotland” project which sought to attain a better understanding of Scottish Jewry and its members. A comparative review piece has now been commissioned and is being undertaken by the Scottish Council of Jewish Communities (SCoJeC).

67. The Welsh Government informed us that work across Wales was being progressed through a plan named ‘Tackling Hate Crimes and Incidents: A Framework for Action’, launched in May 2014\(^{90}\). The framework has three strategic objectives which are prevention, supporting victims and increasing the multi-agency response. The Welsh Government told us it works with partners to expand its own understanding and supports interfaith dialogue.

68. As noted, antisemitic hate crimes in Wales are reported to the National Hate Crime Report and Support Centre which is funded by the Welsh Government and run by Victim Support Cymru. In spite of the low incident numbers and a thinning Jewish population in Wales, the government stated it plans to increase co-operation with places of worship and communities to increase confidence to report.

69. Wales has three major hate crime projects sponsored by the Big Lottery Fund and run by equalities experts which work to empower victims to report and is working to tackle racist bullying in schools. The government also reports that it has a strong commitment to remitting the messages of Holocaust Memorial Day. Finally, the Welsh Government also detailed for us its involvement in interfaith dialogue and support. The First Minister chairs the Faith Communities Forum, which meets on a bi-annual basis and there is an active Inter-Faith Council in Wales.

\(^{89}\) Scottish Government Written Submission

70. The London Assembly provided us with details of the scrutiny undertaken by its members of policing and other responses to antisemitism in London. Across the parties, questions have been asked of police and the Mayor and his officials to ensure the right strategies are in place91.

71. We were told that at a local level, Manchester City Council had “worked hard since the last Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2006, together with the Greater Manchester Police and the Crown Prosecution Service to consult with residents to inform the development and launch of a Hate Crime Strategy and Delivery Plan”92. We were also told that hate crime “remains a significant focus” for the Manchester Community Safety Partnership and is “included as a priority in the Community Safety Strategy”. We were pleased to read that The Standard Advisory Council for Religious Education (SACRE) in Salford has invested heavily in a programme to promote understanding of other religions, and is providing educational programmes for young people in partnership with the Jewish Museum and Imperial War Museum North93.

72. In Gateshead, the council reported that together with its partner agencies, it has a “very strong relationship with the local Jewish community” which is “heavily consulted in relation to Policing and Community Safety activity”. A Single Point of Contact is in place with Northumbria Police and the council (which covers other relevant issues) and this has helped in relation to information exchange and reassurance measures. There is also a meeting three times a year with the CST and Jewish representatives are said to be heavily involved in the bi-monthly Diversity Forum94.

73. The UK National, Scottish, Welsh and Local Authorities were keen to highlight their support for and the significance of inter-communal and interfaith work. Given the importance of keeping communities together when events elsewhere can serve to drive them apart we recommend that the UK Government together with the devolved administrations undertake a national review of this work, including and specifically identification of good practice and case studies of where dialogue has succeeded in spite of international events.

74. We were pleased to learn that the essential funding for security of Jewish schools in the state sector had been considered effective. Given the continuing threat of terrorism against the Jewish community, we recommend that a governmental fund be established to cover both capital and revenue costs for the security of British synagogues.

75. Limited space prohibits a full review of all that has been achieved – there have been successes in discussions about online payments systems, work with the Schools Linking Network, collaborative initiatives with the British Council and more. However, in summary a significant
programme of work has been undertaken with generally positive outcomes. One of the key benefits of the work in tackling antisemitism that bears repeating is that the results achieved serve not only to improve life for the British Jewish community but for all the victims of hate crime. This is particularly true in relation to cyber hate.

2.2.1 Responses to Cyber Hate

76. There are innumerable benefits to be gleaned from social media but as the government set out in its recent paper on antisemitism, “protecting people from the harm caused by antisemitism on the internet remains a challenge”95. The disparity of legal stances and global nature of the web means that the problem may never be fully resolved. So too, social media has enabled antisemitic abuse as one submission put it, “to penetrate unbidden into the home and workplace, changing the nature of people’s experience, raising the level of many people’s anxiety, and, in some cases overwhelming them”96.

77. It was interesting to note that in the JPR report concerning perceptions of antisemitism, to which we referred earlier, 68% of UK respondents reported having seen or heard antisemitism on the internet in the previous 12 months. The next most common location for antisemitism was social situations, at 41%. That study also showed that UK Jews believed antisemitism to have worsened in the past five years in every suggested setting with ‘the internet’ perceived to be worse by 77% of respondents97.

78. However, successive UK Governments have sought to collaborate with industry and improve Criminal Justice System responses to help protect victims, improve standards and prosecute perpetrators. So too, parliamentary groups and civil society organisations have been working with social media companies to try and find innovative solutions to combatting online hate98.

79. The previous All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism highlighted work to tackle internet hate as a key priority99. We were told that following lobbying from members of the APPG, in 2009, Ministers of the then Labour government held a cross-party seminar at which they met with key stakeholders to discuss a wide range of issues related to cyber hate and a series of actions were agreed100. This led to the UK securing agreement on these matters within an OSCE Ministerial forum, which we describe in detail in a later chapter. Coalition government ministers hosted a second UK ministerial seminar in July 2011, which included

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96 SCJeC Written Submission
98 OSCE, 2014, Anti-Semitism remains a challenge to security in the OSCE region, say participants at high-level OSCE conference in Berlin, available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/126695
industry representatives. The resultant discussion and policy recommendations fed into the Home Office deliberations about broader internet policy decisions being considered across government and we have been told a third ministerial event is planned for 2015.

80. The Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combatting Antisemitism (ICCA) explained for us that it was founded in 2009, bringing together parliamentarians from around the world to lead the fight against resurgent global antisemitism. At its inaugural conference, the ICCA London Declaration was agreed and included recommendations for various bodies to take action against online hate. The declaration was subsequently signed by the leaders of all the UK’s major political parties. We were informed that a second conference was held in Ottawa in 2010 and an international task force on internet hate established. That group, which includes representatives of major technology companies reported its findings in 2013 and resolved to establish a permanent Anti-Cyber Hate Working Group combining industry representatives, NGOs, academics and others to develop models of best practice in balancing competing rights and responding to cyber hate. The group produced a statement of aspirational principles that the participating industry stakeholders have supported and which serve as a framework through which those companies can seek to address cyber hate. We have however been made aware of questions that have been asked about the commitment of some companies to these principles.

81. Fortunately, we have a good national record in convictions for internet-related incitement to hatred and violence. In the R v Sheppard and Whittle case two men appealed against convictions for possessing, publishing and distributing racially inflammatory material contrary to the Public Order Act 1986. They had between them composed, edited and uploaded racist material online to a website hosted by a server in the USA. The judge ruled that the UK courts had jurisdiction to try the case as a substantial measure of their activities had taken place in the UK. This sets a very important precedent for prosecutions of online hate. The prosecution of a man who sent an antisemitic twitter communication to Luciana Berger MP has also set an important precedent which we review in further detail in the next chapter.

102 ICCA Written Evidence
82. Other efforts about which we were informed included the publication of guidance from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to prosecutors on when it is in the public interest to take perpetrators to court\(^\text{109}\) and advice from the College of Policing to police and partners on responding to internet hate crime in their latest guidance\(^\text{110}\). DCLG informed us that the government has also supported the establishment of the ‘UK No Hate Speech Movement’ which trains and supports young volunteers who seek to challenge online hate through ‘counter-narrative’ activity\(^\text{111}\). This is in addition to support for the True Vision online reporting system which we have already cited\(^\text{112}\). There is certainly work to do but the UK has at all levels, societal, parliamentary and governmental sought to play a key role in ongoing deliberations. It is vital that we continue to do so.

83. We were told by DCLG officials that a particular concern for the Jewish and indeed other communities had been vile comments left on the open forums provided under articles and elsewhere by newspaper websites\(^\text{113}\). Following discussions at a meeting of the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism, an approach was made to the Society of Editors which was later funded to undertake a survey of website moderators in order to produce a good practice guide for online content. The subsequent Society of Editors report found that “the majority of online news outlets take the issue of moderation seriously, not least because of the reputational damage that the posting of offensive material can cause”\(^\text{114}\). There were a number of important conclusions from that report including: that robust reactive moderation provides the best protection for publishers against actionable comments, that prominent, accessible and easy to use reporting systems are important, and that filters can play a useful role. It was suggested that publishers could do more to maintain a record of material they remove from their sites and to highlight more clearly terms and conditions. The Society of Editors guide is an important example of a civic society organisation taking action. It bears reading even though, as Communities Minister Stephen Williams has said, it is “the start of a conversation”\(^\text{115}\).

2.3 Prosecuting Authorities and the Law

84. There is no specific law on antisemitism in the UK, rather offences might be covered by the ‘Stirring up of Hatred’ sections within the Public Order Act 1986 (which, in 2006\(^\text{116}\), was extended to cover religion as well as race), or by other public order laws, anti-discrimination


\(^{112}\) True Vision, n.d. available at www.report-it.org.uk


\(^{116}\) Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, Section 1
laws, human rights law or the civil law, depending on the circumstances. According to the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the introduction of the Equalities Act in 2010 has “greatly effected” how people understand traditional antisemitism and enabled the organisation to help others. They told us that “having a clear legal framework, especially in relation to workplace issues, has made it clearer what constitutes antisemitism and antisemitic discrimination”\textsuperscript{117}.

85. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is the principal prosecuting authority for England and Wales and has policy on\textsuperscript{118} and a guide to\textsuperscript{119} prosecuting cases of racist and religious crime. It operates a Code for Crown Prosecutors and has Casework Quality Standards and to its credit, the CPS was one of the organisations which responded most fully to the previous All-Party Antisemitism Report\textsuperscript{120}. It put a series of steps in place to improve their procedures and support for the victims of hate crime has improved, with services administered by the CST.

86. In their evidence to us\textsuperscript{121}, the CPS explained that the Director of Public Prosecutions had approved a hate crime strategy in May 2014 and subsequently a delivery strategy for that plan which will determine success by amongst other measures, increased effectiveness of hate crime prosecution and improved quality of related data, increased reporting of hate crime and the effective and purposeful involvement of diverse communities. External scrutiny of CPS endeavours will be provided by “The Community Accountability Forum” which critically challenges CPS delivery and performance in relation to its Equality and Diversity Objectives. A newly established sub-group will focus on hate crime and act as a consultation forum on CPS policy and strategy.

87. The CPS informed us that the delivery plan for the Hate Crime Strategy includes a number of relevant commitments. These include a new regime of “Hate Crime Assurance” from January 2015 through which a ‘live check’ of current casework will be undertaken by experienced prosecutors, CPS support for the wider hate crime agenda including community engagement and regular reporting, a quarterly performance bulletin which will allow for data on sentence uplifts to be reviewed and support for prosecutors through a newly developed ‘Casework Hub’ which gives guidance on prosecuting each strand of monitored hate crime.

88. In addition to the aforementioned Hate Crime Strategy Delivery Plan, the CPS informed us that it has undertaken roundtable discussions with community-based organisations supporting the victims of racially and religiously aggravated hate crime. These discussions were said to have helped identify a perception that “the element of hostility or the aggravation in an offence was often dropped without considering the views of victims”. The CPS has identified the overlap of race and religion hate crime policy as needing attention and are seeking to develop a way forward which will “likely focus on refreshed guidance for prosecutors and

\textsuperscript{117} Board of Deputies of British Jews Written Submission


\textsuperscript{121} CPS Written Submission
clear, public-facing information regarding the prosecution of stirring up offences.” The CPS is also undertaking an assessment in 2015 of the experience of victims of hate crime in supporting a prosecution to its conclusion as it has found a number of further issues in this area.

89. Specifically on social media, the CPS drew our attention to the work of CPS Mersey-Cheshire which helped to secure a prison term for the man that sent an antisemitic tweet to Luciana Berger MP. The case, it told us, was used to highlight best practice such as support for victims and the importance of lawyer liaison at a National Scrutiny Panel meeting on religiously-aggravated hate crime. We know that the police are also using this and other cases to review their approach to investigating and policing cyber crime.

90. In addition to the work of the CPS, there is a Judicial College Equal Treatment Bench Book which was reviewed subsequent to the All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism of 2006 and was last updated in November 2013. The Equal Treatment Bench Book in particular, relates to the fair treatment of those attending court. Where antisemitism becomes a crime, judges will deal with it as such when it comes to them as a court case. As the Judiciary College helpfully pointed out to us, “where the defendant is found guilty of a racially or religiously-aggravated crime, there is scope and a statutory expectation for the judge to enhance the sentence having considered the harm and culpability factors.”

91. The sole prosecution service in Scotland, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) told us that is has “forged good relations with members of communities across Scotland including the Jewish community and in particular the Scottish Council for Jewish Communities (SCoJeC)”125. The organisation has a robust approach to tackling hate crime which is rightly, a key priority. The Lord Advocate, who helms COPFS has repeatedly made public statements condemning hate crime and has met and spoken with the Jewish community on various occasions. The Scottish Jewish community has been represented at and actively engaged with conferences organised by COPFS and the police and the relationship between the two led to a case study on antisemitism being used in the Scottish Government’s “Speak up Against Hate Crime” media campaign in early 2014.

92. Apart from online hate, to which we have already referred, the courts have established some other important precedents. Consideration of the ‘new antisemitism’ in which Jews are targeted not for their racial or ethnic provenance but their national affiliation, has already been considered. In a well-publicised case, Paul Donnachie was sentenced to 150 hours community service for putting his hands down his trousers before rubbing them on a Jewish

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122 CPS Written Submission
124 Judicial College, Written Correspondence
125 COPFS Written Submission
student’s Israeli flag. In sentencing, the judge noted that Mr Donnachie had referred to Chanan Reitblat as a terrorist and that “It is equivalent to saying all Muslims are terrorists, and that’s wholly unacceptable.” This was a prominent ruling and can be cited in English courts. Consideration of the new antisemitism might also be given in court, given the newly published College of Policing Manual for investigating hate crime, includes the EUMC Working Definition on Hate Crime.

93. In its evidence to us, the Association of Chief Police Officers outlined that the College of Policing had published Hate Crime Operational Guidance for police officers in 2014 (and to which we have already referred) and that this includes specific guidance on dealing with antisemitic hate crime – labelled “truly excellent” by the CST. We were told by ACPO that the guide “offers a framework to inform policing decisions where there is a conflict of competing rights. Examples of this would be the right to free speech and the right to be protected from racist harm.”

94. We were also informed that the College of Policing issues ‘Approved Professional Practice’ guidance on a broad range of related subjects. This includes “advice on dealing with racial and religious hatred in a public protest setting, on Critical Incident Management and on community engagement.”

95. Finally, ACPO informed us that the reporting processes of The National Community Tension Team (NCTT) ensure that there are weekly returns from all UK forces about community tensions. These weekly returns, we were told, enable the identification of rises in community tensions, both locally and nationally.

96. In the evidence it submitted to us, the Metropolitan Police (MPS) explained that its strategic response is led through the ACPO Hate Crime lead Commander. That officer chairs “a Strategic Diamond Group consisting of the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime (MOPAC), the CPS, victim support services and key representatives from all of the protected characteristic Independent Advisory Groups”. The rationale for this approach, we were told, is to draw together key external stakeholders who previously sat in isolation from each other. The group helps to share knowledge, identify good practice and helps to inform hate crime policy which subsequently influences operational activity.

97. The MPS related to us that at the local borough level, antisemitic incidents are recorded by frontline staff and investigated within specialist ‘Community Safety Units’. These units are in every borough and resourced by 550 specially-trained staff. We were told that the Territorial Policing Capability and Business Support, Public Protection team which is responsible for

130 CST Oral Evidence
131 ACPO Written Submission
132 Ibid
133 Metropolitan Police Written Submission
MPS Hate Crime Policy has good links with the Community Security Trust and attends relevant briefings provided by CST and others.

98. The MPS set out for us its work to support the MOPAC Police and Crime Plan for 2013-16 and gave us updates against its various targets. For example, in relation to improved information gathering, the MPS told us that a new hate crime performance pack has been commissioned and that it has separated out for the first time race and religion and so captures extensive disaggregated data. The MPS also has an information sharing agreement with the CST. Victims of hate crime, we were told, can report online through the MPS website and a third party reporting leaflet has been produced and is displayed in local communities. We were also informed that since 1 April 2014, there have been 29 charges and four cautions for antisemitic offences. In addition, Liaison Officers are receiving special training in relation to antisemitism and other hate crimes and the MPS continues to support policing activity around the Jewish High Holy Days.

99. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) told us that it works in partnership with Community Security Trust (CST), which has been granted official “third party” reporting status, to create a safer, more secure environment for the Jewish community. We were told that a poster entitled “Taking responsibility Stop Antisemitism, Report Antisemitism” which includes PSNI and CST contact details, has been distributed for display in the Belfast synagogue. In addition, local neighbourhood officers frequently liaise with members of the Jewish community for reassurance and to increase confidence and the Crime Prevention Officer has given advice. The Local Neighbourhood Policing Team officers who fulfil the Hate and Signal Crime Officer role also contact victims of crime and provide support, and sign-post them to agencies who may be able to assist them.

100. In Gateshead, outside of those measures we have already detailed, we were informed that there is a Safer Communities team which co-ordinates a Hate Crime and Tension Group every month, which is attended by a Jewish representative and “reviews all incidents of hate-related crime reports to ascertain if there are any emerging trends or specific incidents that require additional support”. In addition, we were told that the Safer Communities team reviews hate crime cases on a daily basis through the use of the multi-agency Hate Crime Recording System (ARCH).

101. Another force, the Greater Manchester Police, referenced its “long established working relationship” with the Community Security Trust, which it refers to as a valued partner. Moreover, GMP stated that its relationship with local Jewish communities “has gone from strength to strength over many years”. The resultant relationship has amongst other positive outcomes led to increased confidence in reporting, reassurance for the local community, a strengthening of local policing and design plans to tackle ‘hot locations’ at key times. The relationship has also helped GMP to adapt its response “to meet the religious observance needs of its community.”

134 PSNI Written Submission
135 Gateshead Council Written Submission
136 Greater Manchester Police Written Submission
needs of those affected by hate crime”. So effective has the relationship been, that student officers have spent time training with the CST to ensure they are well briefed before being deployed and joint patrols have taken place.

102. We were told that whilst many incidents reported to them do not constitute a crime, such incidents are investigated in the same way and “intrusively managed by local supervision and neighbourhood staff”. In Salford, a project is underway in which the police, local authority, Jewish community and others are looking at ways to increase awareness and reporting from the Jewish community. At a corporate level, GMP and the CST meet every two months to share hate incident and hate crime data to build an effective picture of local offending. Whilst reported incidents have increased, so too has confidence to report.

103. We were informed that in May 2010 the Greater Manchester Police “piloted a Restorative Justice programme in Salford which gave victims an opportunity to meet and communicate with offenders on their terms”137. This approach allowed victims to explain the real impact of the incident or crime and gave offenders the opportunity to apologise for their action. We were told that the initiative which has been supported by the CST has led to “a number of very positive outcomes” and that the victims were said to have claimed the outcome to be both “constructive and productive”. This includes incidents that have occurred over social media.

104. At the time this report went to print, a wider trial of ‘Out of Court Disposals’ was ongoing in four areas and set to continue beyond the 2015 General Election. Of course, a balance must be sought in relation to restorative justice programmes as they can allow for systems to be ‘gamed’. Given the required strict pursuit of hate crime, it is possible that some might see restorative justice as a method for avoiding a CPS decision on progressing a hate crime to court. Whilst avoiding court can be positive in the right circumstances, it is imperative that the right person is making decisions about the progress of a case. It is equally important that victims never feel like a crime perpetrated against them has in some way been downgraded, the response to racist hate crime weakened or a restorative justice resolution imposed upon them. This is no accusation of impropriety though and GMP's efforts were generally perceived to be impressive according to the submissions we received from members of the Manchester Jewish community.

105. As we have sought to indicate throughout this chapter, there is a significant degree of work being undertaken to combat antisemitism in the UK by government, parliament, legal authorities and organisations and individuals across civil society. The success of the all-party approach is clear and has resulted in successive governments seeking to continue to implement and improve frameworks for tackling discrimination. However, in some cases public bodies have rested easy and need re-energising and re-focussing. In light of the last All-Party Report, it is clear Britain’s standards and approaches to fighting antisemitism have improved manifold but in order to continue to be a world leader we must regularly review our procedures.

137 Salford Community Safety Partnership Written Submission
106. We recommend that government continue to report at least once per session to parliament about its work on antisemitism and commits to continuation of the world-renowned Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism.

107. It was disappointing that in the submissions we read from individuals in the Jewish community and from the feedback we received at the town hall meetings we ran, that so little was known about the extent of work carried out to tackle antisemitism by government, parliament and civic society and the progress that has been made. This may have served to reassure the concerned public and certainly needs addressing.

108. We recommend that government together with the CPS, police and other relevant bodies work with the Jewish community to devise a communications strategy which effectively conveys the work that has been undertaken to combat antisemitism.

109. Whilst there is a great deal being done to combat antisemitism, during the summer the situation in Britain deteriorated to a certain extent. The work that we have outlined will no doubt have contributed to our country not suffering as badly as others in Europe but none the less, the increase in antisemitism inspired this report and our analysis of what happened and recommendations for action now follow.
3. EVALUATION OF THE INCIDENTS AND THE RESPONSES

3.1 The Events of July/August 2014
3.2 Incident Figures and Sources
3.3 Nature of Incidents
3.3.1 Assaults, Daubing and Abuse
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3. Evaluation of the Incidents and the Responses

3.1 The Events of July/August 2014

110. Between June and August 2014, there was a significant increase in tension, hostility and ultimately violence in the Middle East between Israel, Hamas and other militants in Gaza and southern Israel.

111. In early June, three Israeli boys were kidnapped and found dead nearly three weeks later. Following retaliatory Israeli attacks on Hamas and an escalation of rocket fire from Gaza, on 8 July Israel launched Operation Protective Edge. Notably in mid-July four Palestinian children were killed on a beach in Gaza and the fighting intensified exponentially throughout the following weeks. Whilst there were temporary truces on the 5 and 10 August, the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire was only brought into effect on 26 August after 50 days of conflict.

112. According to its evidence, since the year 2000 Community Security Trust records demonstrate that ‘critical incidents’ usually involving conflict in the Middle East, act as triggers for antisemitic incidents in the UK and the summer 2014 war between Israel and Gaza “confirmed and accentuated this pattern”. In the period before our report was instigated, the CST announced that either through the targeting of British Jews or through the use of antisemitic language and imagery, antisemitism had increased significantly. Police figures support this assertion.

3.2 Incident Figures and Sources

113. As has already been recorded, our national approach to developing and recording hate crime data has improved since the 2006 All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism and police figures on antisemitism are closely correlated to the CST’s both of whom observe a pattern of an increase in reported crimes during periods of conflict in the Middle East.

114. According to the Association of Chief Police Officers in July 2014, there was an increase in reported antisemitic hate crimes by UK police forces. Compared to July 2013, there were 64 more antisemitic hate crimes in July 2014 (an increase of 221%). ACPO told us that “whilst antisemitic Hate Crime increased, Race Hate Crime overall did not” and that “social media was increasingly a platform for antisemitic rhetoric”.

115. The CST reported to us that it recorded 314 antisemitic incidents during July 2014, its highest-ever monthly total. A further 227 incidents were recorded for the month of August, constituting the third-highest monthly total with the intermediate figure relating to another

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138 CST Written evidence
140 ACPO Written Submission
spike in Middle East tensions in 2009. The CST told us that its total for July surpasses the number of reported incidents for the whole of the preceding six months and the combined figures for July and August of 2014 surpass the annual total for 2013, of 533 incidents. The CST informed us that of the July-August 2014 incidents that were recorded, just under half involved a direct reference to the war, and a third used Holocaust-related language or imagery whilst 25% occurred on social media. These figures are shocking and a cause for great concern.

116. We were told that in a third of the reported incidents during July and August, the CST obtained a description of the offender. Half of that number were described as being of South Asian appearance, 34% as White, 12% as Arab or North African, and 5% as Black. From January-June 2014, 64% of perpetrators were described as white, 27% as South Asian and 4% as Arab. This too is a worrying development as the perpetrator profile is inverse to expected norms outside times of conflict in the Middle East.

117. We were informed that Police Scotland rely on the National Safer Communities Department to collate all hate crimes and incidents on a daily basis. Between Friday 20 June 2014 and Friday 3 October 2014 there were 47 reported incidents, with the majority having occurred in Glasgow and Edinburgh and many occurring on social media.

118. As has already been stated, the Welsh Government informed us that there were very few antisemitic hate crimes or incidents reported across Wales with only a single incident in 2014-15 reported to the National Hate Crime Report and Support Centre. Whilst in Northern Ireland, the window of the synagogue was broken and the Rabbi was harassed about the situation in Gaza according to the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

119. In London, a report published by the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) showed that racist and religious hate crime offences were the largest of all hate crime categories with some 890 offences per month in the year to September 2014 subject to relevant caveats. Faith hate crime – and in London where specifically antisemitic and anti-Muslim faith hate data is collected – is on the rise and a record number of offences was recorded in July 2014, “95% of which were antisemitic incidents following the conflict in Gaza”.

120. According to the MOPAC report, “of those individuals where the MPS initiated proceedings for offences with a hate crime element in the past year 80% were males, almost 30% were aged between 20 and 29 and 45% were white British. This corresponds with national hate crime offender profiles”.

141 ibid
142 SCoJeC Written Correspondence
143 Welsh Government Written Submission
121. In its evidence, the Metropolitan Police provided graphs representing antisemitic incidents and offences which numbered some 400 for 2014. This was a spike comparable only to 2009 during which year there had also been an increase in hostilities in the Middle East. In a comparative graph submitted to us detailing antisemitic crimes and incidents between April and November 2013 and 2014, it was clear to see that there had been a huge spike in figures for July and August 2014 and that this was not a normal state of affairs. It was interesting to note that the greatest number of incidents and offences had been recorded in Barnet (140) and Hackney (92), areas in which Jews are most prominently visible in London. This underlines the important of the Jewish neighbourhood policing group, ‘Shomrim’, established to assist the Metropolitan Police in reducing crime and openly praised by the police and others for their work.

122. The Greater Manchester Police meanwhile told us that 135 antisemitic hate crimes had been recorded in 2014 compared to 78 recorded in 2013 and this was said to have been a ‘significant increase’ for 2014. When combining incidents and crimes, this number rises to 217 although as previously noted the proportion of incidents to crimes has increased. We were told that reports of hate crimes and incidents were received during the summer from areas that were not usually considered to be of concern. Manchester City Council told us that during July 2014 there was a five-fold increase in hate crimes and a three-fold increase in August. For the same months, the majority of the crimes recorded were Public Order offences, which numbered 41. We were told that most of the North Manchester offences were linked to demonstrations about the conflict. Other ‘hate incidents’ which were recorded as such because the victim did not consider the occurrence to constitute a public order offence were said to relate to chants and insults from protestors at those demonstrations.

123. When giving oral evidence to us, Professor Paul Iganski of Lancaster University offered a note of caution when taking antisemitic incident statistics at face value. He argued that at times of heightened tensions in the Middle East, together with any increase in incidents is a greater awareness and thus more reporting. However in addition, he referred to work done by his students in which it was found that many visibly Jewish people don’t report abuse. He said the students calculated four times as many incidents as the CST reported in a year from a group of just 50 Jewish people.

124. We were pleased with the level of detail the police can now provide about antisemitism. It was however a matter of serious concern to us that details of the numbers of charges, prosecutions and convictions relating to antisemitism were not readily available from the CPS (although we know the CST has some excellent data) and we address this matter later in the chapter.

145 Jewish News, 2014, On patrol with the crime-busting Stamford Hill Shomrim, available at:  
http://www.jewishnews.co.uk/patrol-crime-busting-stamford-hill-shomrim/

146 Paul Iganski Oral Evidence
3.3 The Nature of Incidents

125. The nature of the incidents that took place over the summer was varied but touched many aspects of British life. Some of the incidents that took place were straightforward anti-Jewish prejudice and others require deeper analysis to fully understand and appreciate. It is important to recall when undertaking this analysis the aforementioned perceptions of the Jewish community in relation to the conflict and the context in which certain incidents occurred. Our recommendations for addressing these incidents and other related matters are contained in the subsequent section.

3.3.1 Assaults, Daubing and Abuse

126. The most straightforward, shocking and condemnable incidents of antisemitism relate to assaults and abuse of Jewish people and communal property. Any such attack is an affront to our British values of tolerance and respect and an anathema to our wonderfully rich and diverse society.

127. The CST provided us with a more detailed breakdown of the incident figures it collected\(^\text{147}\). Looking in a more forensic way into the CST figures for July and August, we saw that 29 violent antisemitic assaults were recorded (with thankfully none having been categorised as ‘Extreme Violence’ or resulting in serious injury). There were 31 incidents of damage & desecration of Jewish property; 415 incidents of abusive behaviour, which includes verbal abuse, antisemitic graffiti, antisemitic abuse via social media and distribution of hate mail; 47 direct antisemitic threats; and as noted, some 25% of the incidents had taken place on social media.

128. Details of the various incidents were shared with us and these included:

- The daubing of a swastika on the front door of a Jewish home in North West London
- Abuse of a rabbi by a group of youths whilst walking in North London including chants of “Free Palestine” and “F*** the Jews”
- Two attacks on the Somerton Road synagogue in Belfast
- Shouts of “baby murderers” at congregants attending synagogue in Liverpool, a sign displaying “child murderers” being fixed to the synagogue door in Kingston and a brick thrown through the window of the synagogue in Belfast
- Flowers with a card naming three children killed in Gaza, being left outside a prominent Jewish centre in North West London, deliberately in time for Jewish schoolchildren being collected from a summer scheme to see them. Police told people that there had been several similar incidents in the local area

\(^\text{147}\) CST Written Submission
• The hospitalisation of a rabbi who was beaten by four teens in an unprovoked attack in Gateshead. Northumbria Police were investigating a racist tweet in connection with the incident which showed a picture of what was described as a Jewish primary school accompanied by the message: “This Jewish school in Gateshead cheered when the bombs fell in Palestine”

• Verbal abuse of a couple in Bradford in person and on a loudhailer when they politely declined to donate to a roadside collection for Gaza when driving through the town

• An attack on a visibly Jewish boy cycling in North London, who had a stone thrown at his head by a woman veiled in a niqab

• A Nazi salute given to a visibly Orthodox Jewish individual whilst he was in his car at traffic lights in Glasgow

• A man at a party being asked “so, you like killing Palestinian children?” when taking off his hat to reveal a kippah [skullcap]

• Emails sent to a Jewish organisation entitled “murder” and ending “we see why he did it”.

129. According to the CST figures, just under half of the incidents (257 of the 541) reported in July and August involved direct reference to the conflict between Israel. At the time this report went to print, CST’s figures were still interim and numbers may change slightly in its final incidents report.

3.3.2 Political Protests and Demonstrations

130. Rallying for a political cause is not only a well-established and important tradition in British politics, it is a fundamental expression of political freedom and an inalienable right for British citizens. In the report we commissioned to aid our deliberations, Dr Ben Gidley reviewed the protests activities of the summer and themes in the related discourse. He explained that UK activism against Israel’s actions was heterogeneous, as with most protests and political social movements. Amongst other activities there were weekly marches, by typically a coalition of organisations, to or from the Israeli embassy and pickets outside the British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA). Barclays, Marks and Spencer and other places148.

131. We were pleased to learn that the protests that occurred during the summer of 2014, were in broad terms less violent and led to fewer public order incidents than the protests of 2009149. So too, greater efforts were said to have been made to minimise antisemitism and in analysing the images of demonstrations, we were told that researchers found the majority of messages not to be antisemitic150. However, we were concerned to read in the CST’s evidence that such protests “still included antisemitic sentiment and rhetoric on their fringes” and to

148 Gidley, B., 2015, 50 Days in the Summer
149 CST Written Submission
150 Ibid
have this reiterated in the research by COMPAS. A number of those submitting evidence outlined the nature of antisemitic incidents that were related to political protests. These included:

- Displays of placards evoking the antisemitic blood libel and those that declared ‘Hitler was right’
- Reports of Hitlerian salutes and antisemitic rhetoric by some demonstrators

- An attack on a Jewish woman standing in the doorway of her house whom on telling protestors chanting anti-Israel slogans at her that she wasn’t interested, was encircled by the group. Having pointed at her mezuzah (religious symbol) they shouted “she is one of them, you should all die, you and your children, burn in hell”
- Two attacks including verbal abuse and a mugging by the same gang of protestors in central London on Jewish women, holding banners including “Don’t be a Jew in London”
- Reports that following a pro-Palestinian rally in Manchester which included a “Drive for Justice”, a group of cars passed through a predominantly Jewish neighbourhood and occupants shouted antisemitic phrases including “Heil Hitler” at visibly Jewish pedestrians. Cans and eggs were thrown at Jewish people from some of the cars
- Witness report that on the fringes of a demonstration in Glasgow, a man of South Asian appearance was heard shouting “f**king kill the Jews”.

132. The intensification of the Middle East conflict in July/August 2014 coincided with the build-up to the independence referendum in Scotland. We were told in some cases that Yes campaigners that were also supporters of the Palestinian cause had made connections between the two. For example, a banner was displayed depicting a ‘blood-stained’ Israeli flag, hands dripping with ‘blood’, with a picture of David Cameron and the slogan “End corruption – vote YES”, displayed on a bridge in an area of Glasgow where many Jewish people live. This is a particularly troubling development and was said to make some Jews concerned about life in an independent Scotland.

133. There appeared to be a general acceptance in the evidence we received, that the police response to incidents occurring at rallies and elsewhere was good however there were specific concerns about particular long-running protests such as that outside the ‘Kedem’ store in Manchester, on which we focus in another part of this chapter. CST advised us that police responses whilst generally good can be “inconsistent” and depend somewhat on the “knowledge and determination” of individual officers.

3.3.3 Interruption of Trade and Sale of Kosher Goods

134. Tactics used by some pro-Palestinian campaigners during the summer of 2014 included protesting outside UK stores that sell Israeli and in many cases kosher goods. Britain’s major
Jewish communal organisations issued a statement setting out their concerns about such actions and our attention was drawn specifically to co-ordinated intimidatory campaigns in Northern Ireland. Both the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (Usdaw) spoke out in support of their members against attacks on their safety and livelihood. Critically, whilst some kosher food is produced in Israel, by no means is all of it. It is simply unacceptable that some protests have inhibited the access of observant Jewish people to food produced to meet their religious requirements. It is equally unacceptable that some Jewish people will have had the food they are required to buy covered in political propaganda stickers – such intimidation is abhorrent. There were three incidents which were repeatedly raised with us as matters of specific concern:

**Sainsbury’s:**

135. On 16 August 2014, pro-Palestinian activists tweeted that they had successfully caused four Sainsbury’s branches in Whitechapel, Brixton, Brighton and Birmingham to close and shared pictures of police guarding the Brixton store entrance. Sainsbury’s however, said it was only the Birmingham and Brixton branches that had closed, for 30 minutes, on police advice and they promised that the disturbances would not affect the company’s policy further, claiming they are a non-political organisation. However, on the same day, Sainsbury’s staff removed kosher food from the shelves of a Holborn Central London store. There were reports that a staff member had said the action was because “we support free Gaza” but the store said it was a precaution against possible violence, after news of protests elsewhere. The company subsequently apologised, blamed an “error of judgement” and said that it wanted to reassure Jewish customers that it would never remove kosher products again. Meanwhile products said to be “Israeli” were removed from shelves of a Sainsbury’s in Belfast by protestors.

136. In an earlier protest on August 2 2014, a Labour party MP was part of a peaceful protest that caused a Sainsbury’s store to close in Birmingham. The MP posted a video to YouTube in which that parliamentarian celebrated a loss of nearly five hours of business for Sainbury’s, commenting that this would send a message to Sainsbury’s to stop purchasing goods from

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Israeli settlements. As we set out in another part of this report, it is for public figures to set the tone for a reasoned and moderate approach to addressing the conflict.

Tesco:

137. On 16 August 2014 in Hodge Hill, Birmingham as many as 100 demonstrators protested outside a Tesco store against the stocking of Israeli goods. Some protestors ran into the store and began to throw stock. The store was closed for some minutes before the police attended and the store re-opened. One man was arrested for assaulting a police officer. Protests were also said to have taken place outside Tesco stores in Rochdale, Sale, Luton and Blackburn. Tweets sent following the protest reported that “shoppers and staff alike were frightened”\(^{159}\).

Kedem:

138. Starting on 23 July and lasting throughout the summer, daily protests were held outside the ‘Kedem’ cosmetics shop in Manchester, which sells Israeli goods. Threats of arson attack and racist death threats were received by the shop staff\(^{160}\). Protesters successfully managed to close the shop four times at the end of July and on one occasion over 70 police officers were involved in an effort to contain pro-Palestinian campaigners. One man was reportedly arrested for making a Nazi salute at around 150 pro-Israel supporters\(^{161}\). The protests led to calls for calm from police and council leaders\(^{162}\).

139. There are some fundamental points which must be borne in mind when reviewing what happened over the summer. These relate predominantly to violence and intimidation and to antisemitism. First, any protestors that damage goods and deliberately disrupt lawful activity are committing a crime and should be pursued by police and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. So too, innocent shop staff have nothing to do with the cause in question and must be protected against intimidation by their employers and where necessary by the police.

140. As Professor Feldman stated in the report he produced for us, “Boycott movements become antisemitic when they discriminate against Jews” and in some cases “may constitute unlawful discrimination – against Israelis – even when they are not antisemitic”. Pro-Palestinian campaign organisers and activists have the right to protest against Israel but they must be pro-active in ensuring that in doing so they are not targeting kosher goods and distance themselves fully and vocally from any and all violence. Should they wish to boycott Israeli goods they are well within their right to do so but they must be careful not to interfere with legitimate trading operations which are protected within the law and not to target shop owners based on their national origin which may fall foul of the Equality Act.

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3.3.4 Cultural Boycotts

141. In relation to Jewish and Israeli culture, there were two issues in particular which gave rise to concerns over the summer months and which were raised with us specifically and repeatedly.

The Edinburgh Fringe

142. The Edinburgh Fringe Festival is one of the largest arts festivals in the world and brings together a diverse range of people. In advance of this year’s festival, many noted cultural figures signed an open letter protesting the presence of an Israeli company, the Incubator Theatre, which was to be performing a play entitled ‘The City’ itself “a rap opera written entirely in rhyme”163. A second show named ‘La Karina’ was also targeted164.

143. The decision to boycott was based on a protest against Israel’s actions in Gaza. When members of the public attended the performance they were accosted by protestors and suffered intimidation and abuse. As John Stalker, the promoter of the play described it “a 14-year-old girl was yelled at so loudly and at such close quarters that the transfer of spittle from a protestor was evident”165. The show was closed for logistical reasons related to the policing and noise pollution caused by the protests.

144. The company’s artistic director, Arik Eshet, argued that the government funding his group received did not have strings attached and that such funding was key to all international performers. He also stated that the troop were not political people and intended to sing in the streets for peace166. The Scottish Culture Secretary Fiona Hyslop issued a statement against boycotts167.

The Tricycle Theatre

145. One incident in particular caused shock and tremendous concern for those submitting evidence to us. The Tricycle Theatre, which had supported the UK Jewish Film Festival for some eight years and was to be the main venue for the festival said in the summer that it would not host six galas and 26 screenings because it did not want to be associated with a festival which in turn was associated with the UK’s Israeli embassy168. The Israeli embassy

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168 Guardian, 2014, Tricycle Theatre refuses to host UK Jewish Film Festival while it has Israeli embassy funding, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/stage/2014/aug/05/tricycle-theatre-jewish-film-festival-cancelled-israel-gaza
had been a long-standing sponsor of the festival which organisers said was apolitical and screened films “showcasing perspectives from both sides of the conflict in the Middle East”\textsuperscript{169}.

146. For its part, the Tricycle and in particular its Artistic Director Indhu Rubasingham argued that the theatre still wanted to host the festival and had offered to cover the loss of the contribution from the embassy\textsuperscript{170}.

147. The Secretary of State for Culture, Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP intervened in the matter and labelled the Theatre’s decision “misguided”, noting his concern about the impact of the decision\textsuperscript{171}. A number of funders of the theatre withdrew their support and complaints were lodged with the Charity Commission. In addition some 250 people gathered to protest outside the theatre with signs reading “don’t punish London’s Jews”\textsuperscript{172}. The Jewish community leadership condemned the decision and the theatre later withdrew its objections to the funding arrangements for the festival and the two institutions issued a joint statement citing their intention of working together in 2015\textsuperscript{173}.

148. The decision of the Tricycle Theatre requires serious analysis and interpretation, which we seek to provide in the next chapter and in particular we look to address the suggestion that in acting as it did, the theatre was categorising Jewish people depending on their position on Israel. As regards cultural boycotts in general, Mr Stalker to whom we referred earlier put it rather well when he said in the summer that “The hideous intolerance currently evident in the Middle East between and among communities that have to find a way of living together is unlikely to be eased by intolerance and brute force on the streets of Edinburgh”\textsuperscript{174}. His comments certainly have wider application.

3.3.5. Traditional and Social Media

149. Written evidence submitted to us and oral testimony collected during the regional meetings we held demonstrated there is a great deal of frustration with the reporting of the conflict from amongst the Jewish community and indeed other communities too\textsuperscript{175}.

150. There were only two specific complaints about articles that were raised with us. Other than concerns about a column in the Mirror which we address later in this chapter, our attention

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{169} Variety, 2014, Jewish Film Fest Pulls Screenings from London Theatre in Israeli Funding Clash, available at:
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid
\textsuperscript{171} Telegraph, 2014, Protests and boycotts risk stripping Britains vibrant arts scene, available at:
\textsuperscript{172} Jewish Chronicle, 2014, Tricycle Theatre on thin iceover Jewish film festival boycott, available at:
\textsuperscript{173} Tricycle Theatre, 2014, The Tricycle Theatre and the UK Jewish Film Festival, available at:
http://www.tricycle.co.uk/16748/the-tricycle-theatre-and-the-uk-jewish-film-festival/
\textsuperscript{174} The Stage, 2014, ‘Edinburgh Should Hang Its Head In Shame Over Festival Boycotts’, available at:
http://www.thestage.co.uk/opinion/2014/08/john-stalker-edinburgh-hang-head-shame-israel-boycott-incubator/
\textsuperscript{175} Council of Christians and Jews Written Submission
\end{flushleft}
was directed to an article in the Lancet Medical Journal. On 23 July 2014, the Lancet published an open letter about the conflict signed by a number of physicians and its website reportedly facilitated a supporter list for the letter. It later came to light that two of the letter’s authors had been involved in an exchange of emails featuring virulently antisemitic material. Subsequently, the editor-in-chief of the Lancet, Dr Richard Horton at a conference in Israel, spoke of his “deep regret” for “unnecessary polarisation” caused by the letter and condemned the antisemitic content shared by email. Regardless of the intentions of the letter’s authors or indeed the journal, this incident highlights some broader learning points which we highlight in the next section.

151. Despite only two articles having been highlighted as problematic, there was an overwhelming consensus amongst those that submitted evidence or gave personal testimony at the regional meetings we held, that the media, and in particular the BBC, had a role to play in whipping up anger through emotive content in the news and analysis that was broadcast. There was certainly a significant focus on the conflict. Using various analytical tools, Dr Ben Gidley found that there had been particularly intense coverage of protests and demonstrations against Israel and the conflict in general when compared to other countries and conflicts. He argued that the excessive focus on Israel in the media allows for inappropriate language to be used, although we discuss this in a later section. The anger about media coverage was somewhat personified for many of the complainants by way of Jon Snow, the Channel 4 newsreader whom made a very personal video about the plight of the children of Gaza that was posted initially to YouTube and then the Channel 4 website.

152. The expansion of social media has been a significant change since the 2006 All-Party Report into Antisemitism. As late as 2011, only 12 of 609 antisemitic incidents recorded by CST were from social media whereas in July and August 2014 it was 130 out of 541 incidents.

153. Social media was raised more often than traditional media as a cause for concern during the conflict by those we spoke to. This was not particular to the UK but a global issue as the next chapter will explore in greater detail. The fear expressed to us was that unless a crime was committed (and sometimes even then), little could be done as regards monitoring or regulating such content.

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176 NGO Monitor Written Submission
179 Gidley, B., 2015, 50 Days in the summer
181 CST Written Submission
154. Of major concern was the worldwide trend of the term ‘Hitler Was Right’ as a ‘hashtag’ during July and also the terms ‘Hitler Did Nothing Wrong’ and ‘Kill the Jews’ on Twitter but other incidents occurred and a number of them were shared with us, these included:

- Tweets that read (sic): “The Jews now are worse than they were in Hitler’s time no wonder he wanted to get rid, right idea!!”, “If anyone still believes jews have a “right” to exist on this planet, you are a f***** moron” and “Somhow bring back Hitler.. Just for once to finish off the job he startd & show the Muslim world how to do it”
- Pictures shared on Twitter of individuals with waxworks of Hitler and accompanying antisemitic messages
- Antisemitic imagery such as that sent to Luciana Berger MP (for which the perpetrator was later prosecuted)
- An antisemitic trope about Jewish control of politicians referenced by a BBC journalist
- The presence of Hitlerian themes and imagery on Facebook comment chains for pro-Palestinian demonstrations, organised by groups such as Palestine Solidarity Campaign, Stop the War Coalition and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.

155. During an oral evidence session, it was put to us by Dr Ben Gidley, that there was a circulation of discourse across ideological lines. He expanded on this phenomenon in his paper for us, suggesting that since 2000 there has been bi-directional “cross pollination” between different ideological traditions around hostility towards Israel. In this scenario, messages from far-right and other extremist groups were circulated outside of their original context whilst far-right antisemitic movements “borrow the language of anti-Zionism as a cover for their racism” allowing for a wide distribution of hate material. Gidley points to the blood libel and ‘Jewish lobby’ being key antisemitic themes that can circulate and provides examples of where this has happened both online and subsequently at demonstrations. Whilst accepting that most of the messages shared are done so in good faith and without antisemitic intent, Gidley warns that this material can legitimise and normalise antisemitic discourse, reinforce and draw people to more ideological antisemitism. We make recommendation about antisemitic language in a later chapter.

156. Despite the various anecdotal reports of an increase in antisemitic activity on social media, there was little in-depth analysis. We commissioned Professor Paul Iganski of Lancaster University to carry out what to our knowledge, is a unique piece of research which provides valuable and important early indications of trends that occurred during the summer.

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182 Ibid
183 Ben Gidley Oral Evidence
184 Gidley, B., 2015, 50 Days in the Summer
Using the Datasift\(^{186}\) tool which allows access to historic twitter data, the team from the ESRC Centre for Corpus Approaches to Social Science at Lancaster analysed tweets in English that were sent in July (which may have originated from anywhere in the world) and August. They specifically focussed on mention of the words ‘Israel’ and ‘Gaza’ allowing for the fact that some tweets about the conflict may not have used those terms. Their data set for July comprised of 22 million tweets. These were segregated into two different groups according to keywords, with one group focussing on use of the word Jew(s) and the other on Muslim(s). A more specific search in August provided tens of thousands of tweets. Whilst accepting that the available data would not capture everything that happened, the researchers contested that there was a sufficient volume of material to perform robust analysis and highlight emerging albeit inconclusive patterns.

Some of the trends established were perhaps to be expected. The team found that there were “notable variations in the number of tweets daily” for ‘Muslim’ and ‘Jew’ respectively during July and August and that the trends broadly followed the timeline of conflict. Tweets relating to Jews escalated after the beginning of conflict, piquing on 13 July and not decreasing significantly until Israel started withdrawing its troops from Gaza. Tweets in relation to Muslims follow the same conflict timeline but there were said to be more notable peaks on certain days. These appear to relate to advocacy messages and calls for peace on Eid al-Fitr respectively.

Using keyword searches and techniques to identify the collocation of words, the team were able to further analyse the Twitter discourse to identify negative or positive associations with the terms in question. The keyword analysis allowed “isolation of the most salient words” used in relation to the groupings they examined. Looking at top 35 key words relating to Jews, it is notable ‘Nazi’, ‘Hitler’, ‘Holocaust’ and ‘Nazis’ all feature. The research also reviewed the Twitter hashtags (referred to as ‘user-defined keywords’) and amongst other terms, ‘Hitler’ and ‘genocide’ feature with “high frequency”. This then serves to support the concerns underlined in anecdotal reports. In addition, there was generally more hostile or accusatory sentiment amongst the top 35 key words for Jews when compared to those for Muslims which indicated more supportive or sympathetic themes.

The sub-sample of research we saw identified some 200 tweets when searching invective in collocated terms on Twitter. Some were anti-Jewish, some wished violence upon Jews and only a single tweet directly incited violence. The largest category in relation to invectives, again, was Nazi references although there were mentions of gas chambers and invocation of the blood libel. The team were able to draw out and illuminate some of these key themes rather than to quantify the levels of abuse. Estimates of the prevalence of antisemitism on Twitter were not possible in the rapid response provided to us and further research is required. In addition, it was not possible in the time available to identify similar trends on Facebook but such a research project is technically feasible.

161. The importance of this research should not be underestimated. It helps identify some of the themes in discourse and with time could help to detect patterns of antisemitism and therefore to better direct resources to combat it. We make recommendations about antisemitic discourse in the final chapter and recommendations about response to cyber hate in another part of this chapter.

162. **We recommend that further research be carried out into the sources, patterns, nature and reach of the antisemitism on social media.** Such learning can help to identify the most appropriate responses and effective deployment of resources to combat hate online.

163. We have seen that Jewish individuals and organisations were singled out and targeted for antisemitic abuse on social media. The volume of communication is too vast to describe in detail but suffice to say we were all shocked by the ferocity and vulgarity of the antisemitism and the ease with which it was spread.

### 3.3.6 The Example Set by Public Figures

164. It became clear when reviewing the evidence submitted by members of the Jewish community, that they had been particularly effected and unsettled by the statements of public figures, specifically parliamentarians, which in some cases were conceived as exacerbating intolerance or abuse and distrust of others. The fear articulated to us was that such comments other than being problematic in of themselves, allow space for those with the most extreme views to enter public discourse and further polarise an already highly emotive topic of debate. Some of the most high profile comments that were recorded during the period, which may not have been antisemitic but were certainly incendiary in tone, are reviewed in the paragraphs that follow. We explore the language in question in another section.

165. Using the medium of Twitter, one Liberal Democrat MP declared that “The big question is - if I lived in #Gaza would I fire a rocket? - probably yes”, before adding: “Ich bin ein #palestinian - the West must make up its mind - which side is it on?”187 These comments were reported to the police188 but no action was taken. The MP later issued an apology stating that he did not condone the firing of rockets into Israel189. The same MP had previously been the centre of controversy for comments he made on his website in which he referred to ‘the Jews’ and made reference to the Holocaust in relation to the Middle East conflict190. In October, he was again called into question for a tweet that said “After Commons Palestine vote what next? Need to expose Pro-Israel control of MPs against recognition”191. The MP was sanctioned by


190 BBC, 2013, MP David Ward has Lib Dem whip removed over Israel comment, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23361380

the party for the comments on his website but not for the tweets in question. His comments were criticised by MPs from his own party and others on Twitter and elsewhere.192 Separately, a Liberal Democrat peer suggested that the Israel lobby is “particularly dangerous” and is “the thing that dare not speak its name.”193

166. In August, another MP of a different party declared his constituency “an Israel-free zone”. He said: “We don’t want any Israeli goods; we don’t want any Israeli services; we don’t want any Israeli academics coming to the university or the college; we don’t even want any Israeli tourists to come to Bradford, even if any of them had thought of doing so.” He was interviewed by police under caution after claims that he had incited racial hatred.194 The Crown Prosecution Service cited a lack of sufficient evidence in progressing the case which it logged as a “hate incident”.195 The MP later repeated the comments and argued he had been the victim of a targeted campaign.196 The leader of the local council exclaimed that both the MP and the Israeli ambassador in his response to the incident had been inflaming tensions between communities; and it was said that Jewish constituents had raised concerns at an increase in verbal abuse.197

167. Writing in his Sunday Mirror column, one former Labour Minister compared Gaza to a concentration camp before continuing “What happened to the Jewish people at the hands of the Nazis is appalling. But you would think those atrocities would give Israelis a unique sense of perspective and empathy with the victims of a ghetto.”198 His comments were roundly condemned by members of all parties, including by a DCLG Minister in the House of Lords199 and the Board of Deputies complained to Labour party officials.200 This was not the first time such a connection had been made, one Labour MP made similar comments in February 2014 and later apologised for them.201 Another Labour MP, unreservedly apologised to a Jewish News reporter for a tweet in which he wrote to the reporter: “You’ve lost any sense of humanity & justice. You’re killing children.”202

202 Labour MP sorry for accusing Jewish News journalist of ‘killing Gazan children’, available at: http://www.jewishnews.co.uk/gra...
168. Following the cessation of violence, a former Conservative Minister gave a speech followed by a radio interview about foreign policy. In the former, he said that antisemitism “should be crushed in all its forms” but in the latter, when speaking about Israeli settlements and responding to a question about the UK Government using language like his, he suggested that the government should diverge from the United States which is “very much in hoc” to a “very powerful financial lobby which dominates its politics”. He did not specify further about the lobby but it led the CST to conclude that “for many it will echo the hoary old Jewish conspiracy.” During a debate on recognition of Palestine sometime after the summer, a Conservative MP said in the House of Commons that the “well-funded and powerful Jewish lobby” in the United States is a “huge problem” despite criticisms the MP stood by his comments. Concerns were also registered about comments made by a Conservative Baroness during her resignation in which, in the context of criticising the government’s stance on Gaza, she stated that “...the national interest should never be subject to the chequebooks of anybody.” This is an ambiguous reference and an inference that government policy could run contrary to the nation’s real interests is certainly controversial.

169. In the House of Lords, a cross bench peer’s comments that “much antisemitism is a reaction to the appalling Israeli treatment of its Arab neighbours” were roundly condemned by others attending the debate.

170. Of course, the comments outlined in these paragraphs come from members of all parties and none. We have outlined in an earlier chapter, how acutely painful reference to the Holocaust can be for the Jewish community, who of course have a diversity of opinions about the Gaza conflict. No doubt the Jewish community will be united in its condemnation of references to the ‘Jewish lobby’. There is indeed an Israel lobby in the UK as there are lobbying groups established in support of many other countries and causes. To suggest that the Israel lobby is a solely Jewish effort and has undue influence is to adopt a classic antisemitic trope and should be avoided at all costs. We make recommendations about language in the final chapter of this report.

171. We have outlined that across various aspects of public and private life, antisemitism was evident, whether intended or not. Some activities were undertaken during the summer to seek to stem the rising tide of anti-Jewish hatred. In other cases, more could have been done. The next section looks at both what happened and what we believe could and should have happened.

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203 RUSI, 2014, Middle East Peace, the Principles Behind the Process, available at: https://www.rusi.org/events/ref:5409871BCC20A#.VKhfp714gKA
204 CST, 2014, Alan Duncan MP opposes antisemitism and “a very powerful financial lobby” available at: http://blog.thecst.org.uk/?m=201410
205 Ibid
3.4 Addressing the Incidents

3.4.1 Legal and Policing Responses

172. We were told by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) that through “standard UK force reporting processes and consultation with the Community Security Trust, the rise in antisemitic crime was anticipated and identified rapidly”. Subsequently ACPO shared the relevant information with all UK forces and relevant government departments “through the dissemination of products produced by the National Community Tension Team”. Community tensions and incidents were “monitored and assessed weekly” and Community Security Trust reports helped inform each assessment. In addition “exception reporting” was received daily and “where appropriate escalated through established reporting practices”.

173. In addition to the relevant operational levers being pulled, we were told that “UK forces were required to submit an overview of all antisemitic crimes which occurred during the conflict period” this helped to inform both the Hate Crime Working group and national policing leaders. The combined reports provided an accurate picture of incidents reported to police and as we have noted, this represented a significant increase but was according to ACPO “not reflective of the reported increase in offences portrayed in the wider mainstream media”. We note that in the days before this report was published, the national policing lead for counter-terrorism publicly stated that a security review was being carried out in the UK and that additional patrols would be in place in the aftermath of attacks on Jews and others in France. It is reassuring to see this type of considered response from national police leaders.

174. ACPO explained to us that the analytical products they use “allow police and partner agencies to consider an informed risk assessment and to direct local activity to reduce crime and engage with communities”. In addition they “allow for national strategic managers to have an oversight of crime trends to offer appropriate support and to develop national policy”.

175. As we have outlined, Police Scotland relied on the National Safer Communities Department to collate all hate crimes and incidents on a daily basis during the summer months as they do at other times. Although many incidents did not satisfy the threshold required to be recorded as a crime. We have been informed that by October there had been nine arrests and 30 people had been reported to the Crown for prosecution. In addition to standard policing efforts, divisional ‘Single Points of Contact’ (SPOCs) were briefed appropriately and a National Community Impact Assessment had been compiled by the National Safer Communities Department to capture all incidents reported to Police Scotland.

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210 ACPO Written Evidence
211 Ibid
213 Ibid
214 Police Scotland Written Submission
The Scottish Government told us that it was aware that Police Scotland had been actively engaging with the Jewish community and the community told us that it had arranged for senior officers from the Safer Communities Department to meet leaders of local communities, listen to their concerns and discuss practical measures for reassuring those feeling most vulnerable. The community reported that Police Scotland and the Crown Office had been very supportive, had encouraged reporting and reassured members of the Jewish community that all reports would be followed up to their fullest extent. In addition, the Chief Constable had issued a strong statement.

In summary, the Scottish policing response appears to have been good and well regarded by those it sought to safeguard. Concerns were raised with us by the community about the absence of a comprehensive security plan for protecting the community before, during, and after religious services and other communal events. At present, the Glasgow Jewish community leads on this for its own community in consultation with the police and CST but there is little else in place.

A further concern for the community, given funding for security of Jewish schools in the state sector is a devolved matter, is that the Jewish school in Glasgow does not receive public funding for security. It is not for us to make a formal recommendation about devolved matters but the events of the summer show Scotland is by no means immune to antisemitism.

Apart from what we were told by ACPO, the Metropolitan Police Service also put out a number of press statements which sought to reassure the Jewish community and others that action was being taken against the perpetrators of hate crime and was said to be core to the way the MPS polices London. Additionally, when questioned by the London Assembly, Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick explained that counter-terrorism officers were working with borough commanders and local officers to treat all incidents with the appropriate seriousness. She explained that “every meeting about the security plan also talks about how we need to bear down on every crime, investigate it well, give people good advice, and work through our communities to try to prevent these things happening; and be very alert to any increase in tension. We look at that on literally a daily basis.” It was noted that, for example, the London Borough of Barnet Commander had “amended the deployment patterns to reflect when people are likely to be in a particular place.”

In Northern Ireland, the local inspector attended the synagogue and the home of the rabbi that were the subject of antisemitic attacks. In addition, local Neighbourhood Policing Team
officers have continued to work with the community providing reassurance and giving briefings at communal events.

181. In Gateshead, Operations Alleviate and Stride were developed during the summer period to address increased tensions and racial assaults. We were told that “both operations involved high visibility policing patrols, optimal static points in Bensham (where the largest proportion of Jewish Community reside), static points during the Sabbath to improve reporting and key engagement messages”. These operations were discussed at the local multi-agency Neighbourhood Tasking Groups and all community tensions and potential hate-related incidents were closely monitored220.

182. In Manchester, most of the incidents and crimes that were recorded related to criminal damage and public order offences221. We know from the data shared with us, that for example, Hitler salutes given during protests had been recorded at least in some cases. The police launched ‘Operation Chromite’ specifically to address the protests at the Kedem store in the city centre which reportedly included a community impact assessment and has been reviewed222. On other matters, such as the desecration of a Jewish cemetery, the police put out strong statements, appealed for information and worked with communities to secure arrests223.

183. For Salford, we were informed that many of the offences committed were by individuals travelling to and from protests in Manchester city centre. The police and CST attended an extraordinary meeting called by the local Orthodox Jewish Forum to give assurances to the community. The police were also said by the partnership to have made “positive policing responses”. These included increased high visibility patrols in some cases with the CST. Incidents were said to be investigated in the same manner as hate crime and “intrusively managed” by local supervision and neighbourhood staff. More broadly, the emphasis on not just Jewish communal but public reporting of antisemitism in recent years is said to have yielded benefits. We have already noted the generally good perception of Greater Manchester Police amongst those that submitted evidence to us and have outlined the issues relating to the Kedem shop protests which we address separately in this section.

184. The Community Security Trust said it was “satisfied that police are serious in their approach to tackling antisemitism, particularly where CST has strong relationships with local forces”. This is borne out through the evidence we have received. However CST warned that “police responses can be inconsistent and dependent on the knowledge and determination of individual officers”. Judging by the evidence submitted to us, this was specifically the case in relation to protests and demonstrations held during the summer.

220 Gateshead Council Written Submission
221 City of Manchester Partnership Written Submission
185. As we set out in an earlier section, the large demonstrations of July and August 2014 did not feature the violent intensity of those that took place in January 2009, however there was still antisemitic rhetoric and sentiment expressed on their fringes through placards or speech.

186. We know that the protests outside the Kedem shop in Manchester were heavily policed and that in one case, 70 police officers were required to control protestors. Police also attended other protests at supermarkets and at the Edinburgh Fringe. There were arrests which we have detailed and standard police briefing and preparation procedures were in place some of which we have described.

187. ACPO gave us further details about the management of public order events. These are “managed by an operational commander who has access to relevant processed intelligence, risk assessments and specialist tactical advice”. We were told that in cases where a risk of antisemitic crime has been identified, commanders “will maintain a close working relationship with the CST to ensure community concerns are addressed and officers have the most informed knowledge”. We were informed that the role of the Public Order Commanders is “to deliver the strategic operational objectives which would always include ensuring public safety, facilitating free speech and protecting people from harm”.

188. Whilst we expect all hate crime to be aggressively pursued, we reject the proposal put to us by some groups that a ‘zero tolerance policy’ would be feasible or welcome for policing. This may be a useful mantra for some but it does not accurately describe police activity. We expect there to be parity of approach for all hate crime and the suggestion that police employ a different tactic for antisemitism would not work and may even exacerbate some of the problems that exist. As ACPO explained to us, the relevant commanders have training and available resources to help inform their decisions. That guidance “indicates that the police believe it would not be appropriate to dictate in advance when arrests should be made as operational managers need to balance competing demands and operational strategies”. Transgressions of public order are subject to well-informed judgements of skilled officers and there is due process in place. If there are failures of that process they should be addressed on a case-by-case basis but a wholesale change in tactics would not be sensible. There are however improvements that could be made to ensure individual officers are better prepared and informed to police demonstrations and that public confidence is improved.

189. We have discussed the approach to political protests at length with police and leading policy officials. The response to any public order (and indeed other) offence should of course be proportionate, legal, accountable and necessary in line with official guidance. As Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP outlined in his letter to us, in some cases police may avoid arrests for operational reasons but use the opportunity to deploy evidence gathering teams that can enable subsequent arrests and prosecutions. This was demonstrably the case during Operation Ute, which followed the violent protests targeting Israeli and perceived Jewish targets in 2009. In that case, many protestors were charged with violent disorder and other
public order offences months later. This was reportedly reassuring to the Jewish community. The CST noted that, some of those prosecuted have recently been killed whilst fighting in the Syria/Iraq arena\textsuperscript{225}. There is certainly work to be done to provide a similar reassurance following the most recent round of protests.

190. Some of the major concerns expressed to us have related to public order offences and perceptions of inaction. A number of those submitting evidence were troubled by the flying of Hizbollah, Hamas and other jihadist group flags at the summer’s protests. There were also banners and placards equating Israel with Nazi Germany and those which were imbued with antisemitic conspiracy theories which were said to have been paraded without police interruption. We were pleased to note that in his response to Andrew Dismore AM, Mayor Boris Johnson was resolute about the display of certain flags being unacceptable and was willing to investigate failure to arrest perpetrators\textsuperscript{226}.

191. The law forbidding the display of articles which arouse reasonable suspicion that someone is a member of supporter of a proscribed organisation is clear\textsuperscript{227} and the list of banned organisations regularly updated\textsuperscript{228}. Trying to ascertain what flags are being flown or placards displayed at a protest, particularly in the event of a foreign language being used is not just a British but an international concern. It was certainly the case in Germany that the authorities had trouble reading, in particular, some of the Arabic being displayed on various signs and are improving their systems to ensure translators or officers that can read the language will be available for further such protests. In Holland, they planned to and indeed used interpreters at public events where speeches and chants were monitored. In the UK, there is an existing database of flags and symbols to which police can refer but those that we spoke to were not fully confident that the database was current.

192. It is critically important that police are as well prepared as they can be for policing protests like those that took place during the summer. Knowledge of flags and symbols is one preparatory factor but it is equally important, especially where officers from other divisions and regions have been drafted in, that they have a good knowledge of the subject area. Where frustrations did occur with lack of action, it is possible that individual officers were not fully briefed. So too, we have set out in another section some of the learning that we have taken from other countries. One of the natural conclusions from our visits is that expanding and improving the meetings between protest organisers, antisemitism (or indeed other hate crime) experts and the police might yield pre-emptive benefits in situations where hate incidents or crimes may occur. Such meetings would help organisers to better brief their stewards and web

\textsuperscript{225} CST Oral Evidence

\textsuperscript{226} London Assembly, 17 September 2004, Questions to the Mayor, available at: http://www.london.gov.uk/moderngov/documents/b10926/Minutes%20-%20Appendix%20-%20Transcript%20of%20Question%20Answer%20Session%20%20with%20Mayor%20Wednesday%2017-Sep-%202014.pdf?F=\textsuperscript{T=9}


moderators and serve as an opportunity for police to highlight concerns that have arisen at previous events, such as the abuse of shop workers.

193. We recommend that police and Home Office officials work with experts on a pan-European basis to annually review and update the existing index of flags and symbols.

194. We recommend that expert organisations like the CST, Hope not Hate, Shomrim and Tell Mama be invited to attend police briefings ahead of relevant protests to ensure that individual officers have a firm understanding of relevant concerns and to distribute briefing materials.

195. We recommend that the police establish systems for convening preparatory briefing sessions in advance of major events, so that protest organisers, stewards and moderators can benefit from expert advice on antisemitism, or other forms of prejudice where appropriate.

196. We have already stated our belief that those that cause criminal damage and deliberately disrupt lawful activity should be pursued by police and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Where protests are ongoing, pose a threat to community cohesion, legitimate trading operations and are costing significant taxpayer money to police such as in the example of the Kedem store in Manchester, local authorities and police should consider the public impact of such activity and look to properly use the powers granted to them in the Public Order Act and in particular section 14 in the most timely way.

197. In his letter to us, Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP stated that the government “have asked the national policing lead on hate crime to work with public order leads to look at how arrests and charges can be clearly communicated and publicised by police forces to provide reassurance to local communities that criminal acts will be prosecuted”. This is a very welcome step and as we have noted, publicity of prosecutions for offences committed during the protests of the summer should be pursued. This is important both in terms of building confidence that action will be taken but also in managing the expectations of the Jewish and indeed other communities about what action can and will be taken and where the threshold for prosecution lays. It is therefore important that if not charging, the police and CPS must be clear as to why no action has been taken.

198. It is, to be fair to the police and others, difficult to get a full picture of arrests made in relation to antisemitism. However, we were informed that the National Public Order Unit confirmed 26 arrests at Gaza related demonstrations (based on police force submissions) from more than 300 demonstrations across the UK, which in the majority of cases were peaceful. The arrests took place when there was no counter-demonstration and so were presumed in most cases to relate to criminal damage or public order offences. There was no suggestion that the arrests related to antisemitism. The police have a custodial system in place which as we understand it is not immediately compatible with the crime recording systems. These custodial systems are different across the various forces and in some cases when individuals are moved across bases, difficult to track. Information is available, as is clear, for intelligence
analysts to check but it would be perhaps disproportionate to recommend a new system is introduced. However, there are measures that can be taken to publicise arrests and to enhance available information.

199. We were informed that in September, following agreements with Greater Manchester Police and the Metropolitan Police in London, the Community Security Trust and Nottinghamshire Police had signed an information sharing agreement centred on the exchange of anonymised information about antisemitic incidents and hate crimes. The figures we have seen clearly help to establish patterns, to identify hot spots are helpful and must continue. As we have noted, such agreements allow the UK to have one of the best sets of data in the world in relation to antisemitism.

200. In order to be totally effective and to ensure the UK is a world leader in monitoring and recording data on antisemitism, the police should enter into a national data sharing agreement with the CST and look at similar arrangements with groups like Tell Mama.

201. Whilst police data appeared robust and the utility of disaggregated antisemitism statistic proven, this was not the case in relation to the prosecuting authorities. It was disappointing that the Crown Prosecution Service could not provide us with the specific details that we requested about charges, prosecutions and convictions during and after the summer. We were told that the last time the organisation had been asked to sample evidence, significant time and manpower had been required. The CPS does not disaggregate antisemitism from racially or religiously aggravated hate crime offences, which are processed separately or sometimes together depending on the evidence. We were told it is difficult to pinpoint how the CPS operated during a particular period. Their systems are designed for case management and not research and whilst allowing for some of the complexities of religious and racially-aggravated crimes being ‘flagged’ separately and cases being assessed from the perspective of the perpetrator, we believe that there are improvements that could be made – such as specific ‘flags’ or key word searches that whilst imperfect would allow for improved research and analysis of CPS case data.

202. The CPS should instigate, at speed, a better management or sampling system which allows for a simple search and analysis function for the data that it holds.

203. The criminal justice response is of course critical but giving evidence to members of our inquiry, Professor Paul Iganski argued that prosecutions when they do happen give a false impression and are rare229. He told us that his research found only one in 10 incidents recorded by the Metropolitan Police Service resulted in charges being brought or cautions issued. In addition, he referred to the work undertaken by the CPS following the last All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism which found that there were various stumbling blocks to achieving a successful prosecution. This included: that many incidents recorded by the police did not meet the criteria for further action as they were not crimes, that in the majority of cases it

229 Paul Iganski Oral Evidence
was not possible to identify the suspect (although social media does tend to leave a trail) and lastly that victims often did not wish to support a prosecution. He was keen to explain to us that the mantra in the criminal justice system is ‘report’ but when prosecutions do not happen expectations are raised then dashed and frustration follows. In overview, he argued that there were limitations to the criminal justice system that must be acknowledged. This is an important message for police, prosecutors and others about setting fair expectations and again points to the impropriety of the ‘zero tolerance’ approach to policing.

204. Whilst some local authorities argued that the legislative framework needed review, others argued that interventions against antisemitism were best delivered “at a local level through effective partnership, rather than national initiatives”. Both the legal report that we commissioned and evidence from the CST, together with submissions we received from legal professionals, points to the existing legislation being sufficient to protect Jewish people and prosecute perpetrators of antisemitic hate crimes. Most of the concerns expressed to us focus on the effective implementation and interpretation of the law.

205. In a legal opinion specially commissioned to advise our inquiry, Richard Matthews QC and Jonas Milner review the action taken by the CPS following the 2006 All-Party Inquiry. This encompassed the production of a Hate Crime Report which included specific reference to prosecutors potentially benefitting from guidance to help identify and refer cases to the Special Crime and Counter-Terrorism Division (SCCTD). By 2010, the guidance on referral to that specialist unit had changed and rather than clarifying the situation for prosecutors, the new guidance suggested that there was not a requirement to refer cases to the SCCTD. It was said that instead, Area Hate Crime Co-ordinators or experienced prosecutors would be sufficient. The legal report does not criticise that arrangement but notes that the sudden change of heart was not explained. It was indicated to us that over-reliance on specialists can cause fatigue for those prosecutors and prevent others from specialising but at the very least this should have been properly explained.

206. As we have already noted, in 2014 the Director of Public Prosecutions agreed a hate crime strategy and delivery plan including a ‘Hate Crime Assurance Regime’ to be piloted from early 2015. The authors of the legal opinion consider that the decision making processes in relation to offences concerned with hate crime, will be under continuing review and that this might include examination of whether racially or religiously aggravated offences “should revert to being within the remit of Special Crime and Counter-Terrorism Division (SCCTD)”. We think this a very sensible determination to make and if referral to the SCCTD is undesirable perhaps the framework for effective deployment of relevant specialists could be reviewed.

230 Manchester Council Written Submission
231 Salford Submission
232 Matthews, R. and Milner, J., 2015, Addendum consideration of law and prosecution-related issues
233 Ibid
We recommend that as part of the ongoing review of hate crime procedures by the CPS, consideration is given as a priority, to the decision making arrangements for referral to the Special Crime and Counter-Terrorism Division (SCCTD).

The second major area of consideration offered in the legal opinion prepared for us, concerns guidance about online communications. We were informed that there is some overlap between the provisions that cover criminal offences for public order, racial and religious incitement and malicious communication and that “significantly it is the choice of the CPS as to which is charged” although in some cases the consent of the Attorney General is required. In 2013, CPS published guidelines on prosecuting offences involving communications via social media. This, in summary, explains that caution should be exercised when prosecuting under the Public Order Act as it relates more to spoken communications and this is why many prosecutions for online communications have been under the Malicious Communications Act 1988 or Communications Act 2003 (unless they have met the threshold for incitement provisions). We were provided examples of prosecutions under different Acts, all soliciting different sentences.

There is great sensitivity in the law to freedom of speech which is enshrined in both European and national legislation. We were provided with a well-reasoned argument that whilst “there is no statutory offence which is specifically tailored to communications involving race/religious hate that are published online/via social media” there does not exist a need for creation of such an offence. In addition, we were counselled against the creation of a “racist tweet” offence. Existing legal frameworks are sufficient to handle relevant cases and the CPS guidelines do allow for prosecution of offensive comments which can be characterised as hate crime.

It was explained to us that whilst the CPS ‘Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media’ includes various considerations of the tensions between free speech and malicious communications it does not do so in regard to the religious and racial hatred context. It was suggested to us that “whether, if it is not within the hate crime materials developed by CPS, guidance that specifically addresses racist/religious hatred based communications sent via social media should be developed”. In the context of the arguments outlined for us about grossly offensive speech, it was also suggested that we consider “whether, if not within the hate crime guidance material developed by the CPS, there is need for guidance that addresses when and in what circumstances, extreme tactics deployed by anti-Israel demonstrators on UK streets” will be held to amount to “criminal acts” that “will be prosecuted”. Whilst the ‘Hate-Crime Assurance Regime’ has not yet been published or tested, we think there is merit in formally recommending action to address these suggestions.

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236 CPS, 2013, Guidelines on prosecuting cases involving communications sent via social media available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/communications_sent_via_social_media/

237 Ibid

238 Matthews, R. and Milner, J., 2015, Addendum consideration of law and prosecution-related issues

239 Matthews, R. and Milner, J., 2015, Addendum consideration of law and prosecution-related issues
211. We recommend that as part of the ongoing review of hate crime procedures by the CPS, consideration is given as a priority, to the suitability of existing guidance on communications sent via social media as regards racist/religious hatred. We further recommend that hate crime guidance material on grossly offensive speech be reviewed to clarify what amounts to “criminal acts” that “will be prosecuted”.

212. It is of course imperative that our judges and magistrates maintain complete impartiality when making decisions. We have set out how the ‘new antisemitism’ has already been considered in some ways in courts but concerns were raised with us about the Equal Treatment Bench Book in particular\textsuperscript{240} and other associated matters which bear review.

213. As we have set out, the Judicial College’s Equal Treatment Bench Book provides various pieces of guidance on equality and diversity brought together for ease of reading. It is a guide for judges, magistrates and all other judicial office holders and is used as part of the training process for judges. The most recent version of the guidance is from November 2013\textsuperscript{241} but anecdotal examples from individuals and organisations suggest that the updated guidance if it has been shared, has not been widely read. In the introduction to the Bench Book it is stated that the guide combines “separate pieces of guidance on equality and diversity brought together for ease of reading. However it is not a single document in reality and will be updated regularly”. Due to this arrangement, the way the various religious, ethnic and other minorities are covered is, as it was put to us, “somewhat ad hoc”\textsuperscript{242}.

214. Our attention was drawn to two examples in particular. In a section in the chapter on ethnicity, titled ‘Attitudes and Prejudices’, there is a paragraph on prejudice against Muslims, followed by related statistics of public attitudes. There is reference to immigrants, asylum seekers, gypsies and travellers but not to Jews. In the same chapter, a section titled ‘Education’ includes admonition against stereotyping various groups, although not Jews.

215. It was reasonably suggested to us that whilst the Bench Book may be an imperfect vehicle for addressing the full complexities of antisemitism “insofar as it does deal, for example, with the basic stereotyping of Muslims, it should also cover such foundational stereotypes as Jews ‘controlling the world’; and their historic and current role in the Middle East and elsewhere in inciting hostility and violence against Jews”.

216. It was also suggested to us that in the case of Naik, R vs Secretary of State for the Home Department\textsuperscript{243}, that a failure to properly train the judiciary had allowed for some comments to be mis-attributed as political rather than antisemitic. Naik’s statements for example comparing Americans to pigs were considered to be unacceptable but Lord Justice Carnwath found that one statement in particular “though strongly expressed, may be thought within

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\textsuperscript{240} Avril Maier Written Submission


\textsuperscript{242} Ibid

the bounds of legitimate political comment.” This judgement was supported by Lord Justice Gross. Naik had said: “Today, America is controlled by the Jews, whether it be the banks, whether it be the money, whether it be the power. Nobody can become a president of the USA without walking the Star of David.” Whilst we would not question the judge’s decision in this case, the language used to describe the vile antisemitic rhetoric is unfortunate. Although judgements must continue to be made based on the facts of a given case, it is important that some better background knowledge is disseminated.

217. **We recommend that the Judicial College updates its Equal Treatment Bench Book to include basic reference to antisemitism and ensures it has in place an effective mechanisms for wide distribution and communication of the guide.**

218. It is of course important that official guidance is clear, detailed and well distributed but informal guidance can also play a very useful role. Feedback from police officers indicates that the CST’s guide to Judaism and joint guide to the Holocaust with the Holocaust Centre and Holocaust Educational Trust have been particularly helpful. A guide to antisemitism for prosecutors and magistrates might prove equally valuable.

219. As outlined in an earlier section, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) had long-established and well-developed links with the Scottish Jewish community. Being “acutely aware” of the escalating violence in the Middle East this summer the Lord Advocate arranged a meeting with the Scottish Council of Jewish Communities and Police Scotland to discuss any concerns or issues the Jewish community might have had. A number of incidents were related by the police to the meeting although, it was pointed out that not all incidents are crimes and so there was not necessarily a prosecutorial interest. The Lord Advocate subsequently sought to reassure the Jewish community with a letter to SCoJeC in which he undertook to “provide SCoJeC with an outline of circumstances of any relevant prosecutions once proceedings had been concluded”. According to COPFS, it continues to monitor cases reported to it which have an antisemitic element or which are conflict related “in order to have a better appreciation of the issues and scale of the problem”. COPFS related to us that it had a number of reports which when our report went to print were the subject of live proceedings.

220. Our legal system is strong but some of the relevant guidance and frameworks could improve. So too there were both impressive political responses to the uplift in antisemitism but also areas in which more can be done.

### 3.4.2 Political Responses

221. The former Chief Rabbi, Lord Sacks when speaking to members of our inquiry highlighted the significance of governments and others making it clear that Jews won’t fight antisemitism alone and that nor is it their fight to lead. He emphasised the importance of the issue

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244 CST, n.d, working with the police, available at: http://www.thecst.org.uk/index.cfm?Content=12
245 COPFS written evidence
246 Lord Sacks Oral Evidence
being seen as a cross-party parliamentary one and told us this sends a critical signal both to the Jews of Britain and indeed the perpetrators of antisemitism as well as to other European countries that Britain is a real world leader in tolerance.

222. Many Members of Parliament from across the political divide voiced their opposition to antisemitism over the summer, including leading government and opposition figures. The Prime Minister made a statement to the House of Commons on 1 September, another the same week, and on the 10 September wrote to Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis stating “As we reflect on events this summer, it is more important than ever that Britain says loudly and clearly that there can never be any excuse for antisemitism. As a government we are committed to doing everything we can in the fight against antisemitism.” He reiterated this point on 2 October in a letter to Matthew Offord MP that was made publicly available and in a speech to the Norwood charity in November in relation to attacks on their shops that had taken place during the summer. In addition to the Prime Minister, the Communities Secretary Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP spoke to the Telegraph on 5 September and said: “... Whatever one’s view about the politics of Israel and Gaza, everyone who believes in British liberty should stand up for the Jewish community’s right to practise their faith and go about their lives without fear.” Eric Pickles reiterated similar and stronger sentiments on the release of the government’s antisemitism report in December.

223. The Home Secretary spoke out against antisemitism at a Conservative Friends of Israel event on 9 September, reiterating messages she had offered in a piece she authored for the Jewish Chronicle at the end of August (in the weeks following attacks in France, she also spoke out publicly against antisemitism). The Chancellor sent a message condemning antisemitism to a rally in Manchester at which Graham Evans MP, Jim Murphy MP and Ivan Lewis MP all spoke. The Northern Ireland Secretary, Rt Hon Theresa Villiers MP,

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247 Hansard, 1 September 2014, EU Council Security and Middle East, Column 24, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140901/debtext/140901-0001.htm
248 Hansard, 3 September 2014, Questions to the Prime Minister, column 280, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140903/debtext/140903-0001.htm
250 Jewish Chronicle, 2014, David Cameron takes tough line over Israel boycotts, available at: http://www.jewishnews.co.uk/may-conservative-israel/
unreservedly condemned antisemitism in a public meeting hosted as part of the evidence gathering process for this report and had previously issued a statement in August\(^{258}\). The Chief Whip, Rt Hon Michael Gove MP urged people to speak out against antisemitism in a speech he delivered to the Holocaust Educational Trust on 9 September\(^{259}\) and the Culture Secretary, Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP intervened personally in the Tricycle Theatre affair. He later spoke about this to a Union of Jewish Students (UJS) conference\(^{260}\). Boris Johnson also condemned the rise in incidents during a session of Questions to the Mayor\(^{261}\).

224. Having joined the Prime Minister in condemning antisemitism on 1 September\(^{262}\), the Leader of the Opposition, Rt Hon Ed Miliband MP re-stated his opposition to antisemitism at a Labour Friends of Israel event at the Labour Party Conference as did the Shadow Foreign Secretary Rt Hon Douglas Alexander MP\(^{263}\). Ed Miliband made a fuller comment on 4 November through his Facebook page\(^{264}\). At the height of the conflict, then Shadow Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Jim Murphy MP wrote in the Glasgow Herald that “It shouldn’t be left to Jews to speak out against the existence of antisemitism in our midst. It is all of our human and democratic responsibility – no matter our faith and regardless of our view on the Middle East – to renew our opposition to the world’s oldest hatred\(^{265}\).” The London Jewish Forum told us that the Labour General Secretary had ensured a reminder was distributed to councillors reminding them of the importance of using suitable language when addressing the Israel-Palestine debate following an incident in which a councillor had tweeted an inappropriate comparison between the Holocaust and the summer’s conflict\(^{266}\). This is a welcome step and one that all parties might consider where incidents arise and perhaps in advance of them occurring.

225. The Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat party leader Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP wrote an article for the Jewish News on 10th October stating his opposition to antisemitism\(^{267}\) and Stephen Williams, the Communities Minister and also a Liberal Democrat\(^{268}\) interrupted his


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\(^{262}\) Hansard, 1 September 2014, Questions to the Prime Minister, column 27, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm140901/debtext/140901-0001.htm#1409016000155


\(^{266}\) London Jewish Forum Written Submission


summer holiday to return to London, meet with the CST and put out a public statement condemning antisemitism.

226. Of course, many MPs of all parties made both private and public representations about the concerns of their constituents. Questions about antisemitism were raised in both houses and Ministerial responses were strongly condemnatory of anti-Jewish prejudice. We agree with the CST that “whether it is during a parliamentary recess or not, it is important at times of heightened antisemitism that the Jewish community publicly hears that politicians condemn rises (in antisemitism) and are sensitive to communal concerns”.

227. Whilst significant statements were issued, there were also comments made albeit predominantly by backbench MPs or Peers which unintentionally or otherwise fed the fears and anxieties of the Jewish community. We recognise that sometimes there are tensions and difficulties for public figures in finding the right language and voice, when seeking to express deeply held views about the situation in the Middle East and in particular dissatisfaction with Israel’s actions. We explore this further in chapter five. Some comments have however served to alienate and isolate people, exacerbate tensions and feed communal disharmony. Free speech is crucial and accompanied by the likelihood that people be they in public life or not, will say unhelpful, damaging and inappropriate things. There are however a number of themes which are worth reflecting upon.

228. First, it is important that the central narrative be a responsible and moderate one. As the Mayor of London said: “All politicians have a duty to avoid incendiary and inflammatory comments”. It is beholden on political and party leaders and those with an official role to set the tone of debates and for the most part this happened, as we have set out.

229. Second, where inappropriate comments are made the model established by the All-Party Group Against Antisemitism that a given party take responsibility for its own MPs is a good one and we call on UK political parties to heed that message, to act resolutely and with speed when incidents do occur. Additionally, it is important that responses to antisemitism not become a source of party political gesturing – it is most effective when all parties work together.

230. Third, it is important that, when they are issued, supportive statements are delivered quickly and not long after a spike in incidents has occurred.

231. Fourth and finally, it is important to highlight trends in inappropriate speech and devise strategies to counter them which will include education but might also include naming and shaming the worst offenders. We return to that theme at the end of this section.

270  CST Written Submission
232. Within the public sphere, we note that the Equality and Human Rights Commission sought to highlight its work on religion and belief during the summer with specific reference to the increase in antisemitism\(^{272}\). We have been told that they met with Jewish community organisations including the Union of Jewish Students and have either been involved with or are reviewing various cases of antisemitic discrimination relating to employment. It is important the EHRC continues to take a leading role on combatting antisemitism.

233. In addition to statements from political leaders, the voices of respected anti-racist and other NGOs are important in setting political markers for debate. We were disappointed to note the relative silence from anti-racist organisations and civil society groups on the upsurge of antisemitism during the summer with the exception of Tell Mama which issued a statement in response to CST reports\(^{273}\) and Hope Not Hate, which issued statements in condemnation of the increase, as well as taking steps to monitor its social media platforms and address antisemitic rhetoric appropriately. Specifically, Hope Not Hate’s article on ‘red lines’ for antisemitism, which offered bite-sized explanations about antisemitic tropes relating to aspects of Israel, Zionism and the Middle East conflict is excellent\(^{274}\).

234. As the CST told us, this relative silence on antisemitism “contrasts markedly with their proper condemnation of other racist surges, such as faced by Muslims after the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby”. It is very important that NGOs and others start to address this situation and the importance of taking public and exemplary action should not be minimised. In addition, it is important that those NGOs which are charities remain firmly within their charitable objectives.

235. In his letter to us\(^{275}\), Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP set out the government activity during and after the summer months to address the rise in antisemitism. He explained that the national policing lead on hate crime had been charged “to work with public order leads to look at how arrests and charges can be clearly communicated and publicised by police forces to provide reassurance to local communities that criminal acts will be prosecuted”. Mr Pickles explained that fellow Minister Lord Ahmad had visited an Israeli-owned business in Covent Garden to demonstrate support to staff who had been subjected to protest action. This included “protestors entering the shop with red paint on their hands and shouting ‘No amount of soap can wash the blood of Palestinian babies from your hands’”. We were told that Lord Ahmad was “keen to demonstrate” government opposition to boycotts and indeed most leading parties in the UK are against a boycott of Israel.

236. People have a legitimate right to protest against Israel through boycott or other peaceful means. However, such protest becomes entirely illegitimate when constituting an attack on or intimidation of British Jews. We have set out that cultural boycotts,


\(^{273}\) Tell Mama, 2014, Levels of antisemitism are a weather vane on hate crimes against other faith & race groups, available at: http://tellmamauk.org/levels-of-antisemitism-are-a-weather-vane-on-hate-crimes-against-other-c/


\(^{275}\) DCLG Written Submission/Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP Formal Correspondence
implemented in the way they were during the summer, were unacceptable. The boycott movement faces a challenge of how to put their tactics into effect while not slipping into antisemitism, unlawful discrimination or assaulting valued freedoms.

237. Further to the outlined action against boycotts, we were informed by Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP that following the rise in the number of antisemitic daubings on private and public property during and after the Gaza conflict, a joint letter was sent from the Secretary of State and David Delew the Chief Executive of the CST to local authorities “reminding them of the importance of quickly removing offensive graffiti and reporting it to the police”276.

238. Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP also set out his position in relation to the flying of Palestinian flags by some local councils, a matter on which both the Secretary of State and this inquiry received considerable correspondence. We were told that “there may be some occasions where a foreign flag might be appropriate – for example, to mark a visit by a council’s’ ‘town twinning’ partner or a distinguished visitor. However, flying the Palestinian flag is a clear political statement on an area of public policy for which the municipal body has no responsibility. More broadly, whatever one’s personal views on the situation in Israel and Gaza, elected representatives and councils should not be seeking to inflame community tensions. Whilst freedom of speech and freedom of association are important British liberties, they should be exercised with social responsibility”. This is a welcome statement from the Communities Secretary and should be heeded by local councils who in addition should be mindful of their responsibilities under the Public Sector Equality Duty.277

239. We know that local authority action is almost never motivated by antisemitism but conclude that political gesturing gives out entirely the wrong messages. We call upon all local councils to do their utmost to bring people together during times of foreign conflict, particularly in the Middle East, to strengthen inter-communal ties and to avoid isolating or inspiring fear in constituents they are elected to represent.

240. In concert with the measures we have reviewed, we learned that the Secretary of State and Communities Minister spoke to the CST and that officials were in daily contact with the Jewish community. Importantly, Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP recognised that despite the measures that were in place, there must be “a robust communications strategy which reassures the public that those who commit hate crimes will be punished with the full force of the law”.

241. According to the Scottish Government, “the period of increased violence in the Middle East in 2014, and the resultant media coverage, had an impact on communities across Scotland”. They reported to us that there was a sharp increase from what had been a low level of antisemitism prior to the summer and a decrease in hate crime statistics for 2013-14. This demonstrated a clear understanding at an institutional level in Scotland that there was a problem. SCoJeC informed us that both the First Minister had issued a statement and

276 DCLG Written Submission/Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP Formal Correspondence
various meetings had taken place. However, they also stated concerns about a disproportionate approach to Israel from official Scottish bodies which they argued “may inadvertently encourage antisemitism from those who conflate the State of Israel with the local Jewish community”. This again points to the importance of repeated public condemnation of conflict related antisemitism.

242. According to the Welsh Government, there was “anecdotal evidence” of an increase in tensions following the summer conflict. We were told that during Hate Crime Awareness Week the Minister for Communities and Tackling Poverty, Lesley Griffiths AM met with community members to talk about hate crimes at Cardiff United Reform Synagogue with the Police and Crime Commissioner for South Wales. The reported feedback received was that there were “noticeable heightened tensions due to the conflict in Gaza and this has led to greater feelings of insecurity”. We were told that, for example, one observant Jewish man had deemed it necessary to hide his religious head covering.

243. Whilst we were not informed of a specific response by the Welsh Government, we set out earlier in this report the various initiatives it is sponsoring and the low level of antisemitic hate crime in Wales. This does however serve as a useful reminder that the fear of crime can have a significant effect on community confidence which underlines the need for action where it does occur.

244. We began this section by referring to Lord Sacks’ emphasis on the importance of the fight against antisemitism being led by the non-Jewish world. This is something Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis reiterated when speaking to civil servants of the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism. Leaders in political and public life have a burden of responsibility. It is clear that when political leaders speak out, their words mean something to the Jewish community and equally when damaging statements are made, they have a disproportionately negative impact. As we set out in an earlier chapter, Jewish communal discourse serves to feed the rationale for some of our recommendations. Given British Jews feel increasingly concerned, it is important they know that their fellow citizens will not allow them to suffer antisemitism.

245. A number of worrying trends have developed in recent years particularly as regards conflict-related antisemitism. We recommend that an independent council of leading non-Jewish figures from parliament and across public life be convened to identify long-term trends in antisemitism, to speak out against it and make recommendations for action.

278  SCoJeC Written Submission
279  Welsh Government Written Submission
### 3.4.3 The Jewish Community and Interfaith responses

246. Prior to the summer’s hostilities there was already a climate of concern and fear in Europe amongst Jewish communities. The President of the European Jewish Congress, Moshe Kantor, had gone so far as to say “Normative Jewish life in Europe is unsustainable.”

247. Thankfully, there were a number of submissions and testimonies at our town hall meetings from members of the community whom had not ever experienced any antisemitism in their lives. We were told that people generally get along with one another both at work and outside of it and in Nottingham, for example, we were told that despite protests taking place in relation to the conflict, they had not resulted in any antisemitic incidents. However, where incidents did occur, word of them passed quickly in the close knit community. Those incidents, taken together with some of the controversial events of the summer such as the Tricycle Theatre decision and unguarded statements from some public figures fed a feeling of unease. At the height of the conflict, the Jewish Chronicle reported that 63% of British Jews had questioned their future in the UK and whilst this headline was perhaps somewhat sensationalist (and later contradicted by a another Chronicle poll), the general theme of Jews questioning their sense of security has been underlined by the BBC Television Director Danny Cohen and referred to anecdotally by the Prime Minister, Home Secretary, Lord Sacks and others albeit very well caveated.

248. We received a great many submissions from individual members of the Jewish community across Scotland, England and Wales and we are grateful to them all for taking the time to share their thoughts and feelings with us. According to the Board of Deputies, communities across the country have been affected, including but not limited to those in Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Brighton, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leicester, Manchester and Newcastle among others.

249. It is perhaps important but perhaps obvious to note at the outset that there was a complete disparity of views on the Israel-Palestine conflict from those members of the community (and indeed others) submitting evidence with the majority stating that they only wanted...
to see a peaceful outcome. A minority blamed Israel for inspiring anti-Jewish prejudice, some saw Israel’s actions as irrelevant in the context of antisemitism and others believed that some forms of action against Israel such as boycotts were in themselves antisemitic. In the Fundamental Rights Agency survey of 2013, it was revealed that only a third of those surveyed thought that criticism of Israel was probably or definitely antisemitism whilst on another question two-thirds thought that boycotts were probably or definitely antisemitic. This highlights that on some key questions there are very large minorities in the Jewish community with counterposing ideas.\(^{289}\)

250. Reviewing the evidence that was submitted by so many individuals from within the Jewish community, it is clear that there is a palpable anguish about conflict-linked antisemitism. According to the submissions, this feeling emanates from: the attacks on Jews for Israel’s actions; the double standards to which Israel is perceived to be held; the comparison of Israeli action to Nazis; the belittling of the Holocaust; the type of incendiary language sometimes used by those in public life; and the media coverage of the conflict and specifically attempts to employ anti-Zionism as a front for antisemitism. Other anxieties raised by community members touch on the incidents we have referred to elsewhere including: protests and the perceived lack of arrests and prosecution for antisemitism, posts on social media, the raising of Palestinian flags over town halls and incidents in grass roots football. This multiplicity of concerns has reportedly led a number of submitters to cover any publicly visible sign of their Judaism. As one gentleman put it, “I am saddened that my children experience more antisemitism than I did”.

251. We have been abundantly clear that the fight against antisemitism should not fall to the Jewish community. Although the responsibility is not solely theirs it also, of course, falls to that community to be prepared and respond effectively. The CST told us that its “considerable investment in physical security enhancements to Jewish communal buildings” together with volunteer training over many years had ensured the right infrastructure was in place to protect and reassure the Jewish community throughout the summer months. Additionally, the CST told us that it was constantly reviewing security and granting funding to urgent security upgrades. CST volunteers secured dozens of Jewish communal events, protests and counter-demonstrations. Each of the hundreds of incidents reported to CST was “carefully analysed and administered” and responses put in place, ranging from victim support to police liaison. The CST also “continued to work closely with police at a local, national and regional level in sharing incidents, briefing officers and in some cases conducting joint patrols”.\(^{290}\) By all accounts, the CST continues to operate as a model of best practice not just in the UK but across the world.

252. Apart from the physical security measures that were in place, we were told that senior CST staff members briefed civil servants on a daily basis, and senior Ministers at the Home Office, Department for Communities and Local Government, and Foreign Office. Parents of children...
attending Jewish schools were sent letters of reassurance, and Jewish students were briefed before leaving for campus. Importantly, CST told us that it has done its utmost “to ensure that the situation was reported objectively and accurately, without panic or undue alarm”. This was an approach CST spokespeople were said to have taken when providing statistics and information to local, national and international media, and to senior Jewish communal figures, government and police.

253. The Board of Deputies of British Jews for its part, told us it ‘organised and initiated’ a number of key Ministerial meetings to feedback communal concerns to government and had spoken with many retailers to ensure kosher products remained on sale in addition to meeting with the British Retail Consortium to outline its concerns about the effect of some pro-Palestinian protests. It also said that it had articulated ‘where legitimate criticism of Israel had overstepped the line’ in the media and made representations to political parties about the behaviour of some of their members. In addition the Board told us it sought to work with other faith communities to calm tensions in the UK. The Board said it played a co-ordinating role and had offered its assistance to its communal partners in France and Germany291.

254. Outside of the established Jewish community organisations and latterly with their support, a ‘grass roots’ campaign group named the ‘Campaign Against Antisemitism’ was founded and organised a rally on the 31 August which was held outside the Royal Courts of Justice. We were somewhat disappointed to note that not all of the messages from that group have been in line with CST’s stated approach of seeking to avoid undue panic and alarm. We encourage Jewish communal leaders and others when speaking on antisemitism to follow CST’s example and to be reassuring and responsible in their language, taking into account the activity which as we have outlined had been undertaken before the summer and during it. So too, it is important that the leadership do not conflate concerns about activity legitimately protesting Israel’s actions with antisemitism, as we have seen has been the case on some occasions.

255. One of the most disheartening matters we considered in our deliberations was the impact of the summer’s conflict on interfaith and inter-communal relations. In Nottingham for example, we heard that whilst successful events had occurred in the past, the summer’s hostilities had impacted on and provoked enough mistrust to lead to the abandonment of some joint Muslim-Jewish initiatives292. Speaking at the 2014 ‘Limmud’ conference Muslim and Jewish communal leaders Fiyaz Mughal and Laura Marks suggested this was somewhat of a national theme293.

256. There were however aspects of hope amongst the gloom. In particular, the Very Reverend Rogers Govender, the Dean of Manchester and Chair of their Challenging Hate Forum eloquently explained how he had witnessed increased tensions, anxiety and security measures deployed during the summer but saw it as his role to bring people together294.

291 Board of Deputies Written Submission
292 Nottingham Regional Meeting
294 Very Reverend Rogers Govender Written Submission
We were particularly pleased to read about the response to the desecration of a Jewish cemetery in Manchester in late June. A call for a ‘Community Clean-up’ was met with huge and unexpected take up of over 100 people from different backgrounds who went to Blackley Cemetery to repair the damage that had been caused and to show moral support to the local Jewish community. Faith leaders in Manchester also issued a statement condemning the desecration of the cemetery. This and other activities such as the Jewish communities efforts to support members of an Islamic Community Centre following a suspected arson attack in North London might not appear to be significant at the time but they are in fact internationally well regarded examples of communities working together in the face of hate.

In many cases there is common cause particularly between Muslims and Jews. We learned during our overseas visits that before tensions were heightened in the summer months, both the Jewish and Muslim communities’ shared deep concerns when restrictions of religious freedoms were discussed and levels of hate incidents increase.

Major interfaith organisations tried their best in what they described to us as challenging circumstances to keep faith communities talking. The Interfaith Network told us that it was concerned about the rise in both antisemitism and anti-Muslim hatred and whilst it is quite careful about the declarations it makes in relation to overseas events, it believed it necessary to issue exceptional statements in August. So too, the Joseph Interfaith foundation issued an important statement on behalf of the National Council of Imams and Rabbis, having released cross-communal statements in the recent past in relation to anti-Muslim hatred. The Three Faiths Forum also issued key statements as did the Board of Deputies of British Jews in partnership with the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). We wish to commend all of the organisations that issued statements, particularly those Muslim groups that stood in solidarity with the Jewish community. This has added resonance given

the indications from victim feedback on the profiles of perpetrators, that a high proportion of cases involved someone from a Muslim background.305

260. The Archbishop of Canterbury made a very important and welcome statement in which he said: “While it is acceptable to question and even disagree with particular policies of the Israeli Government, the spike in violence and abuse against Jewish communities here in the UK is simply unacceptable... In the year ahead, I look forward to working, in my capacity as a President of the Council of Christians and Jews (CCJ), to see how our relationships at grassroots level can flourish.306” It is important not to underestimate the impact of such eminent figures as the Archbishop of Canterbury showing moral leadership of this calibre during such difficult times.

261. Both the Interfaith Network and the Three Faiths Forum sought to impress upon us the importance of their activities having continued despite and only in some cases in reaction to the Middle East conflict. The Three Faiths Forum told us that the conflict had added to the “urgency” of the work and that it had been required to be “more mindful and prepared”307. One event in particular which it ran with an Imam and Rabbi entitled “Talking Across Faith Lines When Times Are Tough” was directed at practitioners in the field and said to be helpful for those gathered. In addition to that event, Three Faiths Forum has run training including ‘controversial issues’ management for councils, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the National Union of Students (NUS) among others. It also took part in the sixth annual ‘Urban Dialogues’ exhibition which was marketed as a safe space in a time of conflict308.

262. Given the very real concerns and anxieties of the Jewish community that have been so eloquently communicated to us, it is important that effective systems for reassurance are in place and accompanied by appropriate security measures. We have already made a recommendation about improved publicity for the measures that are in place and being taken. Additionally, it is important that where they are not justified, sensationalist statements are avoided by community groups. It is however clear that many Jews felt distinctly uncomfortable at home over the summer months and this needs remediying. For British society as a whole, it is crucial that conflicts elsewhere in the world are not imported and efforts to bring communities together must be intensified and properly resourced at these times of heightened tension.

263. The interfaith work undertaken during the summer months was vitally important. In particular, work on training individuals and organisations in ‘handling difficult conversations’ is paramount. We recommend that the government look to support an extension of this work in particular to local authorities with a view to implementation of a national support structure, through local authorities, for intensified interfaith activity during periods of potential disharmony between communities.

305 Tell Mama, 2014, Levels of antisemitism are a weather vane on hate crimes against other faith & race groups, available at: http://tellmamauk.org/levels-of-antisemitism-are-a-weather-vane-on-hate-crimes-against-other-c/


307 Three Faiths Forum Written Submission

3.4.4 The Role of the Media

264. The media does not just have a right but a responsibility to cover world events and of course to do so in a fair and balanced way. In certain cases like with the Israel-Gaza conflict, the emotive nature of what is happening can intensify the anxieties of those watching from afar with updates delivered on a daily if not hourly basis and this can in turn exacerbate communal concerns.

265. The media coverage of the Israel-Gaza conflict during the summer of 2014 was vast and there have been accusations of bias from both ‘sides’ directed against various media outlets\(^{309,310}\). It is not our role to determine editorial practice, to adjudicate individual complaints or to advise broadcasters or other journalists on how to present any given conflict. Suffice to say we would think any respectable media institution would want to be as fair and objective as possible for the sake of its own credibility. The rush to feed the 24-hour news cycle and the inclination of some to use the cover of the conflict to pursue a discriminatory agenda makes the requirement for fact-checking all the more important and we would hope media outlets have the appropriate systems in place. Where mistakes are made, it is important that prominent apologies are displayed and that where necessary, and as happened in the case of the Lancet journal which we referred to, editors apologise.

266. Where news or other media consumers have concerns about the language used in stories, factual accuracy or any other complaints it is most important that they know where to direct their complaints and have confidence in the frameworks for adjudication that exist.

267. As regards print media, the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Electoral Conduct covered in some detail concerns about certain sections of the then Press Complaints Commission’s Editors’ Code of Practice\(^{311}\). Since that time, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) has been formally constituted and has adopted – for the time being – the Editors’ Code. Clause 1 (Accuracy) of that code, for example, states that “the Press, whilst free to be partisan, must distinguish clearly between comment, conjecture and fact”. Another clause, Clause 12, states that the press must avoid discrimination\(^{312}\).

268. The Electoral Conduct report reviewed various criticisms that had been made of Clause 12 of the Code. The clause was designed to protect individuals from discrimination and the Press Complaints Commission once argued that an equivalent protection for groups of people would impede freedom of expression. Individuals from a group subject to alleged discrimination were therefore required to complain under Clause 1 (Accuracy) of the Code. Previously, the Commission for Racial Equality had made specific recommendations for


\(^{312}\) IPSO, n.d., Editors’ Code of Practice, available at: https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO2/cop.html
amendment of the PCC Code, echoing a number of concerns raised by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. Subsequent to the publication of the All-Party Inquiry into Electoral Conduct report, Natascha Engel MP wrote to the secretary of the Editors’ Code Committee with details of the recommendations made by the parliamentarians she had convened\footnote{Hansard, 1 December 2014, Electoral Conduct, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldhansrd/text/141201-0002.htm#141201-0002.htm_spopq0, column 1185}.

269. In our correspondence with IPSO officials, we learned that an independent appointments panel was in the process of appointing new lay members to the Editors’ Code of Practice Committee, which is in fact separate to IPSO (albeit the appointments process for the lay members was being managed by IPSO). The plan at the time this report went to print, was for the Code Committee once fully established to conduct a full review of the terms of the Editors’ Code of Practice. Until that review was carried out, the PCC Code remained in place\footnote{IPSO Correspondence}.

270. There was however a relevant change in relation to complainants about cases of alleged discrimination against individuals. We were told that “IPSO can, of course, take complaints from individuals who believe that they have been discriminated against on the grounds set out in Clause 12, which include race and religion. In addition to that, however, IPSO is specifically empowered to take forward complaints from representative groups affected by an alleged breach of the Code, where the alleged breach of the Code is significant and there is a public interest in our doing so. There still has to be an individual who is the subject of the alleged discriminatory material, but this mechanism recognises that others may be affected by such discrimination, indirectly.”\footnote{Ibid}

271. This is an important and welcome step forward. The fact that there is at least some recourse for groups is welcome. It is only logical that having accepted such rights for groups that an extension to the relevant section of the Code on discrimination be made.

272. \textbf{We recommend that the Editors’ Code of Practice be reviewed and that the relevant section be extended to give recourse for groups to complain about discrimination on the grounds of race or religion whilst ensuring a sensible balance for freedom of speech.}

273. The comments boards of online newspapers continue to be a concern for members of the Jewish community and were raised with us specifically by members of the Irish Jewish community in relation to commentary during the summer months. We have already set out the work that has been undertaken with the Society of Editors (Soe) which should be shared by concerned parties with relevant media outlets. The Communities Minister was right to say that such work is the beginning and not the end of a conversation and of course moderators should be alive to the content on their discussion boards whilst designers should bear in
mind the importance of reporting functions being easy to use and prominently placed. We would recommend that users share the Soe guide where necessary when making complaints.

274. For the UK communications industries including broadcast media, Ofcom is the independent regulator and set the standards expected of licensed broadcasters under its Code.\textsuperscript{316} This includes certain powers to regulate the BBC’s licence fee funded television and radio services aimed at audiences in the UK. If contraventions of the Ofcom Code occur, are serious and/or repeated it may impose sanctions including fines or in extremis the revocation of the broadcaster’s licence. The BBC also has due accuracy and impartiality clauses in its agreement and is required to broadcast impartial coverage of current affairs in the UK and beyond. The BBC Executive Board and BBC Trust also have responsibilities in this regard and the BBC must also support fair and informed debate at local, regional and national levels.

275. Whilst it was certainly heartfelt and in no way antisemitic, we cannot ignore the frustration, upset and shock that was registered with us in particular about Jon Snow’s personal report about Gaza that was shared so widely online\textsuperscript{317}. Mr. Snow has a right to share his feelings and to blog in whatever personal capacity he wishes. It is however cynical at best for Channel 4 to have filmed an emotive piece in the studio and to distribute it online in what appears to have been an attempt to avoid regulatory oversight by Ofcom. This sets a worrying precedent with wide implications beyond the Israel-Gaza war and should further such incidents occur, we recommend that Ofcom look at the structures in place to properly regulate such content.

276. Thankfully, we are told that antisemitism has not proved a major source of complaints to regulators but there is some possibility that the avenues for complaint are not well understood. There are different regulators for mobile phone content, for on-demand services, broadcast and print media. In some cases individual companies run their own complaints procedures.

277. Given the diversity of mechanisms that exist for registering complaints about media content, we recommend that the government identify the most suitable agency to produce a guide for consumers which sets out roles, responsibilities and grievance procedures in plain terms for all.

278. Social media platforms facilitated important exchanges of information and opinion during the summer’s conflict but sadly they were also a breeding ground for serious discriminatory and racist content. This material, unlike verbal abuse, was occasionally left to linger, shared widely and in some cases set a trend for others to follow. Antisemitism was targeted at individuals and broadly directed at online communities. Some action was taken by the companies in question and others but there is certainly more that can and must be done.

279. According to the CST, the antisemitism transmitted across social media platforms was a “principal factor” that sharpened the Jewish community’s awareness and sensitivity during the

\textsuperscript{316} Ofcom, 2014, About Ofcom, available at: http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/

summer\textsuperscript{318}. However, it noted that there were some “sensible steps” to prevent discrimination in place. For companies like Facebook and Twitter, this includes methods to flag abusive content on their sites and commitments to reviewing the material and taking action warranted by their Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. A residual benefit of hate material appearing online of course, is that it is relatively easy to report to groups such as the CST.

280. Given the nature of social media, regulation is constantly changing. Self-regulation had historically been considered the best approach and UK Internet Service Providers have, according to Ministry of Justice officials, been good at removing illegal material. There is also important work being undertaken through the Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combatting Antisemitism as we set out in a previous section\textsuperscript{319}.

281. In particular, the action taken by prosecuting authorities in relation to the antisemitic targeting of Luciana Berger MP sets an important precedent. On 7 August 2014, a 21-year-old man named Garron Helm sent antisemitic tweets to Luciana Berger from an account called ‘Aethelwulf’, which translates as ‘Nobel Wolf’, a far-right reference. The tweet showed a photograph of Ms Berger with a yellow star superimposed on her forehead with the wording: “You can always count on a Jew to show their true colours eventually.” It also contained the hashtag “Hitler was right”. On entering Helm’s home, police found Nazi and other extremist materials. He was charged over his antisemitic tweet and appeared before Liverpool Magistrates’ Court on the 20 October where he pleaded guilty to sending an offensive, indecent or obscene message\textsuperscript{320}. As well as a four-week jail sentence, he was ordered to pay an £80 victim surcharge after the judge upgraded the offence to one considered racially-motivated\textsuperscript{321}.

282. The jailing of Garron Helm provoked an extreme and orchestrated antisemitic backlash on social media and other parliamentarians were subsequently attacked\textsuperscript{322}. A number of far-right activists were arrested outside Luciana Berger’s office in Liverpool, which points to the real life consequences of social media activity\textsuperscript{323}. Of course, it is not only Members of Parliament that can fall victim to racist attacks on social media and as Ms Berger has been keen to point out, members of the public often have no support and should not have to suffer in silence or isolation\textsuperscript{324}.

283. We met with both Twitter and Facebook in Dublin in the aftermath of the attacks on Luciana Berger and others. We found Facebook a willing partner. They told us that they rely on

\textsuperscript{318} CST Written Submission


\textsuperscript{322} Hansard, 9 December 2014, Anti-Semitism, column 260WH, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141209/halltext/141209h0001.htm#141209h0001.htm_spnew13


\textsuperscript{324} Hansard, 4 November 2014, Internet Abuse of Members of Parliament, Column 798, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmhansrd/cm141104/debtext/141104-0004.htm#141104-0004.htm_spnew56
community reporting and that the results tend to be positive. They are developing new systems, similar to restorative justice approaches, which when fully enabled will allow users that receive or are privy to posts and messages they do not like to respond to the author of the content, explaining what upset them and why. Where applicable social media platforms should seek to learn from Facebook’s approach in this regard. Facebook also told us that in some cases, incidents are used as case studies from which to learn and improve their systems for the future.

284. Facebook is ultimately a company with American roots and there are differences of opinion about the approach to certain key issues but they have matured significantly in their understanding of the breadth of impact that cyber hate can have. They were open to our suggestions of enhanced co-operation with relevant experts and there is an ongoing dialogue with members of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism and others. Whilst there are criticisms of Facebook from members of the public and NGOs amongst others, we were satisfied that they were willing to listen to our concerns and to take action.

285. The Facebook platform facilitates the posting of news articles and videos, opinion and various other content. Given how easily available and well monitored it is by users it is not surprising that many of those we spoke to were profoundly affected by what they had read or seen. Some of the greatest concern related to Facebook groups and we raised these specifically with the company. They told us that reports from users about specific groups would be reviewed and appropriately moderated. In addition, we were told Facebook feedback systems are being enhanced in order to provide the public with a clearer understanding of why a particular moderation decision was taken and we will hold them to their word about this. The easier it is for the public to assess the company by its own community standards, the better.

286. We had more serious concerns about Twitter and their approach although the company does have some sensible policies and procedures in place. For example, certain expert groups have priority reporting status and provide expert advice. Since meeting us, Twitter have changed their reporting mechanisms and blocking feature. They tell us they now have enhanced harassment reporting options and more robust blocking features and plan to add more controls and features in due course. In addition, we were informed that Twitter offer the complimentary use of ‘promoted tweets’ to key partners like the CST – and that they have the ability to demote trending hashtags such as ‘Hitler Was Right’. Again, we will hold them to this in the future but believe there was more that could have been done during the summer months.

287. The concerns we have and that we raised with Twitter primarily relate to the intensiveness of the reporting process and the burden on the user. Individual ‘tickets’ need to be filed which for some can mean thousands of reports, each of which required a detailed form to be filled in without a proper tracking mechanism. We trust that this will improve in time but want Twitter to understand the immediacy of the problem.

288. We were concerned to hear conflicting accounts from Twitter itself about the speed and priority with which Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) requests are handled. We were told on the one hand that there was not a specific point of contact for such requests, that
bureaucracy had led to delays and that all requests needed to be passed to the US first for adjudication and on the other hand that there was a specific point of contact, that requests could be prioritised and did not necessarily need to go through the US. The company, which has offices in the UK and whose platform is available here must comply fully and without excuse or exception to British law. Twitter needs to be unambiguous in its approach and clearer in its explanation of its own procedures in this regard.

289. There are however multiple other concerns which apply to all social media. In an age where increasingly, such content is viewed through mobile phones, the respective companies need to enhance their systems for blocking those that repeatedly contravene their stated terms and community standards. Too often, abusers simply get a new phone and continue to abuse others and social media companies need to find innovative solutions to this problem. The British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) which currently regulates much of the content viewed through mobile phones and produces regular reports is doing an excellent job and its current pilot projects in relation to regulation of online music videos may have wider application in the future.

290. Twitter and other social media platforms now act not only as a communications tool but in some cases a form of search engine which can be accessed by children and others. More thought can and should go into the implications of this, which are significant. Whilst we appreciate that there are contextual factors to consider, it is beholden on these companies to look at how they manage search functions and ensure racist and other abuse on their platform where it appears, is downgraded in search indexes and of course ultimately removed.

291. We have already referred to improvements that might be made to CPS guidance in this area. Various Chief Crown Prosecutors and the government have made clear statements about online behaviour. There is an allowance in the law for banning or blocking individuals from certain aspects of internet communication in relation to sexual offences. Informal feedback we have received from policy experts indicates that this is a potential area of exploration for prosecutors in relation to hate crime. If it can be proven in a detailed way that someone has made a considered and determined view to exploit various online networks to harm and perpetrate hate crimes against others then the accepted principles, rules and restrictions that are relevant to sex offences must surely apply. ‘Confiscate and Destroy’ orders have been issued in the past in relation to hate crimes but there is clearly more that can be done to give confidence to the victims of cyber hate.

292. **We recommend that the Crown Prosecution Service undertakes a review to examine the applicability of prevention orders to hate crime offences and if appropriate, take steps to implement them.**

293. Given the scale of social media content produced on a daily let alone minute by minute basis, we have some albeit limited sympathy for the companies that are responsible for hosting it. Whilst there is rightly an expectation on those companies to act as there is on government, police and prosecuting authorities, so too civil society has a crucial role to play. The importance of third-party reporting groups cannot be underestimated and users must be vigilant to seek out and report racist and other abusive content. Volunteers for the ‘UK No Hate Speech Movement’ and others that are helping to provide ‘counter-narratives’ online should be championed and congratulated for their important efforts.

294. **True Vision (www.report-it.org.uk) is a critically important framework for third-party reporting which deserves wider publicity and we recommend the government works with industry partners to organise a prominent awareness campaign about methods for reporting online racist and other abuse.**

295. The conflict between Gaza and Israel in the summer of 2014 was not just a local one and through social media and other means, it was transmitted and felt very personally by large numbers of people. We learned more about this on our visits to other countries in Europe. Whilst there were similarities, the nature of the antisemitism expressed in those countries was often different and there are lessons to be learned which are explored in the next section.

4. ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPE AND THE EVENTS OF JULY/AUGUST 2014

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4. Antisemitism in Europe and the Events of July/August 2014

4.1 Overview

296. We have learned that following the report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has, under successive governments, been working with superior effort within international organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to co-ordinate Europe-wide action against antisemitism and these efforts continue. The OSCE was the first inter-government agency to recognise that antisemitism mutated and did not cease after the Second World War. The 2004 Berlin Declaration committed OSCE Participating States to recognising this development, and to combating it through the provision of specially prepared educational material for high school students in post-Soviet states, training for law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, and other means. To some extent, it led to the development of new European political and legal norms, notably the 2008 EU Common Framework Decision and 2009 OSCE Ministerial Decision on Hate Crime which as we have explained, the UK played a significant role in securing.

297. An OSCE High Level Conference on antisemitism was convened in 2014 to mark the 10th anniversary of the OSCE’s Berlin Declaration on Antisemitism. The conference was also designed to focus on the implementation of OSCE commitments to combating antisemitism by its participating states, review the ‘current situation’ (particularly in the light of events of July/August 2014) and to focus on what more European governments should be doing to protect their Jewish citizens. The resultant press statements from the OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) highlighted the importance of political will and leadership alongside partnerships with key civil society institutions. The OSCE was reported to be well positioned to help deliver a broad approach to tackling antisemitism – one that encompasses the UN, EU, Council of Europe, governments and non-governmental organisations.

298. The German and Swiss political leadership that convened and enabled the delivery of that OSCE conference should of course be applauded for their efforts. However we were passed

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337 ibid
copies of the speech delivered by American Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power, who speaking to participating states, warned that antisemitism across Europe posed a threat to European values of “liberalism, pluralism and freedom” and urged governments to do more. She queried the diminished levels of attendance and senior representation at the 2014 event, compared to that of a decade previous which for her and for us, is a serious concern. Ambassador Power called on European governments to: design concrete action plans for combatting antisemitism, appoint special high-level envoys, hold perpetrators to account, engage civil society to increase incident reports and to speak out against conflating Israel and Jews. Some of these recommendations are referenced in the concluding document presented to the conference, which urged states to redouble their efforts to combat antisemitism.

299. In its papers, the OSCE stated that governments and in particular relevant officials needed to better understand antisemitism. Thankfully, we have an excellent record in this regard. For example and as highlighted in the recent government report on antisemitism, officials from the Ministry of Justice and Foreign and Commonwealth Office have pressed at the OSCE and in other international fora for action to address the challenges posed by hate crime on the internet. This includes OSCE Ministerial Council Decision 9/2009 signed in Athens and which called for participating states to take specific steps to combat hate crime online. We continue at a national level to support OSCE efforts and a DCLG Minister attended and delivered a speech at the 2014 Berlin conference.

300. It is right and proper that the UK should continue to take a leadership role within the OSCE. We recommend that Britain continues to send high level representation to key events in order to show our dedication to tackling antisemitism at home and abroad. In addition, we recommend that commitments we make in OSCE fora should be implemented fully and in a timely way.

301. Despite attempts by the OSCE to combat antisemitism, the viability of Jewish communities in Europe was called into question by the FRA attitudes survey. In that report, roughly half of the European Jews that were surveyed said that they had contemplated emigrating.

340 Ibid
as a result of antisemitism. It appears that something is not working and whilst some efforts are being made on a pan-European level to combat antisemitism, it is clear that individual states vary widely in their approaches. Members of our inquiry and other parliamentarians visited a number of countries in Europe in order to better ascertain the situation in relation to antisemitism, with a particular focus on the events of July/August 2014 and the lessons that could be learned.

4.2 Germany:

302. We were told in various meetings in Germany that antisemitism exists on the far-left, and far-right of the political spectrum and within the immigrant Turkish Muslim population. A number of those we spoke to also referred to a general latent antisemitism amongst one fifth of the population. This is a concept divined from a German expert report from 2011, commissioned by the Bundestag and modelled on the UK All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism. As befits its troubled past, Germany is appropriately sensitive to concerns about antisemitism and has adopted a foreign policy position which is strongly supportive of Israel. We were told that this approach has itself caused some of the hostility towards Jews in Germany.

303. Representatives of the Jewish community in Germany told us that they have undergone significant growth following an influx from the Former Soviet Union. In addition to assimilating these recent arrivals into their community, they undertake a number of successful educational outreach programmes with, amongst others, the German army, police and Football Association. They have an adult education centre which provides Jewish cultural and historical lessons for any interested person and we were told that 80% of those attending the Jewish cultural week were interested non-Jews and that the impact was positive. This underlines the importance of UK phenomenon like the Jewish community centre JW3, the Jewish Book Week and Film Festival.

304. There were also some very positive interfaith initiatives that the Jewish community run in partnership with Muslim groups. Berlin’s Rabbi Alter co-founded the ‘Need to Respect’ initiative in which a rabbi and an imam join together to speak to groups of children be they Muslim, Jewish or from any other background.

305. Concern about antisemitism has been building amongst the Jewish community and others. Tensions have been at their highest during public debates on ritual slaughter (2008 and 2010), circumcision (2012) and during periods of increased tension in the Middle East, including in July/August 2014. The Jewish community, journalists, NGOs and politicians all

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related to us that in respect of the latest round of protests, individuals campaigning against Israel's actions appeared to be more self-confident, open, outspoken and aggressive in their campaigns. Moreover the ‘taboo of antisemitism’ we were told, had been broken and chants relating to Israel were focussed on the Jews. We were informed that letters and emails to the community that were once from seemingly poorly educated, anonymous individuals had become well-formulated and signed. Meanwhile, foreign satellite TV programmes continued to broadcast antisemitic material into many homes.

306. The collection methods for antisemitic incidents in Germany are not as well developed as in the UK and so there is debate about their accuracy and the related analysis. As far as we could ascertain, incident levels remain relatively constant (despite a significant degree of under-reporting) but as noted above, the intensity and openness of the hatred had increased.

307. Whilst the initial response of the authorities to antisemitism that manifested during the July/August Middle East tensions was said to be slow, we were told that efforts improved over time. However, according to those we met, attempts to prosecute protestors and antisemitic abuse have generally been unsuccessful. The situation in which Jews hide their head coverings and require security measures outside their institutions has become normalised and communal anguish is high.

308. The response of the German polity was resolute and the Chancellor herself addressed a rally against antisemitism in Berlin whilst the Foreign Minister released a joint statement with his French and Italian counterparts. The German police meanwhile are working to improve their intelligence picture following the rallies over the summer, although this is linked to German counter-terrorism efforts. German Interior Ministry officials related details to us of their proactive efforts to combat antisemitism. These included a civic education and awareness course, a cross-sector partnership which considers how best to combat online crime and an NGO forum of some 54 organisations, which undertakes a critical private discourse on racism.

309. As opposed to the UK, there is evidence of political discord over the approach to combatting antisemitism. The governing CDU party has not joined the cross-party parliamentary group on antisemitism and were the subject of attack from opposition MPs. In addition, accusations were levelled that the government seeks to blame the far-left and Islamists for antisemitism for fear of upsetting the core of society, where we were told, the problem is equally shared.

310. The result of the political disunity was troubling. As noted, the German parliament had commissioned a group of academics to prepare a report on antisemitism, modelled somewhat on the British approach. The Jewish community and opposition parliamentarians alike are concerned that the recommendations of that report remain unfulfilled. However, the political parties have recently negotiated the establishment of a second expert commission.


349 Meetings in Berlin with Volker Beck MP and Interior Ministry Director Jorg Bentmann.
4.3 France:

311. The situation for French Jewry in relation to antisemitism is very grave indeed. Although Jews only constitute some 1% of French society, 40% of the racist crimes in 2013 were perpetrated against them.\footnote{Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive, Jewish Community Security Service, 2013, Report on Antisemitism in France, available at http://www.antisemitisme.org/dl/SPCJ-2013-EN.pdf} As this report went to print, the threat to Jews in France was tragically emphasised as a jihadi gunman took a number of innocent people hostage in a kosher deli, resulting in the deaths of four people.\footnote{BBC, 2015, Charlie Hebdo hunt: Police storm two hostage sites, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30752239}

312. The problem is multi-faceted and complex and this has led to a degree of confusion and malaise within the French polity. Concerns raised with us during our visit included: the poor economic situation in France and resultant success of the far-right, the general disillusionment with politics, the absence of a proper cohesion or integration plan, the vacuum of religious debate and associated ability of Islamist extremists to benefit from French secularism, an historic absence of political support or recognition of the problems of antisemitism until the 1990s, the Middle East conflict, the inability of the French to reconcile themselves to their complicity in the Holocaust, lack of proper resource for tackling antisemitism and the strength of a populist movement built on a hybrid of classic far-right antisemitism merged with a more modern far-left antisemitism come anti-Zionism which incorporates suspicion of ‘the system’.

313. The Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives (CRIF) which represents 68 Jewish organisations reported to us a mass exodus of Jews from France. Whilst some of the emigration is said to relate to the precarious economic situation, antisemitism is still believed to be a major motivating factor. Incident figures have risen manifold and in recent years\footnote{Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive, Jewish Community Security Service, various, Rapports annuels sur l’antisémitisme en France depuis, available at http://antisemitisme.org/telechargement/#} and the intensity of antisemitic discourse and activity has increased, including a number of antisemitic murders. French Jews are regularly abused in public and avoid identifying themselves (although, in secular France this would not necessarily be completely atypical) meanwhile Jewish students are said to be moving out of state education. In the Parisian suburb Sarcelles, trust in the police force is so low that members of the Jewish community registering complaints have been advised to ensure they are accompanied to the station so that their reports can be corroborated.\footnote{Meeting with French MPs}

314. As the fighting between Israel and Gaza intensified over the summer, the situation in France destabilised. There was an urban revolt and nearly a civil war in parts of Paris, with guerrillas on the street. We were told by students and parliamentarians that police in Sarcelles had informed the Jewish community that if rioters passed defensive lines, the Jews would have to fend for themselves. This has led to a communal fear of state impotence and isolated
incidents of Jewish vigilantism. Some marches were banned (and some took place anyway with increased violence). The authorities were said to have been caught off-guard but later tightened their grip, meanwhile sensible groups moved into the space created by the radical marches and managed to arrange peaceful demonstrations. There is a strong case for the UK police to learn from this and to note that relevant authorities should look to identify, foster and support responsible protests.

315. Whilst various educational initiatives have been proposed and enacted by the Jewish community, their impact is unquantifiable. The French Union of Jewish students (EUFJ) in particular have had some success in tackling antisemitism online but are also facing significant difficulties. The organisation believes its neighbours fear of a far-right attack on the openly Jewish group, has contributed to a joint effort to have it removed from its premises. The students recounted for us stories of one Jewish society being forced to move from a central hub at one university for ‘security reasons’ and on another campus, the names of Jews having been daubed on a wall resulting in some students requiring bodyguards.

316. Although there have been some notable exceptions in their discourse, generally the political elite responded well. Statements were issued by Ministers and security increased significantly. We were told that the Prime Minister had prioritised fighting antisemitism (something the President made a national cause for 2015) and were alerted to the fact that the Presidential campaigns were halted after the Toulouse murders of 2012. Government officials highlighted one particular training programme for civil servants but its efficacy and resourcing was challenged by others that we met. In addition, we were alerted to concerns about the lack of prosecutions for antisemitic hate crime.

317. When challenged about their plans, officials from the French interior ministry suggested that antisemitic incident statistics (and the response to them) should be understood according to a five year timeframe and that current analysis is too ad-hoc. They also highlighted their strong stance against the French “comedian” Dieudonné M’bala whom seems to be a lightning rod for much of the antisemitism percolating in popular culture. The officials stated their belief that rather than mass antisemitism in France, there is an amplification of particular acts through social media. To its credit, the French Government established a cross-government task force on antisemitism two and a half years ago to look at education and training but no additional funding has been allocated to the programme.

318. The parliamentarians that we met appeared concerned about antisemitism but did not think France was a European exception. They highlighted the strict separation of religion and state and the consequential difficulty, as they saw it, of establishing parliamentary groups


358 Meeting with French Prefect Regis Guyot, Interior Ministry
like the APPG Against Antisemitism. They also raised concerns both about the impact of returning Jihadis and the National Front’s increasing credibility but had no particular plans to deal with the problem. It is of course, regrettable that there is no French all-party group on antisemitism. It would be valuable to have French parliamentarians more involved in international efforts to combat antisemitism and we encourage them to enhance their engagement with the ICCA and other groups. This would be welcome, particularly in light of recent events in France.\(^\text{359}\)

319. In overview, we were told antisemitism in France is not a short-term but rather a structural problem and in some part linked to the economy. The vast complexity of the issue has left government and parliament alike uncertain about how it should be tackled.

320. On a more positive note, central anti-racist organisations in civil society, including SOS-Racismé have taken up the cudgels in the fight against antisemitism.\(^\text{360}\) Whilst admitting a sense of fatigue about the extent to which they are having to address the problem, their leadership are determined to work with the Jewish and Muslim communities to face down discrimination.

4.4 The Netherlands:

321. In comparison to the visits to Berlin and Paris, the messages emanating from Amsterdam and The Hague were more complex and contradictory. Incidences of antisemitic violence against the 45,000 Jews are infrequent and yet when they do occur are sometimes linked to the Middle East conflict (such as stones being thrown at a women displaying an Israeli flag on her balcony.\(^\text{361}\)). However, the Jewish community believes that whilst Holland fared better than other European states, there was a rise in antisemitism through the summer albeit an under-reported one.

322. Whilst, we were told, Jew-hatred emanates from the extreme right and from academics on the far-left the main concern, particularly during the summer, related to the mainly Moroccan and Turkish Muslim population. In the Netherlands as elsewhere, interfaith links were severed as a result of the conflict and we have made recommendations elsewhere in this report about strengthening such ties which we believe should be intensified during periods of international conflict.

323. In the broader political context, the Jewish community have felt particularly unsettled and concerned about the debates over ritual slaughter\(^\text{362}\) and circumcision\(^\text{363}\) and felt there was

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some antisemitic motivation behind them. Relations with the Muslim community in respect of these issues and others are generally good so long as the Israel-Palestine conflict is not discussed and we were told that Middle East tensions contributed to a breakdown of relations over the summer.

324. The Jewish community worries about latent antisemitism too. The Minister of Social Affairs is Jewish and whilst his policies are attacked, this tends to be accompanied by mentions of his Jewish genealogy. We also discussed issues relating to Ajax were discussed but mirror much of the debate about Tottenham Hotspur in the UK. The Dutch FA does have relevant powers and there have been occasions when large groups of extremists were removed from the stadium with little resultant press coverage364.

325. In contrast to some other countries it was the younger generation that appeared most unsettled in the Netherlands, whilst the older generation was somewhat more content. Those amongst us that visited a Dutch Jewish school, spoke of their ‘profound shock’ and distress at the responses from the students. Amongst the youth, over half stated an intention to move to Israel, in most cases for fear of antisemitic attack, and spoke of their concern about social media. They saw attacks in Brussels and France “like a shark, coming to get us” and although experiences and opinions were diverse, there were some appalling stories of antisemitic bullying. Numerous students and teachers had gone so far as to remove mezuzahs (identifying Jewish artefacts placed on a door post) from outside their houses. In particular, demonstrations during the summer at which antisemitic chants had been shouted, were of concern to them. Most palpably worrying was the genuine fear that so many of the students expressed about their future lives as Jews in Holland.

326. The response of the authorities seems to have been generally good. The Jewish community is able to secure high-level meetings at short notice and was happy with both the public denunciations of antisemitism365 and public promises of efforts to improve education. Most of the political parties spoke out against the anti-Jewish prejudice and in particular, the Christian parties were supportive. When a civil servant tweeted about Jewish conspiracy theories, she was immediately suspended366. The Minister for Social Affairs visited a synagogue and a mosque and the government increased security funding for the community. Whilst the resultant improved security measures, including police boxes outside some 15 Jewish communal buildings are welcomed by the community, this has also raised anxiety levels about the propensity for attacks.

327. Where Dutch Mayors (similar to UK police commissioners) took action and “didn’t make it someone else’s problem”367 as in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, demonstrations passed without
incident. Where they failed to, as we were told was the case for The Hague, antisemitism was evident. The approach of the Mayor of Amsterdam in particular was impressive and generally well-regarded by others. He spoke out immediately, publicly and had political cover to do so. Even critics who argued that his initial response was slow, accept that he caught up quickly. Although in a similar fashion to the UK police, the typical response of the Dutch forces is precautionary so as to prevent potential escalations in public disorder, the Mayor of Amsterdam felt that people and in particular the Jewish community required action to be visible. He worked in a triumvirate partnership with police and prosecutors to make this happen. The lack of subsequent prosecutions is of concern to the community whom feel other forms of racism are better prosecuted but this was put down by the authorities to a lack of prosecutable incidents.

328. In general the government has a responsible approach to matters of integration, discrimination and antisemitism. It has: run awareness raising campaigns about discrimination, established hotlines, sought to build capacity in civil society groups, offered appropriate prosecution guidelines and has proper monitoring, training and criminal sentencing in place, including where appropriate, compulsory visits to the Anne Frank House and to Auschwitz. There are appropriate accountability frameworks and the government has even sought to challenge the existing liberal approach to free speech in reaction to what it considered to be racist incitement by Gert Wilders and others. During our visit, the government held a special conference about integration and in addition, departments meet regularly to discuss discrimination.

4.5 Ireland

329. The situation of the Irish Jewish community is very different to those we visited in other countries. The community numbers some 2000 members and is not therefore particularly visible. Antisemitic incidents were few and far between. Nonetheless Irish Jewry are concerned about antisemitism and were at a state of heightened alert and vulnerability during the summer period. The synagogue and Jewish centre in Dublin were considered soft targets, especially after the attack on the Brussels Jewish museum and as a result, the doors of the synagogue were made bullet-proof.

330. One particularly shocking incident from the summer related to a former ‘GAA’ football player whom had tweeted: “If you are lucky enough to know or work with a Jew, punch him right on the nose tomorrow” followed by an expletive. The excuse he offered subsequently was: “...for any offence caused... you’re sitting there watching the news and you’re thinking this is not right... I am not in the public eye and it was just a joke to the people I hang around with.” The PSNI investigated but no action has been reported368. Online comments boards and social media were highlighted by Irish Jewry as they had been by the communities we visited, as a serious cause for concern. Numerous attendees referenced casual antisemitism in media reports including the use of the word Zionism. Other incidents did occur over the

summer and the synagogue reported that their communal offices received numerous calls about Israeli policy which went “from zero to Hitler in 60 seconds”\textsuperscript{369}. When they did speak out in the press, the community told us that they had received envelopes containing powder and pictures of Nazis in the post.

331. There was a general consensus that there were strong enough laws in place to combat antisemitism but it was suggested that people needed to be better motivated to report incidents. Unfortunately, there is no all-party structure for addressing antisemitism and we were told that not all parties were fully committed to doing so. In particular, concerns were registered about Sinn Fein. As a result, the Jewish community is left to lead the fight against Jew-hatred and some of their number queried whether their invisibility is part of an unarticulated fear they have about openly displaying and expressing their religious identity. Conversely, the community admitted that it sometimes is too introverted and should take the opportunity to speak out more often.

332. Other civil society institutions had given rise to concerns. In particular aid agencies were said to have set unhelpful terms for the debate in the Middle East and the Holocaust Commemorative committee was singled out for criticism for explicitly isolating Israel from its work\textsuperscript{370}.

333. Whilst these various incidents may seem and indeed are shocking, the message we received in Ireland was that the community does not experience antisemitism on an ongoing or regular basis and most live their lives without ever experiencing it. However, the experiences in Ireland show that however small a community is, the authorities must be vigilant against antisemitism.

4.6 Learning Points and Recommendations:

4.6.1 Education:

334. When asked to offer their proposed solutions to increasing antisemitism, individuals, community groups, officials and others all highlighted the critical importance of education. It is perhaps pertinent to recognise some British best practice in this regard that we touched upon in an earlier chapter. Whereas in other countries, we were told that Holocaust education is lacking or at least underfunded, in the UK we are lucky to have excellent provision from outstanding providers. The Holocaust Educational Trust, the Centre for Holocaust Education at the Institute of Education, the National Holocaust Centre and Museum, the Anne Frank Trust, the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust and others are tremendous organisations which have been acknowledged for their help in broadening the knowledge base of both students and teachers across our country\textsuperscript{371}.

\textsuperscript{369} Meeting with Jewish communal representatives and others

\textsuperscript{370} Meeting with Jewish communal representatives and others in Dublin

It is particularly important that, as schools move towards a more streamlined national curriculum and the number of survivors diminishes, Holocaust education does not suffer and governments of any party make continuing long term commitments to supporting it as Britain must remain a world force in this area. The Prime Minister’s Holocaust Commission was due to announce its findings in the month that this report went to print. That cross-party commission signals a commitment from the top level of government and indeed all parties in this regard. We note only our hope that any announcement about the commission is accompanied by the requisite planning and funding plan for the future.

We recommend that the government makes and seeks all-party commitment to a long-term plan for and continuing state funding of Holocaust education.

There is also room for improvement where Holocaust education in the UK is concerned. The Centre for Holocaust Education at the Institute of Education has undertaken some ground-breaking research with input from more than 9500 secondary school students. There were some interesting and troubling findings. In statistics relating to the knowledge-base of secondary school students aged 11-18, it was found that: 89.5% of students identified the correct definition of racism. 87% the correct definition of homophobia, 53% the definition of Islamophobia, 45.8% genocide and less than a third, 31.8%, correctly identified antisemitism. Taken together with earlier research performed by the Centre, this data should serve as a guide for teachers.

It is important students have access to appropriate materials and knowledge for what is a sensitive and challenging subject. To that end it is critically important that the Holocaust education being delivered across the country be evidence-based. That is, developed according to the evidence of teacher and student attitudes, knowledge and practices. The statistics we have outlined give us cause for concern. If less than a third of secondary school students know what antisemitism is then teacher training and educational materials need to be duly reviewed, amended and appropriately targeted.

We recommend that the government increases its grant for the evidence-based teacher training conducted by the Centre for Holocaust Education at the Institute of Education, with a view to expanding its work and the number of teachers it is able to train.

Holocaust Education is as we have noted, critically important but so too is wider education about our shared and diverse backgrounds. Cultural and interfaith or inter-religious dialogue can have a disproportionately positive impact on different faith communities. There were examples of good practice we discovered on our visits abroad which we in the UK might follow. These tended to rely on humanising or putting a face to unfamiliar concepts including the various religious traditions. We were specifically informed that where possible

373 Woolf Institute reports, various, available at http://www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/resources/reports.asp
educational initiatives about antisemitism should be multi-faith in order that a message of shared resistance to it can be conveyed. So too, we were told that careful thought needs to go into sourcing the right interlocutors for various communities of differing backgrounds and that the importance of outward facing Jewish educational initiatives cannot be underestimated.

341. Irrespective of any particular initiative, the most urgent message, from a number of sources was that it should not be left to the Jewish people to fight antisemitism alone. In comparison to the countries we visited and as we noted earlier in this report, there is a distinct lack of co-ordinated effort from within the anti-racism movement in the UK (with the exception of Hope Not Hate) to educate about and combat antisemitism. This requires serious attention. So too, the Jewish community could and should broaden its links within that movement in order to better equip anti-racist organisations to act. Where this has happened in France, such as with SoS Racisme, it has proven successful.

342. We have already outlined our recommendations about intensified interfaith co-operation during periods of conflict in the Middle East. The Israel-Palestine conflict has the potential to ignite considerable passion in people. Irrespective of anybody’s view of what is happening it is important that our children do not become political tools in a foreign battle. Whilst there have previously been attempts to provide balanced guidance in the UK on how to teach the conflict and in particular to cater to the potential for increased discrimination against Muslim and Jewish pupils, there appears to be a somewhat of a void at present (albeit with some exceptions). We know that the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism is currently looking to support the Schools Linking Network in an effort to develop a practical guide for teachers wanting to engage young people in difficult conversations but there is certainly a research gap in this area and educational organisations in the UK should consider how best it can be filled.

343. We recommend that relevant officials on the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism identify suitable partners to seek appropriate redress for the lack of educational resources for teachers about how to sensitively handle the Middle East conflict in the classroom and in particular to support Jewish, Muslim and other pupils in what can be difficult circumstances.

375 Meetings with NGO's and MPs in Berlin and Paris
4.6.2 Political Institutions

344. In all the European countries we visited, there were well-established government and decision-making structures. As has been related, in some cases like France and the Netherlands, cross-government working groups were in place and in others like Germany, reports on antisemitism had been commissioned. Of course, there is not a uniform approach nor should there be. However, it was pleasing to see that the UK model was held in high regard and that both the UK Cross-Government Working Group and All-Party Parliamentary Group were respected models of international good practice. This vindicates the all-party approach to combatting antisemitism, which political parties on all sides should note carefully. Where party political battles have ensued, it has generally been Jewish citizens that have suffered the fallout.

345. One model that bears consideration by UK Ministers and officials is the NGO forum convened by the German Interior Ministry. It might be that similar forums on a smaller scale could be convened by the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism both at times of increased Middle East tension and in general. For example, a meeting convened by the working group in which Jewish communal representatives could have met with key trading bodies about the threat to kosher food, might have been a useful addition to this summer’s activities or as we set out earlier meetings with protest organisers so that they might be better brief their stewards and web moderators.

346. **We recommend that the Cross-Government Working Group seeks to establish a calendar of engagement and crisis planning procedures for meetings to address antisemitism in those areas of British public life giving the greatest cause for concern. This should include a broader engagement with NGOs.**

347. The British embassies that helped to co-ordinate our visits were courteous and appeared to be doing an excellent job of representing UK interests abroad. We were however concerned that particularly in relation to France, there had been minimal focus on reporting back the veracity and scale of antisemitic rioting which had taken place in the summer, despite staff having been acutely aware of the problem. With an established pattern of tension in the Middle East leading to antisemitic attacks, it would be wise for key officials at the FCO in London to be advising embassies to pay considered attention to these matters, so that an appropriate global intelligence picture can be drawn, Ministers briefed appropriately and practical measures put in place in the UK. Where appropriate they should certainly be raising the matter with host governments, as the embassy in Berlin do so effectively.

348. Whilst Ministers have raised terrorism with French and German counterparts in particular, antisemitism does not appear to have been raised by successive UK governments at Ministerial level with France or Germany. This is an omission. Whilst the government does not hold a central record of the matter being raised[^380], minutes of such Ministerial meetings will of course be taken and in countries where antisemitism is a serious concern, it would be wise for embassies to keep appropriate records.

349. We recommend that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office enhance its systems for co-ordinating feedback from embassies specifically to plan for antisemitism during times of increased tension in the Middle East and where appropriate brief Ministers to raise the matter with foreign counterparts.

4.6.3 Policing

350. We have addressed UK policing already in this report. It was however interesting to learn from many of those we met that both the French and German authorities and in some cases the Dutch too, were considered to have been caught off guard by the level of violence and open antisemitism that occurred at public rallies in particular.

351. As we learned in the Netherlands, the role of the Mayor in Amsterdam in partnership with his colleagues was key to both the public perception of action taken and the more peaceful nature of the rallies that took place. There is much to be learned from his public-facing and publicly aware approach. The levels of co-ordination were impressive and particularly for London and Manchester but elsewhere too, authorities and specifically police commissioners should be looking at this model and the mayor’s rationale for his actions.

352. We recommend that the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and Mayoral offices in London and Manchester perform a short case study of the Mayor of Amsterdam’s approach to policing during the conflict and update their thinking and preparedness procedures accordingly.

353. We further recommend that the Metropolitan Police and College of Policing organises for representatives from relevant forces to visit Paris to meet with police officials and Jewish community organisations to learn the lessons of the extreme antisemitic violence that manifested over the summer of 2014.

354. We have fully considered political protests in an earlier section of this report but it is important to reiterate that given the nature of the antisemitic incidents not just in the UK but across Europe, that police forces look to identify, foster and support responsible protests, engaging organisers at an early stage to set expectations about both online and real world activity.

355. As Lord Sacks said in the House of Lords, we must recognise “the power of the internet and social media to turn any local conflict into a global one”. Social media is a global phenomenon and one that, despite the multitude of benefits it provides, assists the globalisation of antisemitism and can make communities feel more acutely at risk. As the CST put it, “antisemitism is no longer contained between victim and perpetrator” and this helps explain the concerns expressed not just by British but Dutch, German, French and Irish Jews and no doubt countless others during the summer.

381 Meeting with the Mayor of Amsterdam, Jewish communal representatives, Journalists, Officials and others
383 CST Written Submission
356. As we set out in an earlier section, social media companies need to think of innovative solutions to this such as sponsored advertising and counter-speech. However, it is beholden on the European community to arrive at a common understanding on the dangers posed by internet hate and to plan accordingly. There are a number of forums for action in Europe. We know that at least one unit in the Directorate-General for Justice of the European Commission is working on implementation of European Framework Decisions pertaining to racism and xenophobia. We believe UK officials should be seeking to mainstream discussion of social media into such existing forums and that our contemporaries in the European Parliament should be considering these matters with some urgency. In addition, our police should be on a par with, if not leading European and indeed international counterparts in efforts to combat online hate crime. In order to be world leaders, our police must be properly resourced.

357. We recommend that officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other relevant departments pursue a strategy of mainstreaming concerns about social media and cyber hate into existing discussion forums in Europe including the EU Fundamental Rights Agency working groups on hate crime, with a view to securing further Ministerial decisions.

358. We recommend that the government offers additional resources to the police to enhance and develop policing and investigation of online hate crime.

359. Whilst the UK has some good practice in place, there are a number of lessons to learn from other European countries. As our world becomes more globalised and social media enables deeper connections between people, our response to antisemitism and other forms of racism must become more conjoined and effective. We will endeavour to share the findings of our inquiry with colleagues in Europe and elsewhere and allowing for national variances, hope that this will be another link in the chain of a better co-ordinated attack on anti-Jewish prejudice.

360. The UK employs a number of internationally-recognised good practices in combatting antisemitism. We recommend that the government works with civil society groups to design a simple toolkit that can be distributed in European and international fora to serve both as a guide to official efforts for combatting antisemitism and as a celebration of UK achievements in the field.
5. ADDRESSING ANTISEMITIC DISCOURSE

5.1 Nazi and Holocaust Analogies
5.2 Accusations of Dual Loyalty and Malign Influence
5.3 ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Jews
5.4 Educating About Language
5. Addressing Antisemitic Discourse

361. The 2006 report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism included an in-depth review of antisemitic discourse and its constituent parts\(^\text{384}\). Some of the fundamental points outlined included that: such discourse is not targeted at a specific victim but Jews as a group; can be found in media, public statements or private interactions; has wide ramifications; tends to reflect some of the features of historical antisemitism, playing on myths and stereotypes; is harder to identify than physical attack and is more easily recognised by those that experience it than those that engage in it; and that it has become more subtle as lines of acceptable discourse have become blurred.

362. As with the last parliamentary report, this one follows an upsurge in antisemitism entwined with heightened tensions in the Middle East and it appears that there continues to be great confusion now as there was in 2006 in relation to how society understands anti-Jewish prejudice. As we touched on in our introduction and other parts of this report and as the last inquiry referenced, anti-Israel discourse can, at times, become polluted by antisemitism and it is important to identify whether or not this has occurred and when people are simply using foreign conflicts as a proxy for racism.

363. It is important to note that there are not explicitly defined boundaries about what public figures who are dissatisfied with Israel’s, or indeed any other country’s actions should or should not say. Some comments will be illegal, some discriminatory or offensive but others might simply lack common sense. In analysing antisemitic discourse we aim to explore where language has become unacceptable but there is room for the design of clearer guidelines or rules of good practice to be established on a cross-party basis, perhaps with the assistance of the CST.

364. The panel of MPs that produced the 2006 report looked specifically at the significance of discourse and were told that “the significance of public discourse is that it influences attitudes which in turn influence actions”\(^\text{385}\). A scale of influence was established and at the most extreme level, this was said to include the rhetoric of terrorist groups that see Israel’s policies as a justification to attack all Jews and increase tension between communities. The inquiry also established that action taken by police against various groups in the 1990s had led to a decrease in antisemitic incidents.

365. The previous inquiry furthermore looked quite specifically at themes in antisemitic discourse including anti-Zionism, conspiracy theories, the blood libel and Holocaust denial. We won’t repeat the basic principles outlined in that document and interested parties should review the contents of the relevant chapter. However there are some elements of the various discourses

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\(^{385}\) Ibid
that exist which have continued\textsuperscript{386}, developed, worsened or indeed seeped into mainstream public consciousness since the last inquiry which need addressing. Both the trivialisation and relativisation of the Holocaust, and accusations of dual loyalty are themes that have continued\textsuperscript{387}, modified and in some cases exacerbated in recent years and particularly during the summer and so merit review.

\section*{5.1 Nazi and Holocaust Analogies}

\textsuperscript{366} We have touched upon the inappropriate use of Holocaust imagery by public figures but this was not confined to that group and was employed by activists and demonstrators amongst others both online and off\textsuperscript{388}. As we have stated, a third of the incidents reported to the CST over the summer period used Holocaust-related language or imagery. It is perhaps logical to separate out three separate strands of potential offence that such discourse inflicted.

\textsuperscript{367} The study by Professor David Feldman, commissioned to assist this report has guided much of our deliberation about these matters. In his paper, Professor Feldman argues that where reference to the Holocaust and National Socialism took the form of statements such as ‘Hitler was right’, they were antisemitic “because they endorsed a figure - Hitler - whose political ideology was shaped by a malign stereotyped image of ‘the Jew’ and whose policies discriminated against Jews as he stripped millions of their rights, including their right to life”\textsuperscript{389}. He continues that “the statement that ‘Hitler was right’, made in the context of a demonstration against Israel, invokes both a set of antisemitic stereotypes and a genocidal project targeted at Jews”.

\textsuperscript{368} More broadly, attempts were made to draw analogies between Nazi inhumaneness and the summer conflict including references to Gaza as a ‘concentration camp’ and Israel if not on a par with Nazi Germany, then at least as perpetrating a Holocaust or genocide. Professor Feldman suggests that such comparisons are “grossly misleading” given the intent, scale and consequences of the Holocaust and adds that such analogies can “diminish the Holocaust”. He continues that “the analogies are doubly offensive because they take a disaster inflicted on Jews and use it as a stick with which to chastise the State of Israel, established in 1948 as ‘a Jewish state.’”. We know that the majority of Jews do find this comparison to be offensive from the opinion surveys to which we have already referred. One of the potential risks of using such comparisons is that they might be seen to confer legitimacy of attacks on Jews.

\textsuperscript{369} A third round of offence was also perpetrated by those that suggested the Jews as victims of the Nazis should know better and have learned the lessons of the Holocaust. Professor Feldman suggests that aside from the lessons of history rarely being self-evident, that we “may sympathise with those who are offended by the idea that an episode of suffering

\textsuperscript{386} Gidley, B., 2015, 50 Days in the summer


\textsuperscript{388} Gidley, B., 2015, 50 Days in the summer

\textsuperscript{389} Feldman, D., 2014, Sub-Report for the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism
and slaughter should be turned into an object lesson with which to lecture Jews on how to behave”.

370. There was some debate between those from whom we took expert testimony regarding the nuances of the definition of antisemitism when it comes to Nazi comparison. It was noted that whilst sometimes it can be wrong, misleading and hurtful not all comparisons are antisemitic and there is a key question of context and intent. That intent was said by Professor Paul Iganski to be particularly important as many that use certain Nazi imagery “know full well it hurts”. Dr Ben Gidley supports this assertion, arguing that application of a ‘Holocaust inversion” as the frame for understanding the actions of the Jewish state “is not neutral” given the rarity of its use in other protests.

371. Finally, there has been some discussion of the breadth of recourse to Holocaust and Nazi analogies. As Professor Feldman wrote, it is important to promote understanding of National Socialism and the Holocaust as real historical phenomena and not merely phenomena with a symbolic value. This is of course correct and we have already made a recommendation about effective Holocaust education.

5.2 Accusations of Dual Loyalty and Malign Influence

372. Together with the various Holocaust and Nazi references that were made during July/August 2014, were increasing allusions to Jews having a ‘dual loyalty’. During the 2006 All-Party Inquiry into Antisemitism, Professor David Cesarani described the “conditional tolerance” of Jews which prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He set out how Jews were “tolerated as long as they resembled other English people, adopted British values and did not raise issues specific to their community”. That ‘antisemitism of tolerance’ was said to have conditioned Jewish life in Britain and “Jews seeking to be treated in any way different from the majority were accused of dual loyalty”.

373. Further exploring the history of dual loyalty accusations, which have developed since 2006, Professor David Feldman told us that “The idea that Jews conspire to shape public policy so that it serves Jewish interests is closely related to the notion that Jews in general (that is to say, not only powerful Jews) reserve their loyalty for Jewish interests only”. Professor Feldman suggests that these are “time worn” ideas which “have played a significant role in modern Britain” and cites the example of those Liberal and Radical opponents of the Boer War who viewed the conflict in South Africa as one “pursued by the British government in the interests of Jewish mine owners and financiers” and who asserted that “popular support for the war should be explained by the Jews’ control of the press”. Such historical examples in which antisemitism featured in mainstream political discourse were said by Professor Feldman to “provide a rough and ready point of comparison with present-day accusations that Jews

390 Ibid
392 Feldman, D., 2014, Sub-Report for the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism
constitute some sort of ‘fifth column’.” As the 2006 inquiry into antisemitism rightly stated, the experience of multiple identities is common to all minority communities in modern Britain but questions about Jewish loyalties to Britain have been raised by far-right groups and others particularly since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

374. Dual loyalty accusations appear to have become increasingly mainstreamed during the summer months of 2014 and afterwards. In an earlier section we highlighted some of the incidents of concern that had occurred in relation to public figures. Close examination of some of the language that was used can help to better explain the nature of those concerns. A Liberal Democrat MP tweeted: ‘Need to expose pro-Israel control of MPs against recognition.’ As Professor Feldman noted, “the use of the words ‘expose’ and ‘control’ suggest covert manipulation and though the MP did not state that he had in mind Jewish supporters of Israel, in view of the fact that Jews have long been accused of exerting a ‘hidden hand’ over policy, it is not surprising that some people inferred that this is what he meant”.

375. When a Conservative MP referred to a ‘well-funded and powerful Jewish lobby’ in the United States being a ‘huge problem’, he unwittingly characterised the lobby for Israel which does exist and seeks influence, as ‘Jewish’ which as Professor Feldman told us “erroneously suggests that Jews speak with one voice on Israel and that they are blind to the United States’ national interest”. So too Professor Feldman argued that when a Liberal Democrat Baroness suggested that ‘all lobbies are dangerous and undemocratic’ but that the Israel lobby is ‘particularly dangerous’ and is ‘the thing that dare not speak its name’ that it “requires a degree of charity not to suggest that this was a reference to hidden, malign Jewish power.”

376. References to and interest in the ‘Jewish lobby’ was not only a feature of political debate. One article in the Independent referenced, in respect of its policies on Israel and Palestine, the behaviour of Jewish voters for and donors to the Labour party. This “extended the frame” said Professor Feldman, beyond the influence of formally constituted lobby groups. Whilst there were unattributed quotes in the article, the treatment of Jews as an “undifferentiated body, united in their support for Israel and collectively determined to punish the Labour party” said Feldman is a caricature which could be labelled antisemitic for evoking a stereotype of Jewish people being politically active “but taking account of Jewish interests only”. Professor Feldman does however argue that this would be a harsh judgement given it is “one example of the widespread tendency to generalise when discussing ethnic or national voting patterns”. We were warned however of “the capacity of this sort of article to generate troubling stereotypes” given a reference to ‘the Jewish lobby’ was made when the article was discussed on the BBC News Channel. We note

393 Twitter, 2014, status, available at: https://twitter.com/DavidWardMP/status/526069599981563904
394 Ibid
that the language used to collectively describe Jews was raised again in this regard in early 2015. 398

377. Of course lobbying for Israel is performed by groups both inside and outside parliament in the same way many groups operate lobbies for any number of countries. That they seek to influence policy is a legitimate part of our democratic system. So too, the Jewish community has a wide range of opinions about the conflict as we have set out earlier. Leading figures and commentators in public life must be clear that it is inaccurate to use the term ‘Jewish lobby’ which used in this context is antisemitic and that there is nothing disreputable about the existence of an Israel lobby. Sadly, antisemitic stereotypes of Jewish influence and dual loyalty, albeit not as prolific as in other periods of modern British history, were used during Operation Protective Edge 399 and afterwards and as Professor Feldman put it, emerged “from all points of the political spectrum” 400.

5.3 ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ Jews

378. Over the course of the summer, there were a number of references in the media to the categorisation of Jews into categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ by Liberal-minded elites, based on their views on Israel 401. The most prominent example cited as proof of this, is the decision taken by the Tricycle Theatre to dissociate itself from the UK Jewish Film Festival (UKJFF).

379. As we set out in another section, the Tricycle Theatre requested that the UKJFF “reconsider” sponsorship it received from the Israeli Embassy. In his sub-report, Professor Feldman references an editorial in the Guardian which is helpful in establishing the sensitivities of the Israel debate for many Jews 402. This centres on the argument that the Tricycle decision was hurtful because it required Jews to ‘surrender’ their connection with Israel, a country whose government they may not support but that they feel an inherent connection with. It was further argued that the Israeli embassy does not just represent the government of Israel at any particular time but ‘Israel itself, its society and people’ and in refusing a connection to it the Tricycle had inhibited ‘something crucial about contemporary Jewish identity’. The Jewish Chronicle put it that ‘Good Jews’ would comply with this arrangement and ‘Bad Jews’ would not.

380. Professor Feldman characterised the Tricycle incident in a wider context according to three conditions. First, that most Jews feel themselves to have a connection with Israel.

399 Gidley, B., 2015, 50 Days in the Summer
400 Feldman, D., 2014, Sub-Report for the Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism
Second, that Israeli policies were being widely criticised not only on political but also on humanitarian grounds, including by the Prime Minister and others, and third, that some Jews had publicly associated themselves with such criticism ‘as Jews’ in direct contrast to several Jewish communal organisations. This context, says Professor Feldman, was contributory to the tendency to perceive Jews as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in relation to their position on the Israel-Gaza war. This can usefully be laid alongside the historical picture which David Cesarani described in his evidence to the 2006 report, in which Jewish integration is conditional on acceptance of certain societal norms. Feldman argues that the terms of debate meant that those not supporting the Palestinian cause were seen to be rejecting ‘humanity’ and ergo ‘bad’. Conversely, societal acceptance meant distancing oneself from Israel whose policies were portrayed as outside humanitarian norms. Feldman continues that this pressure to conform is similarly borne by other communities in different circumstances and suggests “it indicates a widespread tendency to regard minority groups as cohesive communities whose acceptance by the majority is conditional”.

381. The solutions to such categorisation and societal pressure are far from obvious. For a number of reasons, from Jewish communal cohesion to the desire for effective integration, the situation will likely persist. Our interest of course is to try and stop the harm and upset caused to the Jewish community and to prevent scenarios in which Jews are made to feel responsible for and are targeted for attack by extremists that take issue with Israeli Government policies. Professor Feldman does not believe the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ categorisation is antisemitic per se. Nevertheless, depending on one’s perspective, the Tricycle incident certainly could have had antisemitic implications or, as the barrister Adam Wagner has suggested403, possibly have been discriminatory under the law. It certainly contributed to the alienation of many in the Jewish community. As Professor Feldman concludes, “we should acknowledge the pressure that integration and conformity can place on minority groups, including Jews. This recognition should provide ground for dialogue both between Jews and the government and between Jews and other minority groups.”

5.4 Educating About Language

382. Very many of the statements, messages, tweets, posts, banners and placards that displayed antisemitic content over the summer did so in condensed torrents of communication without context. It has taken us an entire chapter to explain some of the nuance in the language that has been used and ours is not a wholesale evaluation. As we have suggested, some clarification is needed from prosecuting authorities about the thresholds of the law but so too there is important work of education to be done in ensuring that politicians, activists, journalists, children and indeed some British Jews understand the complexities and importance of the language that is used to describe the Israel-Palestine conflict.

383. As Professor Feldman concluded in his sub-report, “in the course of the summer of 2014 the antisemitic elements in public debate grew. This registered in formal politics, in the media and in street politics”. This growth, as he rightly states, “was limited to a small portion of the public debate”. However, there is the potential for this trend to develop and it is important we work now to stop it.

384. There is a requirement for a more sophisticated understanding and definition of antisemitism. This should recognise that whilst people may not have been antisemites nor had any antisemitic intent in their communications (and indeed would be shocked to think it) they have in fact been employing antisemitic language or themes and the impact of their words is significant. So too, it should be clearer that even when not antisemitic, aspects of debate are deeply offensive to Jews and in some way impact upon their rightful ability to identify with Israel. To this extent context matters and must be taken into account. As Ben Gidley told us, ‘Free Gaza’ graffiti may not be problematic but when daubed across a synagogue door it is. Any definition might also take into account a number of other factors, such as the consequences and effects or language or that since criticism of Israeli policy is not antisemitic so too defence of Israeli policy should not automatically be seen as an appropriate or effective means of expressing opposition to antisemitism.

385. This then takes us back to the introductory section of our report. The two “distinct but complementary definitions” of antisemitism proposed by Professor Feldman and that we briefly outlined are helpful in seeking to set a context of identifying what and was not antisemitic in the communications of the summer months. There are other definitions which were reviewed for us but these did not fully satisfy the necessary requirements.

386. We recommend that in order to properly educate about the language of antisemitism, further research be commissioned by government with a specific focus on properly identifying and explaining antisemitic themes whether or not they are used intentionally. This research must include practical recommendations for its application.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Final Conclusions:

387. There was an unacceptable rise in antisemitic incidents in July and August 2014. This ranged from assaults and abuse to inappropriately instituted protests against Israel’s actions. Whilst the Jewish community is diverse and multi-faceted there is a palpable concern, insecurity, loneliness and fear following the summer’s rise in incidents and subsequent world events. It is for non-Jews to speak out and lead the fight against antisemitism with strong action. We have recommended a number of measures including the establishment of an independent council to highlight trends in antisemitism and improvements to police, CPS, judicial and other guidance, systems and communications. Taken together we hope these measures, when instituted, will ensure Jewish communities have the necessary protection from the continuous terrorist threat they face and provide the necessary reassurance that our national frameworks are as strong as they can be.

388. In particular, we have found that the language being used to discuss the conflict requires urgent address. The trivialisation and relativisation of the Holocaust, accusations of dual loyalty and malign influence and the categorisation of Jews as ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ are all recurring themes that must be stopped. A more sophisticated understanding of antisemitism is needed, together with better defined boundaries of acceptable discourse. Whilst some language is discriminatory, some is simply offensive, hurtful and misleading. It is for public figures and institutions to set the tone of our national debate and where they have not been responsible, the impact on the Jewish community has been significant.

389. Regardless of the contributory sources, the atmosphere in the summer was so bad that in some cases, there was a breakdown of interfaith relations. The importance of interfaith activity cannot be overstated and we have made recommendations for national review of the work being carried out and a prioritisation of resources.

390. Dialogue both offline and online is important but the increase in antisemitism on social media is a serious and growing concern. Work has been undertaken to engage the industry and there have been important precedents established in the courts but incident figures indicate a ten-fold increase in online antisemitism over three years. Our report highlights the cross-pollination of extremist ideas into debate on Israel, the prevalence of Hitler and the Holocaust amongst the top 35 key words on Twitter and the overly user-intensive reporting processes that are in place. We have recommend further police resource, guidance for prosecutors, awareness raising about reporting mechanisms and most importantly exploration of the potential for using prevention orders to curb determined offenders.

391. Not solely in relation to social media but in many aspects of public life, over the past 10 years and following the 2006 All-Party Report Into Antisemitism, there has been considerable success at establishing national frameworks for combatting antisemitism. This has put Britain far ahead of Europe but we cannot relax. We have better data collection systems,
better Holocaust education, better policing and security measures, better community partnerships and other systems that are comparatively advanced but this has not all been well communicated at home or abroad. We have recommended communications be improved internally and externally through community engagement and a British best practice toolkit for use overseas.

392. Antisemitism continues to linger in British society as it does across Europe and beyond. The frameworks that are in place to tackle this societal infection are strong but could be tightened and we have made recommendations for doing so. We were delighted to read in a letter from the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP, that he looked forward “to receiving and reviewing a new set of recommendations” from us and would “look to refer these to the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism”. This predisposition to action from across the party spectrum means that thankfully there are many measures in place that show Britain is in a strong position to face down antisemitism for the benefit of the Jewish and other communities and indeed for our society.
6. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations:

**Antisemitism in the UK**

1. There is a requirement for further reputable quantitative and qualitative research about the concerns of British Jewry, UK antisemitism and the interplay with the Middle East conflict. We recommend that the government direct funds to appropriate organisations to undertake such research.

2. The UK National, Scottish, Welsh and Local Authorities were keen to highlight their support for and the significance of inter-communal and interfaith work. Given the importance of keeping communities together when events elsewhere can serve to drive them apart we recommend that the UK Government together with the devolved administrations undertake a national review of this work, including and specifically identification of good practice and case studies of where dialogue has succeeded in spite of international events.

3. We were pleased to learn that the essential funding for security of Jewish schools in the state sector had been considered effective. Given the continuing threat of terrorism against the Jewish community, we recommend that a governmental fund be established to cover both capital and revenue costs for the security of British synagogues.

4. We recommend that government continue to report at least once per session to parliament about its work on antisemitism and commits to continuation of the world-renowned Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism.

5. We recommend that government together with the CPS, police and other relevant bodies work with the Jewish community to devise a communications strategy which effectively conveys the work that has been undertaken to combat antisemitism.

**Evaluation of the Incidents and the Responses**

6. We recommend that further research be carried out into the sources, patterns, nature and reach of the antisemitism on social media. Such learning can help to identify the most appropriate responses and effective deployment of resources to combat hate online.

7. We recommend that police and Home Office officials work with experts on a pan-European basis to annually review and update the existing index of flags and symbols.

8. We recommend that expert organisations like the CST, Hope not Hate, Shomrim and Tell Mama be invited to attend police briefings ahead of relevant protests to ensure that individual officers have a firm understanding of relevant concerns and to distribute briefing materials.

9. We recommend that the police establish systems for convening preparatory briefing sessions in advance of major events, so that protest organisers, stewards and moderators can benefit from expert advice on antisemitism, or other forms of prejudice where appropriate.
10. In order to be totally effective and to ensure the UK is a world leader in monitoring and recording data on antisemitism, the police should enter into a national data sharing agreement with the CST and look at similar arrangements with groups like Tell Mama.

11. The CPS should instigate, at speed, a better management or sampling system which allows for a simple search and analysis function for the data that it holds.

12. We recommend that as part of the ongoing review of hate crime procedures by the CPS, consideration is given as a priority, to the decision making arrangements for referral to the Special Crime and Counter-Terrorism Division (SCCTD).

13. We recommend that as part of the ongoing review of hate crime procedures by the CPS, consideration is given as a priority, to the suitability of existing guidance on communications sent via social media as regards racist/religious hatred. We further recommend that hate crime guidance material on grossly offensive speech be reviewed to clarify what amounts to “criminal acts” that “will be prosecuted”.

14. We recommend that the Judicial College updates its Equal Treatment Bench Book to include basic reference to antisemitism and ensures it has in place an effective mechanisms for wide distribution and communication of the guide.

15. People have a legitimate right to protest against Israel through boycott or other peaceful means. However, such protest becomes entirely illegitimate when constituting an attack on or intimidation of British Jews. We have set out that cultural boycotts, implemented in the way they were during the summer, were unacceptable. The boycott movement faces a challenge of how to put their tactics into effect while not slipping into antisemitism, unlawful discrimination or assaulting valued freedoms.

16. We know that local authority action is almost never motivated by antisemitism but conclude that political gesturing gives out entirely the wrong messages. We call upon all local councils to do their utmost to bring people together during times of foreign conflict, particularly in the Middle East, to strengthen inter-communal ties and to avoid isolating or inspiring fear in constituents they are elected to represent.

17. A number of worrying trends have developed in recent years particularly as regards conflict-related antisemitism. We recommend that an independent council of leading non-Jewish figures from parliament and across public life be convened to identify long-term trends in antisemitism, to speak out against it and make recommendations for action.

18. The interfaith work undertaken during the summer months was vitally important. In particular, work on training individuals and organisations in ‘handling difficult conversations’ is paramount. We recommend that the government look to support an extension of this work in particular to local authorities with a view to implementation of a national support structure, through local authorities, for intensified interfaith activity during periods of potential disharmony between communities.
19. We recommend that the Editors’ Code of Practice be reviewed and that the relevant section be extended to give recourse for groups to complain about discrimination on the grounds of race or religion whilst ensuring a sensible balance for freedom of speech.

20. Given the diversity of mechanisms that exist for registering complaints about media content, we recommend that the government identify the most suitable agency to produce a guide for consumers which sets out roles, responsibilities and grievance procedures in plain terms for all.

21. We recommend that the Crown Prosecution Service undertakes a review to examine the applicability of prevention orders to hate crime offences and if appropriate, take steps to implement them.

22. True Vision (www.report-it.org.uk) is a critically important framework for third-party reporting which deserves wider publicity and we recommend the government works with industry partners to organise a prominent awareness campaign about methods for reporting online racist and other abuse.

Antisemitism in Europe and the Events of July/August 2014

23. It is right and proper that the UK should continue to take a leadership role within the OSCE. We recommend that Britain continues to send high level representation to key events in order to show our dedication to tackling antisemitism at home and abroad. In addition, we recommend that commitments we make in OSCE fora should be implemented fully and in a timely way.

24. We recommend that the government makes and seeks all-party commitment to a long-term plan for and continuing state funding of Holocaust education.

25. We recommend that the government increases its grant for the evidence-based teacher training conducted by the Centre for Holocaust Education at the Institute of Education, with a view to expanding its work and the number of teachers it is able to train.

26. We recommend that relevant officials on the Cross-Government Working Group on Antisemitism identify suitable partners to seek appropriate redress for the lack of educational resources for teachers about how to sensitively handle the Middle East conflict in the classroom and in particular to support Jewish, Muslim and other pupils in what can be difficult circumstances.

27. We recommend that the Cross-Government Working Group seeks to establish a calendar of engagement and crisis planning procedures for meetings to address antisemitism in those areas of British public life giving the greatest cause for concern. This should include a broader engagement with NGOs.

28. We recommend that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office enhance its systems for co-ordinating feedback from embassies specifically to plan for antisemitism during times of
increased tension in the Middle East and where appropriate brief Ministers to raise the matter with foreign counterparts.

29. We recommend that the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and Mayoral offices in London and Manchester perform a short case study of the Mayor of Amsterdam’s approach to policing during the conflict and update their thinking and preparedness procedures accordingly.

30. We further recommend that the Metropolitan Police and College of Policing organises for representatives from relevant forces to visit Paris to meet with police officials and Jewish community organisations to learn the lessons of the extreme antisemitic violence that manifested over the summer of 2014.

31. We recommend that officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other relevant departments pursue a strategy of mainstreaming concerns about social media and cyber hate into existing discussion forums in Europe including the EU Fundamental Rights Agency working groups on hate crime, with a view to securing further Ministerial decisions.

32. We recommend that the government offers additional resources to the police to enhance and develop policing and investigation of online hate crime.

33. The UK employs a number of internationally-recognised good practices in combatting antisemitism. We recommend that the government works with civil society groups to design a simple toolkit that can be distributed in European and international fora to serve both as a guide to official efforts for combatting antisemitism and as a celebration of UK achievements in the field.

Addressing Antisemitic Discourse

34. We recommend that in order to properly educate about the language of antisemitism, further research be commissioned by government with a specific focus on properly identifying and explaining antisemitic themes whether or not they are used intentionally. This research must include practical recommendations for its application.
7. APPENDIX: 
FULL LIST OF WITNESSES
7. Appendix: Full List of Witnesses

**Oral and Written Evidence and Formal Correspondence**

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<td>Clive Cass</td>
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<td>David Cohen</td>
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<td>Paul Corrick</td>
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London Jewish Forum
Sharon Lukom
Avril Mailer
Manchester City Council
Manchester Jewish Community
Manchester Jewish Representative Council
Manchester ZCC
Richard Matthews QC
Metropolitan Police Service
Joanne Miller
Jonas Milner
Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis
Alison Moscow
Movement for Reform Judaism
NGO Monitor
Nottingham Jewish Community
Andrew Pal
Parliament Street
Police Scotland
Police Service of Northern Ireland
Lord Sacks
Salford City Council
Gill Saunders
Scottish Council of Jewish Communities
Scottish Government
Doe Solomon
Karen Solomon
Southend Jewish Community
Gerald Stern
Debbie Taylor
Three Faiths Forum
UK lawyers for Israel
Linda and Roger Valins
Welsh Government
George and Corrine White
Robert Willer
Dr Yaakov Wise
Lynne and Tony Zeffert
Thank You:

A number of people contributed to the panel deliberations but did not submit formal evidence. We are grateful to the following people for their input:

Jessica Asato
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Eve Byrne
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Justin Cohen
Virginia Crompton
Sybil Crowther
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Ann Dholakia
Christina Dyke
Marcus Dysch
Rob Ellis
Hannah Evans
Zoe Evans
Professor David Feldman
Mark Gardner
Paul Giannasi OBE
Dr Ben Gidley
Dean Godson
Leah Granat
Caroline Gray
Luke Handley
Louise Higgins
Graham Holliday
Bishop Toby Howarth
Professor Pauk Iganski
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James Libson
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Grant McDonald
Carly McKenzie
Caroline Millin
Jonas Milner
Jonny Newton
Alexander Pack
Lord Pannick QC
Rabbi Moshe Perez
Stephen Pollard
Siwan Puw
Karen Pollock MBE
Robert Rams
Dave Rich
Paul Richards
Pete Robbins
Daniel Sacker
Rishi Saha
Sally Sealey
Katy Showman
Ruth Smeeth
Katherine Thompson
Ed Thornton
Nora Tillman
Jack Tunmore
Laurence Turner
Georgina Wade
Jack Wagner
John Webster
Mike Whine MBE
Joanna White

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The All-Party Parliamentary Report into Antisemitism was instigated by the Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Antisemitism. That group will hold all the relevant documents pertaining to this report. Further copies of the report can be downloaded from www.antisemitism.org.uk