Radicalisation Literature Review

The issues of radicalisation, violent terrorism and programmes that aim to counter violent extremism are the subject of much research and debate. This literature review aims to provide a concise summary of numerous studies to give an overview of research in this area from a wide range of sources such as think tanks, university departments, research journals and charities. This literature review places particular emphases on sections of research relating to the UK, higher education and the Prevent programme. All of the studies summarised in this literature review can be found in the Resources section of Safe Campus Communities: as an overview this literature review is not aimed to be a substitute for reading the original studies, and interested readers are encouraged to read studies in full where possible.

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Guidance for Identifying People Vulnerable to Recruitment into Violent Extremism. Produced by Dr. Jon Cole, Emily Alison, Dr. Ben Cole and Professor Laurence Alison (2009)

This guidance was issued to support practitioners’ level of awareness and decision-making in identifying individuals vulnerable or ‘at-risk’ of being recruited or involved in violent extremism. The paper outlines three key phases by which individuals conclude that violent action against others is an acceptable way to achieve their objectives:

1. The first phase is passive recruitment whereby people experience events that lead them to desire radical change to the United Kingdom. These events are often real or perceived grievances held with the state, society or specific societal groups. For the purposes of this model radicalised individuals are motivated by political reasons, they do not seek violence as an end in itself.
2. The second phase is active recruitment when an individual seeks out, or is sought out, by violent extremists. The individual may decide at this stage that violence is the only solution to their perceived problems.
3. The third phase is the act of terror itself, whereby the terrorist violence is decided upon as an instrumental behaviour to coerce the state / individuals / societal groups.

The aim of a prevention intervention is to prevent a target behaviour occurring: it not aimed at stopping behaviour that an individual is already engaging in. The aim is to identify, and protect, vulnerable individuals. The criteria provided in this guidance are intended to document behaviours and characteristics that practitioners should be aware of. The risk factors outlined in this guidance are based on research into the open source background material on convicted violent extremists: they are statistical associations and thus not a ‘cast-iron’ prediction of future behaviour. The criteria for identifying vulnerable people are as follows:

- Cultural and / or religious isolation: a core element of this is a lower tolerance for other communities and religious beliefs. This may result in no involvement with education or employment that involves contact with a diverse range of ethnic or religious groups.
- Isolation from family: conflict and estrangement from one’s family over life choices leaves an individual vulnerable to extremists who offer the individual solutions to this conflict.
- Risk taking behaviour: there is often observed a period of risk taking behaviours in the development of extremism. It is when young people seek to change their risk taking behaviour that they are vulnerable to violent extremists, often through guilt and a subsequent engagement / reengagement with religion.
- Sudden change in religious practice: violent extremists often undergo sudden and rapid changes in religious practice, often coupled with a limited understanding of the religion. This lack of religious knowledge can then by exploited by extremist ideologues and recruiters.
- Violent rhetoric: exposure to violent rhetoric and media is linked to violent behaviour through the establishment of pro-violence norms and values.
- Negative peer influences: social status is important to individual and group identity. Intergroup conflict between peers can lead to the formation of gangs for fighting real and perceived threats. Some of these gangs can be ideologically driven and can be a gateway to violence.
• **Isolated peer group**: peer groups that isolate themselves from outside influences, especially through violence, indicate a high risk of ‘groupthink’ and engaging in acts of violent extremism.

• **Hate rhetoric**: hate, specially of ‘the other’, sustains violent extremism. It strengthens and enforces a sense of separation between the target group and the extremists. Dehumanising and hateful language indicates an increased threat of violent behaviour.

• **Political activism**: an increased political awareness, specifically on issues championed by extremist groups, can be expressed through membership of extremist groups. Association with individuals and groups known to have links with violent extremists indicates the individual is at risk of recruitment.

• **Basic paramilitary training**: many activities that are harmless fun can be used by violent extremists as paramilitary training. The criterion for this is when it is used for this purpose.

• **Travel / residence abroad**: some areas of the world are conflict zones where it is possible for vulnerable people to come into contact with violent extremists. The criterion in this case is based on (often multiple) journeys to, or residence in, known conflict zones and areas where proscribed organisations operate.

There is also a separate set of Red Category Behaviours. These are behaviours that are strong behavioural indicators that an individual is on the way to involvement with violent extremism. Individuals displaying these factors require reporting to the relevant authorities for further information gathering and monitoring:

• **Death rhetoric**: individuals, groups and institutions that provide justification for violent behaviour make individuals feel less responsible for their own. This can be expressed within casual conversation and possession of material containing death rhetoric.

• **Being a member of an extremist group**: membership of non-proscribed extremist groups is not illegal but joining can be an individual’s transition from passive support to active involvement in extremism. These groups / individuals often form an amorphous nationwide network that violent extremist recruiters tap into.

• **Contact with known recruiters / extremists**: this can lead to the spread of violent ideology, justification of violence, and recruitment into established violent organisations and networks.

• **Advanced paramilitary training**: violent extremists do not necessarily require specialist training, but most terrorists are trained, such as in weapons handling skills.

• **Overseas combat**: although individuals who have fought abroad in the name of jihad do not necessarily subscribe to domestic jihad in their own countries, and believing in violent jihad does not necessarily mean an Islamist ideology, this is a key sign an individual may be about to be involved in violent extremism.
Institute of Community Cohesion report – Promoting Community Cohesion and Preventing Violent Extremism in Higher and Further Education. Produced by Prof. Harris Beider and Rachel Briggs (2010)

This report consisted of a mixed methodology, composed of an Independent Advisory Board, a review of literature, stakeholder interviews, two surveys of higher education and further education leadership, case studies and four workshops. The report aims to explore the role of further education and higher education institutions in community cohesion and the prevention of terrorism.

Section 1: Good “Campus Relations” and Safe Colleges

The research indicated that most universities were compliant with their governance requirements in relation to campus relations. The research indicated there is a reasonably positive state of campus relations, but does recommend universities and colleges establish a system to record incidents and monitor tensions. The report does note the following key challenges and drivers:

- Poor access to universities is linked to social class as well as race or religion.
- International students on some issues have had a more negative experience studying in the UK than other European countries. The report recommends universities establish programme to maximise resources and share good practice.
- A high proportion of local students can have a negative impact on campus cohesion.
- Alcohol and associated drinking culture appears to a major divider, for both international students and those who do not drink.
- The built environment can impact relationships between different groups.
- Students with higher levels of cross-cultural interaction at university tend to know more about, and accept, different cultures. They also have better general knowledge, critical thinking skills, problem solving skills and confidence.
- It is important for universities to engage directly with the student body in addition to the student union elected structure.
- Universities say the most important factor in building good campus relations is staff experience and confidence in handling student relationships.

Section 2: The Role of Universities and Colleges in Community Cohesion

Almost all universities in the survey considered that they have a role to play in promoting good relations within their local area. Vice-chancellors also have a legal duty to promote good race relations. The research indicates that some universities are actively involved in community cohesion project. Attitudes towards the role of universities in promoted community cohesion vary by location and institution: town-based universities have an obvious interest in links between themselves and the local area. Universities offering vocational courses also rely on strong relationships with local industry.

Other universities may need to work harder: campus-based universities might be inhibited by the physical barrier between them and local partners. Similarly, research-intensive institutions and universities with a collegiate structure tend to collaborate less with local communities.
The market in higher education might help explain the interest of universities in good campus cohesion, due to the emphasis on ‘student experience’ which extends to local area and related facilities. Some universities are using course content to improve local relationships and increase local accessibility. The report recommends universities develop a strategy for local partnerships and engagement. The report also recommends universities and student unions consider their ‘footprint’ in the area such as labour markets. Student unions can play a significant role in coordinating community cohesion activities. The report also recommends universities become integrated into local tension monitoring arrangements.

Section 3: The Role of Universities and Colleges in the Prevention of Violent Extremism

The report notes some of the criticisms of the Prevent agenda: the perceived victimisation of Muslim communities, accusations of intelligence gathering, heightened community tensions, the lack of emphasis on animal rights / right wing extremism and the problematic expanded remit to tackling non-violent extremism.

The report’s research shows that universities and colleges are aware of the threat from terrorism and understand they have a role to play. A minority of vice-chancellors report that staff had expressed concerns and their role or institution in prevent violent extremism. The research indicates universities were beginning to incorporate preventing violent extremism into their governance systems and are beginning to incorporate the Prevent agenda into their policy frameworks.

There were concerns within the higher education sector about the skills and confidence of staff to deliver what is required in relation to preventing violent extremism, recognise signs of vulnerability, distinguish between radical views and dangerous intent, and were keen to ensure students were not stigmatised through misunderstanding or prejudice. Some staff were concerned about personal risks they faced as a result of being involved in the Prevent agenda, and if they would be seen as accountable if the wrong decision were made on their advice.

Universities make a positive contribution to the prevention of violent extremism through their core education activities and an open and exploratory setting. There is a role for universities to act as a safe space for discussions and debates on controversial topics, in addition to the research and teaching which increases understanding of terrorism and related matters. The report recommends a working group to offer help and assistant to individual universities and academics who have ethical or legal concern about research and teaching relating to terrorism. The report notes the size and complexity of universities and how this can create difficulties for engagement with Prevent. Some universities were cautious of overemphasising threat due to the risk of reputational damage and sensationalist report. All universities agreed that students were central to the institution’s response to violent extremism.

One of the most consistent messages from the research is that universities preferred to take a broader approach to violent extremism such as animal rights, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Produced by Dr. Bibi van Ginkel (2012)

The report notes that the 2006 Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy aims to integrate different pillars of counter-terrorism policy to form a comprehensive approach. However the implementation of this approach has been hampered by the fact that the actors involved with this process do not include civil society actors. The report notes the increasing role of civil society actors in more recent UN General Assembly and UN Security Council resolutions.

The report notes that the counter-terrorism actions of UN member states have in many cases created negative impacts on fundamental freedoms and human rights, often including restrictive measures against human rights defenders and civil society activists. Some countries have also used the global war against terrorism to legitimise actions against political opponents and critics. There have also been unintended consequences of counter-terrorism measures, for example restricting financing of terrorism has led to suppression of civil society groups and charities.

This is counterproductive as civil society organisations working in numerous areas such as women's rights, conflict transformation, interfaith dialogue and human rights contribute to addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Civil society organisations can work as facilitators between the population and government authorities when allowed to do so, enabling them to act as a credible messenger in developing and deliver counter-narratives.

The report therefore argues that is important to build a bridge between civil society organisations, national governments and international actors to exchange experiences and strategise. The report makes a number of recommendations to facilitate cooperation and engagement with civil society groups to collaboratively approach preventing and countering violent extremism whilst also respecting their independence.
This report describes the genesis, characteristics, aims, underlying philosophies, and challenges experienced by counter-radicalisation strategies in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. The report focuses exclusively on Jihadist radicalisation.

Introduction

The report notes that few governments believe that most terrorists are deviants, sociopaths or psychopaths who were "born" terrorists. Hence several countries have developed counter-radicalisation programmes to prevent or even reverse the radicalisation process. The report clarifies that it focuses on jihadist extremism as most of the studied programmes currently focus on this form of extremism. The report also notes that it focuses on government programmes, but does recognise the enormous potential of civil society organisations also in the struggle against radicalisation. The report focuses on the four selected countries as it can be argued these are the most advanced in the field, with initiatives that predate and are more extensive than those of other European countries. The terminology of radicalisation is clarified: cognitive radicalisation is the process whereby an individual adopts radical ideas, whereas violent radicalisation is when an individual employs violence to further those ideas. Counter-radicalisation is a catch-all term covering three specific types of initiative:

- **De-radicalisation** that consists of measures to lead a radicalised individual to abandon their militant views;
- **Disengagement** that entails an individual abandoning their involvement in a terrorist group or terrorist activities;
- **Radicalisation prevention** that consists of measures to prevent radicalisation taking place initially, usually by wider societal measures.

The report also clarifies the use of the term Islamism as the project of establishing an Islamic state with governmental principles, institutions and legal system derived directly from the sharia, but does note the considerable variety within this movement. Within this there are three main subcategories:

- **Violent rejectionists** also known as jihadists that reject democratic participation and use violence to advance their goals;
- **Non-violent rejectionists** who reject the legitimacy of government not based on Islamic law but do not openly advocate use of violence;
- **Participationists** are individuals that interact with society at micro-level and macro-level through public life and the democratic process.

United Kingdom

The report lists a number of factors that have resulted in the UK being faced with the most serious and enduring threat from domestic jihadist terrorism. Their counter-radicalisation strategy (later named Prevent) was launched as part of the wider Contest counter-terrorism strategy in 2003 aiming to tackle extremism both as a cause of terrorism and as a societal problem in itself. Prevent has been particularly controversial, and been criticised by civil libertarians, Islamists and neo-conservatives.
After the 2011 review there are two broad categories of Prevent. The first consists of more general preventative measures such as community projects and outreach schemes. This has been successful in some areas, such as the reporting of radical convert Andrew Ibrahim in 2008 by a conservative Somali mosque. However it has been criticised for a lack of accountability of the use of funding during the initial decentralised approach that resulted in untrained workers allocating large amounts of money.

The second category is that of the targeted intervention. The British Government’s Channel Programme, a one-to-one voluntary intervention scheme, seems to have been much more successful than the more contentious preventative programmes. The Channel programme consists of assessing individuals that have been referred by a local partner such as a college of university. If they are judged to be at risk of radicalisation the intervention is carried out by an appropriate person such as a religious or community leader, addressing issues such as identity, social exclusion and religious understanding. Channel is seen as cost-effective and successful.

One identified persistent challenge to the Prevent agenda is identifying partners in the Muslim community to work with. Prevent workers without specialist knowledge have accidentally funded Islamist organisations. Many Prevent teams do engage tactically with extremist groups whilst ensuring they are not given recognition or funding, whilst also engaging and funding more moderate groups.

The report concludes that the UK’s Prevent strategy has been less effective proportionate to the time and resources invested than it should have when compared with work done by European countries. The pressure to roll out Prevent after the 2005 attacks meant it was implemented without sufficient consideration for what radicalisation was, how it occurred and how to address it. This was coupled with a lack of internal assessment, a lack of vision and high expectations of often untrained local government workers.

However, the Channel Programme has been innovative and achieved quantifiable results in prisons, schools and communities. Low-key funding for debating initiatives and funding of moderate groups have started debates about secularism and Muslim identity that have enabled a push-back against extremist voices.

Many of Prevent’s early problems are now being rectified, with financial support for extremists being halted and more rigorous assessment methods established.

Conclusions

Through comparing the United Kingdom’s Prevent programme to other European counter-radicalisation initiatives, the author makes a number of overarching observations:

- European authorities are increasingly narrowing the definition of radicalisation to focus their efforts on violent radicalisation rather than on extremism. This is not to say authorities do see a relation between non-violent extremism and violent radicalisation or do not wish to challenge extremism in and of itself. It is the result of budgetary constraints and the lack of clear empirics on the radicalisation process.
- Authorities are increasingly isolating their efforts to counter violent radicalisation from initiatives aiming to create integration and social cohesion. There is a danger when doing both under a counter-radicalisation strategy that the lines are blurred and neither objective is achieved.
Largely due to budgetary constraints, authorities are decreasing their focus on large-scale preventative initiatives aimed at the public or large cross-sections of the community. Conversely, there is an increased focus on targeted interventions on well-identified individuals.

The author also highlights four trends from an organisation perspective:

- Authorities are recognising the necessity of training for individuals involved in counter-radicalization work to understand the complexities involved.
- Authorities are recognising the importance of good communication in explaining their strategy and aims to professionals they work with and communities they reach out to.
- A clear trend is the increasing mainstreaming and normalizing of counter-radicalisation work incorporated into the roles of staff such as police officers, teachers, medical staff and housing officers.
- An emphasis on assessment is increasingly recognised as important to ensure value-for-money and assessing which programmes should be kept.

The author highlights three trends specifically to working with Muslim communities:

- A shift away from a “theological approach”, moving to broader secular approaches aimed at background vulnerabilities rather than theological opinions.
- The exclusion of Islamists and Salafists, and refusing to fund, empower or employ them other than in exceptional circumstances.
- A dual focus on far-right and Islamist extremism, with most Prevent-style programmes describing the threat from far-right and Islamist extremism and being comparable. This may not be empirically true, but it is seen as a way of winning the trust of Muslim communities, individuals and organisations.

Executive Summary

This comparative case study looks at five "homegrown" terrorist attacks to derive common processes and characteristics to inform a conceptual framework. It then applies this to five U.S. post-9/11 case studies, and also applies the same radicalisation framework to the Hamburg group (who led the 9/11 hijackers).

Radicalisation

The jihadist, or jihadi-salafi, ideology is the bedrock and catalyst of radicalisation. The authors outline a model of the radicalisation process composed of four distinct phases. Not all individuals who begin the process necessarily pass through all the stages, and may stop or abandon the process at different points. Not all individuals always follow a linear progression, and individuals who do pass through this process are quite likely to be involved in a terrorist act.

- **Stage 1: Pre-Radicalisation.** This is an individual's world prior to their radicalisation. Environments that provide enclaves of isolated ethnic communities are more vulnerable to being penetrated by extremism. Common traits of extremist from the case studies are being under 35, having middle class backgrounds, not beginning as radical or devout Muslims, little criminal history and “unremarkable” profiles in terms of their lives and jobs.

- **Stage 2: Self-Identification.** This is the stage where an individual, influenced by external and internal factors, begins to explore Salafi Islam and migrate away from their former identity to Salafi philosophy, ideology and values. The catalyst for this is often a cognitive, or crisis, which challenges an individual’s previously held beliefs. Such crises can be economic, social, political or personal. The individual is alienated from their former life and begins to seek out like-minded individuals. The two key indicators of progressions along the radicalisation continuum are progression / gravitation towards Salafi Islam and regular attendance at a Salafi mosque.

- **Stage 3: Indoctrination.** This is the stage where an individual intensifies their beliefs, wholly adopt jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes that action is required to support and further the Salafist cause: that action is militant jihad. This involves accepting a religious-political worldview that accepts violence against anything considered to be *kufr* (un-Islamic). The key indicators of an individual progressing to this stage is withdrawing from the mosque and the politicisation of their new beliefs through applying their ideology to global events in the real world. As individuals progress through this stage they will have bonded with other like-minded individuals in a cluster based on shared commonalities.

- **Stage 4: Jihadisation.** This is the stage where members of a cluster accept their individual duty to participate in jihad as holy warriors, and the group will begin operational planning for a terrorist attack. This stage can occur quickly and with little warning. Substages can include traveling abroad often to a training camp or to seek religious justification, training / preparation through mental reinforcement or outward physical training, and planning the attack itself.
Conclusions

The report reaches the following conclusions:

- Al-Qaeda has provided inspiration for home-grown radicalisation and terrorism, with direct command and control being comparatively rare.
- All the terrorist-related case studies showed the four stages of the radicalisation process to be clearly evidenced.
- The transformation of the Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge or desperation but looking for an identity and cause found in extremist Islam.
- There is no useful profile to predict who will follow the trajectory of radicalisation. Individual who take this course being as "unremarkable."
- Europe's failure to integrate 2nd and 3rd generation immigration has left many young Muslim torn between the secular West and their religious heritage. This conflict makes them vulnerable to extremism. Muslims in the U.S. are more resist, but not immune, to this radical message.
- The jihadist ideology combined the extreme and minority interpretation of Islam with an activist-like commitment to solve global political grievances through violence.
- The internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalisation, serving as a source of extremist ideology and an anonymous virtual meeting place.
- Individuals tend to begin the radicalisation process on their own, and seek like-minded individuals later in the process.
- All case studies had a "spiritual sanctioner" who provided justification for jihad and an "operational leader" controlling and keeping the group focused and motivated.
- Full radicalisation has in many cases led to individual fighting in conflicts overseas rather than committing terrorist acts.
- The radicalization process can be thought of as a funnel: not everyone who enters will not go through all stages and become a terrorist.
- The subtle and non-criminal nature of behaviours involved in radicalisation make them difficult to identify or monitor.

Introduction

The report aims to review the state of antisemitism in the UK, to analyse the effectiveness of measures in place to combat anti-Semitism and make future recommendations. Anti-Semitism is a hostility, phobia or bias against Judaism or individual Jews as a group.

Antisemitism in the UK

The Metropolitan Police Service’s data indicates that areas with a significant Jewish population have higher incident rates of anti-Semitism, and most incidents took place in identifiable Jewish locations such as synagogues or schools. There were spikes in anti-Semitic crimes and incidents in 2009 and 2014, during times of escalation of violence in the Middle East. The report of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research concluded that Britain remains a considerably more tolerant and accepting environment for Jews than certain other parts of Europe. The report notes that campus anti-Semitism remains a matter of concern for members of the Jewish community, with students recognising that antisemitism may surface in the guise of criticism of Israel. The internet and social media has enabled anti-Semitic abuse, with 68% of respondents to a 2014 survey reporting that they had seen or heard antisemitism on the internet in the previous 12 months, with 77% of respondents believing antisemitism to have worsened in internet settings in the previous 5 years.

Evaluation of the Incidents and Responses

The Association of Chief Police Officers reported that in July 2014, in the context of an increase in tension in the Middle East, there were 64 more anti-Semitic hate crimes than in July 2013, up to a total of 314, the highest-ever monthly total. The perpetrator profile differed as well, moving from 64% white in January – June 2014 to half being of South Asian appearance during July and August 2014, indicating that times of conflict in the Middle East affect not just frequency of crimes but perpetrator profiles. The reported anti-Semitic incidents consisted of 29 violent assaults, 31 incidents of damage and desecration of Jewish property, 47 direct threats and 415 incidents of abusive behaviour. Political protests over 2014 were, however, in broad terms less violent than in 2009. The Community Security Trust did evidence that there were still anti-Semitic sentiments and rhetoric on their fringes. The report described boycotts over the summer of shops such as Sainsbury’s, Tesco and Kedem. The report argues that Pro-Palestinian campaign activists have a right to campaign against Israeli but must be pro-active in ensuring that in doing so they are not targeting kosher goods (many of which are not made in Israel) and distance themselves from any violence. They must also ensure they do not target shop owners based on their national origin as this may fall foul of the Equality Act. The report recommends that there are also future resources on the sources, patterns, nature and reach of antisemitism on social media in order to research appropriate responses to online hate.
Addressing Anti-Semitic Discourse

The report notes that there are not explicitly defined boundaries about what public figures who are dissatisfied with Israel’s actions should or should not say. Comments may be illegal, discriminatory or offensive but others may simply lack common sense. The report aims to analyse where language becomes unacceptable but does recommended the design of clearer guidelines or rules of good practice.

The report notes three key offensive ways in which Holocaust imagery is used. The first is direct endorsement of Hitler or National Socialism, and by implication endorsement of their anti-Semitic political ideology. The second are more broad attempts to draw analogies between Nazi inhumaneness and Gaza, such as comparing Israel to Nazi Germany. These analogies are offensive as they use a disaster inflicted on Jews to criticise Israel with, and might be seen to confer legitimacy of attacks on Jews. The third is suggesting that Jews as victims of the Nazis should have “learned the lessons” of the Holocaust, using a historical episode of slaughter to lecture that victim group on how to behave. The report does note the importance of context and intent in judging if comments are anti-Semitic.

The second strand of anti-Semitic discourse that has remained prevalent are accusations of dual loyalty and malign influence. Such discourse posits that the general Jewish population conspire to shape public policy to serve Jewish interests only. References to the Jewish lobby are widened beyond formally constituted lobby groups to donors and voters, treating them as an undifferentiated body unified in support for Israel.

The third strand of anti-Semitic discourse prevalent in 2014 was categorising Jews into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ based on their views of Israel. The most prominent example cited was the decision of the Tricycle Theatre to dissociate itself from the UK Jewish Film Festival. Professor Feldman does not believe such categorisation is anti-Semitic per se, however could certainly have anti-Semitic implications.

Conclusions

The report concludes that there was an unacceptable rise of anti-Semitic incidents in July and August 2015 ranging from assaults and abuse to inappropriate instituted protests against Israel’s actions. In particular, the language used to discuss the conflict requires urgent address: trivialisation of the Holocaust, accusations of dual loyalty and categorisation of Jews as ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’ are recurring themes that must be stopped through a more sophisticated understanding of anti-Semitism and better defined boundaries of acceptable discourse. Some language is discriminatory, but in other cases it is simply offensive, hurtful and misleading. The report calls for public figures and institutions to set the tone of the national debate. The report stresses the importance of interfaith activity and both offline and online dialogue. The report highlights social media as a particular and growing concern. The report concludes that the predisposition across the party spectrum to act means Britain is in a strong position to face down anti-Semitism for the benefit of Jewish, and other, communities and indeed for society.
Introduction

The paper highlights that the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘de-radicalisation’ are used widely but lack a clear definition. If such terms are problematic, this has negative implications for policies designed to ‘de-radicalise’ individuals or counter radicalism. There are many suggested causes of radicalisation, but they can be categorised into three main subdivisions:

- **Micro-level** explanations look at the individual level, for example issues of identity, integration, alienation, deprivation, rejection and moral outrage.
- **Meso-level** explanations look at the supportive or complicit social surroundings such as a reference group or terrorists’ broader constituencies.
- **Macro-level** explanations look on a wider level such as the role of government, society, public opinion minority relationships and so on.

Most research indicates there is no single cause but a complex mix of internal and external pull and push factors, triggers and drivers that can lead to radicalisation. The report argues that micro-level explanations have become a substitute for fuller explorations of extremism and terrorism, including 'politically awkward' factors such as 'counter-productive counter-terrorism.'

Historical Roots and Definitions

The concept of ‘radicalism’ originates in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, but became widespread in the 19\textsuperscript{th} when it referred to a political agenda advocating thorough social and political reform. In the 19\textsuperscript{th} century radicalism referred primarily to a liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political position: the opposite position of contemporary ‘radical Islamism.’ Radicalism is therefore relative to the mainstream political activities within democratic societies. The author concludes that radicalism is best described as having two main elements: the first is advocating sweeping political change to the status quo to a fundamentally different alternative. The second is that the means can be non-violent and democratic (persuasion and reform) or violent and non-democratic (coercion and revolution). Radicals are therefore not violent \textit{per se}: they may share characteristics with extremists but it does not follow that a radical attitude must result in violent behaviour. Extremists strive to create a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenants and seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities. They have a propensity to be fanatical, intolerant, value uniformity over diversity and value collective goals over individual freedom. Extremists in power tend towards totalitarianism. Radicals may be violent, and may be democrats, but extremists are never democrats. The writer distinguishes between (open-minded) radicals and (closed-minded) extremists. There is a debate amongst Western counterterrorism policy makers over whether non-violent extremists should be engaged with: some see them as ‘conveyor belts’ on a path to terrorism whereas others see them as a ‘firewall’ preventing youths gliding into terrorism. The writer concludes that partnering with extremists is a risky and mistaken policy.
The Two Sides of Radicalisation

The author disagrees with a definition of terrorism that is based simply on acts of political violence by non-state actors. The reason is there is a wide spectrum of political violence practiced by non-state actors: some examples of this are hunger strikes, sabotages, hate crimes, torture, ethnic cleansing, guerrilla warfare and revolutions. There are important distinctions of political violence such as whether it is against armed opponents, whether it has democratic legitimacy, whether it has the approval of a regional security organisation, and so on. These factors determine whether political violence is considered justified. Political violence in turn must be situated in the broader spectrum of political action by governments and non-state actors ranging from a state of peace to persuasion politics (rule of law by governments or constitutional opposition by non-state actors) to pressure politics (oppression by governments or extra-parliamentary action by non-state actors) to violent politics (violent repression by a state, or challenge of state power through the use of violence by non-state actors). The report offers a definition of radicalisation that incorporates the above distinctions, based on uses of pressure, political violence and acts of violent extremism generally accompanied by ideological socialisation towards more radical or extremist positions. The author argues that radicalisation is a political construct, no socio-psychological, introduced into debate mostly by security establishments faced with Islamism.

Drivers of Radicalisation

Despite the lack of broad empirical findings, there are a number of things widely considered as well-established knowledge about those radicalised to terrorism:

- Most terrorists are clinically normal although their acts are considered widely as extra-normal in moral terms.
- Backgrounds of terrorist are very diverse: there are many paths to terrorism and there is no single profile of a terrorist.
- Radicalisation is usually a gradual, phased process.
- Individual poverty alone does not cause radicalisation towards terrorism but un(der)employment may play a role.
- Grievances play a role but often more as a mobilisation device than as a personal experience.
- Social networks / environments are crucial in drawing vulnerable youths to a terrorist movement.
- Ideology often plays an important role in that it can provide the true believer with a ‘license to kill.’
- Disengagement from terrorism often occurs without de-radicalisation.

Conclusions

The report concludes that radicalism and extremism must be understood in their relation to mainstream positions of the political spectrum of a given society. Literature on radicalisation often sees it as a one-sided phenomenon and not that it can take place in a polarised conflict relationship. Another shortcoming is the tendency to equate radicalism with extremism and both with terrorism, while at the same time using ‘terrorism’ as a shorthand label for political violence. More meso- and macro-level research is required on causes of terrorism.
Introduction

In anticipation of the Government's review of the Prevent programme, this inquiry was launched with 5 key objectives:

- Determine the major drivers or, and risk factors for recruitment to, terrorist movements.
- Examine the relative importance of prisons and criminal networks, religious premises, universities and the internet as for a for violent radicalisation.
- Examine the operation and impact of the current process for proscribing terrorist groups.
- Consider the appropriateness of current preventative approaches to violent radicalisation.
- Make recommendations to inform implementation of the Government's forthcoming revised Prevent strategy.

Who is at risk of radicalisation?

Most witnesses were in more or less agreement that sympathy for violent extremism in relation to Islamic terrorism was declining. However, some witnesses were concerned about a growth in non-violent extremism. The Government's Prevent Strategy cites examples of those who had previously been members of non-violent extremist groups going on to support terrorism. Some witnesses and participants suggested the threat from the far right was increasing. It became apparent during the inquiry that radicalised individuals come from a wide range of backgrounds, with recent research describing them as “demographically unremarkable.” The inquiry indicated there many drivers for Islamist radicalisation along four main pathways: ideology, theology, grievance and mental health problems. Other evidence emphasised grievance and social exclusion. The weakness of the evidence base came across strongly, with evidence obstructed by a lack of participating research subjects, the difficulty in analysing personal stories in a rigorous way and that research tended to be theoretical rather than evidence-based.

Most people who spoke to the inquiry mentioned the centrality of grievance such as 'stop and search,' a perception of biased media coverage and UK foreign policy. The inquiry argues that the Prevent Strategy should attempt to address perceptions of Islamophobia and that the British state is not antithetical to Islam. The inquiry argues that there is insufficient focus within Prevent on building trust in democratic institutions at all levels.

Where does radicalisation take place?

The evidence suggests that there is a much less direct link between university education and terrorist activity than was thought in the past, with recent evidence suggesting that violent extremists are little different to others around them in terms of education, and little evidence that radicalisation took place during their time at university. Mosques comprise a very small amount to total cases of radicalisation, whereas the internet features in most cases of radicalisation. In all cases there was little evidence there was a real problem in the examined fora.
The Prevent Strategy

Witnesses at the report on the whole supported the three objectives of the revised Prevent Strategy:

1. Challenging the ideology that supports terrorism and those who promote it;
2. Protecting vulnerable people;
3. Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.

The report noted the apparent concentration of resources of Prevent on Muslim communities, and that the Prevent strategy only pays 'lip service' to the threat from extreme far-right terrorism. Although it is accepted that resources should be allocated proportionately to the terrorist threat, there is persuasive evidence of the potential threat from far-right terrorism. The report argues that the Prevent Strategy should outline more clearly actions to be taken to tackle far-right radicalisation, particularly important as far-right extremism can have a consequential effect on Islamic extremism and vice versa.

The report notes that in some cases universities had been complacent on engaging with Prevent. The report argues that universities are ideal places to confront extremist ideology, but was not convinced extremists are always subject to equal and robust challenges. The report recommends the government provide clear guidance to universities on their expected role, and that a designated contact point with relevant expertise within Government is provided to student unions and universities to assist with difficult decisions about speakers on campus.

The report agreed with the Government’s position that public money should not be used to fund groups with views that contradict fundamental British values. However, there were concerns that the situation could arise where risk-averse public authorities discontinue funding for effective groups because of unfounded allegations of “extremism.” The report therefore recommends Government offer guidelines with clear criteria to potential funders. The report also noted that several Channel providers had recently lost funding and this should be rectified urgently.

Through discussions with Muslims communities, it became apparent radicalisation was not a problem they recognised day-to-day. Muslims communities have felt unfairly targeted by Prevent, in part due to the phrasing and communication. The report recommends a more open and transparent approach, and engage more widely. The report also recommends a more pro-active approach to combating negative publicity, particular in respect of the Channel programme. It is also suggested that Prevent might be renamed to reflect a positive collaborative approach, for example the Engage strategy. More generally the language used in public life when discussing Prevent and counter-terrorism has at times had a detrimental effect on Muslim communities’ willingness to cooperate with Prevent.
Introduction

This report is an annual report present the results of analysis conducted using data collected part of the 'Tell MAMA' (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) initiative during 2014/5.

During 2014/5 there were 729 reports of anti-Muslim attacks, 548 of which were externally verified and approved. This represents a significant reduction in the 734 verified cases recorded in 2013/4, likely attributable to the aftermath of Lee Rigby’s murder.

Online incidents

Of the 548 verified incidents, 402 were coded as taking place online. Consistent with previous years, less than 25% of incidents involved threats, with most being coded as anti-Muslim abuse or anti-Muslim literature. The data suggests male victims were more likely to report incidents.

Offline attacks

A disproportionately large number of cases came from repeat victims, with attacks mostly perpetrated against women. Most offline attacks were coded as abuse, with other attacks containing significant numbers of property damage, threats and assault. Perpetrators were overwhelmingly reported to be white and male. Perpetrators tended to be older, with the single largest demographic identified as those aged 40+.

Case Study: Cumulative Extremism

In 2014/5 the data supported the notion of ‘cumulative’ extremism, referring to a cyclical escalation of violent activity between opposing communities, with each executing violent retribution on the other in a self-perpetuating downward spiral. In the 2013/4 report this was identified through the rise in anti-Muslim attacks in the 7 days following the murder of Lee Rigby. Similar patterns can be seen in the 2014/5 data when looking at the 7 days following attacks in Sydney, Paris and Copenhagen.

Policy Implications and Discussion

The report notes that overall levels of anti-Muslim hate crime have remained mostly unchanged since the 2013 report. These indicate that recent government programmes aimed at fostering inter-community relations have failed to make a meaningful difference: the report therefore recommends moving beyond Prevent’s counter-terrorism paradigm to offer a broader programme of interventions. The report also notes that the low number of victims reporting to police is troubling, and indicates a need for relationship and building by the police. The report also questions the role of the media in the level and tone of its coverage and the consequent violent responses of ‘cumulative extremism.’

Introduction

The report seeks to analyse how and why some types of radicalisation develop into violence and others do not, how these types relate to each other and the implications for policy. The report studies two phenomena: radicalisation that leads to violence and radicalisation that does not. This is studied through interviews with 70 young Muslims in Canada and 75 interviews with a range of local and national experts.

Radicalisation

Underlying causes are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for terrorism, but are ‘permissive’ factor that increase the likelihood of terrorism. There are three main categories of permissive factors:

- **Global factors** such as geopolitical affairs, foreign policy and interventions;
- **State factors** such as considerable educational, professional and economic disadvantages;
- **Sociocultural factors** are a complex mixture of characteristics relating to ideology, culture and identity.

There are also competing theories of how radicalisation leads to violence. The **rational choice model** argues that under certain conditions terrorism is the most rational tactic to achieve one’s aims, **stage models** attempt to model radicalisation as a process of discrete phases, and **social movement theory** regards terrorist groups as rational actors responding to various incentives such as social affiliations and a process of socialisation. The report notes that only 20% of research articles about terrorism are based on new research.

**Violent and non-violent radicals: social and personal characteristics**

Research into identifying certain characteristics of al-Qaeda terrorists has concluded that a single profile does not exist. The report compares the characteristics of radicals, terrorist and young Muslims to isolate differences and identify common experiences.

Radicals were more likely to have attended universities and be in employment than terrorists. Radicals, terrorists and young Muslims all shared a dislike and distrust in their current government, and in current foreign policy. Muslims and radicals often express their frustrations through the political process, unlike terrorists. All three complained about hypocrisy towards Muslims on issues such as the burqa, but terrorists were far more likely to have a deep hatred for Western society.

**Violent and non-violent radicals: religion and ideology**

The key difference between terrorists and radicals on religion was the willingness or radicals to delve deeply into religion, to recognise complexity and admit one’s own ignorance. Radicals and Muslims see terrorists as having a shallow conception of Islam. Supporting the creation of a caliphate or implementing Sharia law was not a significant predictor of radicalisation to violence.
Violent and non-violent radicals: attitudes to terrorism

There were three key arguments used by radicals and young Muslims in rejecting violent Jihad in the West:

- The **covenant** argument is that the laws of the land apply to Muslims;
- That **killing civilians** are not permissible targets under any circumstance;
- That violent jihad is **counterproductive** and does not advance the cause of Islam.

Young Muslims and radicals didn’t necessarily dismiss violent jihad: many supported the right of Muslims in other countries to engage in violence in self-defence, but not violent Jihad in Western countries. It is more accurate to say that the conditions under which violence is justified were contested, rather than radicals and Muslims being pacifistic.

Violent and non-violent radicals: the journey of radicalisation into violence

The report suggests 5 elements that are often overlooked contributing to radicalisation to violence: the emotional ‘pull’ of acting in the face of injustice, thrill / excitement, status within the social group, peer pressure by others in the group and a lack of alternative source of information to inform their actions.

Conclusion

The report makes a number of recommendations, based on three underlying principles:

- **To encourage positive activism**, young people need space to be radical and engaging in political and social protest should be encouraged. Governments should create and encourage exciting alternates to al-Qaeda, for example schemes that allow young Muslims to volunteer in countries they are most concerned about such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
- **Demystify and de-glamourise al-Qaeda**, freedom of speech and debate can be a weapon against violence. This can be accomplished through emphasising the incompetency and theologically incompatibility: discourse around ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims should be minimised. Silencing radical views is not effective, and independent voices must set out counter-arguments. There should be a broader presumption in favour of transparency in security and intelligence services.
- **An important role for non-governmental actors**: governments should intervene in radicalisation to violence, but broader social concerns such as discrimination, integration or socioeconomic disadvantage should not be part of a counter-terrorism agenda. Governments should work with radicals when there are specific tactical benefits, and Muslim community work that is already taking place should be further encouraged and facilitated.
The Quilliam Foundation – Radicalisation on British University Campuses: A Case Study (2010)

Introduction

The report aims to explain how the head of the City University Islamic Society (ISoc) praised al-Qaeda members, called for jihad, advocated the murder of homosexuals and non-practicing Muslims, and collided with university authorities, staff and other students. The report outlines the four contributory factors to radicalisation identified by the government’s guidance for their Channel programme, and uses these as the reference point for the analysis of City University ISoc:

- Exposure to an ideology that seems to sanction, legitimise or require violence, often by providing a compelling but fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and recent history;
- Exposure to people or groups who can directly and persuasively articulate that ideology and then relate it to aspects of a person's own background and life history;
- A crisis of identity about belonging which might be triggered by a range of further personal issues such as racism or deprivation;
- A range of perceived grievances, some real and some imagined, to which there may seem to be no credible and effective non-violent response.

The report does not argue that the presence of these four always translates into a commitment to terrorism, but that presence of them may potentially increase risk of a person becoming involved in Islamist-inspired violence. The report also argues that Islamist extremism in non-violent forms still has negative impacts on society such as reducing cohesion, damaging the academic life of universities and generate intolerance of others.

The radicalising effects of members of the Islamic Society

The report argues that the ideology of the City University ISoc was one that sanctioned, legitimised or required violence. The ideology is summarised as follows:

- An ideological belief in a politicised interpretation of Islam, which necessitates active pursuing by Muslims of achieving a constitutionally enforced sharī’ah legal system. This is known as Islamism;
- A theological belief in Wahhabism. Wahhabism is an austere, literalist and highly socially conservative interpretation of Islam. Anything that differs from their interpretation as regarded as un-Islamic;
- The combination of socially conservative Wahhabism and ideology of Islamism combines creates the political leverage to realise puritanical theological views. This is Salafi-Jihadism.

The report also argues that the president of the ISoc was responsible for the majority of ISoc’s output and decision-making. He was reported to be a forceful, dogmatic yet at times polite and charming. The report argues such a charismatic and powerful figures is necessary in order to give credibility to his ideology. On top of this, numerous charismatic and seemingly influential Wahhabi and pro-jihadist clerics were promoted via the ISoc website, and invited them to speak at public events.
The report argues that during the 2009/10 academic year, the City ISoc had a number of high-profile altercations, channelling individuals' crises of belonging into an antagonistic and divisive 'Muslim' identity and providing evidence for potential or real grievances. The report argues that the ISoc leadership constructed such identities and managed grievances to propagate their ideological agenda. These altercations are as follows:

- The student newspaper, *The Inquirer*, criticised the platform given to a radical Islamist preacher. City ISoc responded through their website with threatening messages and personal insults. ISoc framed this grievance in religious terms reinforcing a divisive identity defined largely in opposition to perceived non-Muslim aggression.
- In 2009 a number of City ISoc students were attacked by youths in the local area. The ISoc leadership discouraged their followers from cooperating with the police investigation, obstructing the inquiry.
- In 2010 university authorities decided to move the Isoc’s isolated Muslim-only prayer room to a multi-faith room in the main building, based on safety requirements and not favouring any particular faith group. The ISoc held prayer protests, and portrayed the move as an attack on Muslims and Islam. They offered their brand of Islamist as a solution to this sense of grievance.

**Impact on the wider student body**

The report argues these events had a negative effect on university politics: examples of this were Muslim students preventing others (including other Muslims) using the multi-faith prayer room, over-representation of the ISoc on union council meetings and advocating bloc voting on the basis of an exclusivist and ‘aggrieved’ Muslim identity politics. A senior member of the LGBT society believed that members of the ISoc were responsible for a perceived rise in homophobia on campus, and had invited homophobic speakers. Similarly, a member of the Union of Jewish Students reported the sense of growing unease, intimidation and a rise in the number of report anti-Semitic incidents. Moderate Muslim students were also alienated and upset by ISoc’s actions and wrote an open letter expressing this to *The Inquirer*. Women were also treated in a discriminatory manner: the ISoc attempted to implement gender segregation at public events, and there were reports of pressure being placed on a female Muslim student to wear a hijab. The report argues the total result of these issues had a chilling effect on the university’s academic and social life.

**Recommendations**

The report makes a number of recommendations such as that student unions should have an individual responsible for oversight of religious studies, clear points of confidential reporting of campus extremism and prohibition of gender segregation at public events. Recommendations for government include increased Prevent funding, national / local conferences and clear guidance for SU officers. Universities were recommended encouraging challenges to extremism, access to shared spaces and that representation of students be through universities’ democratic structures.

Origins of the English Defence League

The English Defence League was formed in June 2009. The stimulus for the EDL’s formation was in Luton, where there had been tensions between Muslims and white communities for a number of years. More specifically, the spark for the formation was the hostile reception given for returning soldiers in Luton from a local Islamist group. The EDL’s origins were not in the established far right such as the British National Party or the National Front. Instead, the EDL’s origins lay in several pre-existing, ultrapatriotic organisations that have evolved within the football casual subculture over recent years such as March for England and the United British Alliance. The EDL is not a political party but a grassroots single-issue movement, claiming to be primarily concerned with defending England’s identity against Islam. The EDL is an identitarian movement, deploying a native English ‘identity’ as a principal weapon against ‘alien’ Islam.

Links to the Far Right

From the start, the EDL has denied any links to far-right organisations. However, it has attracted the interest of numerous far-right activists from the British National Party and the National Front. In order to cultivate respectability, the BNP had de-commissioned ‘boots and fists’ by the late 1990s and turned its back on 1970s-style street demonstrations. For some BNP members, the promise of street agitation by the EDL fills a void left by the BNP’s abandonment of the streets. The BNP did declare the EDL a proscribed organisation, however none of its members appear to have yet been disciplined for the involvement in the EDL.

Alan Lake

Alan Lake, a millionaire IT consultation, came forward as a key figure working behind the scenes for the EDL. Lake embodies a fiercely pro-Western, anti-Islamic current that has little time for the traditional obsessions of the Fascist Right such as race and conspiracy theory. Lake insisted that a condition of his generous financial support was the EDL distancing themselves from the BNP. It has been rumoured (although unsubstantiated) that Lake has bankrolled the EDL with millions of pounds. Lake has been quoted as recommending that anti-jihadist groups co-opt ‘floating groups’ such as Sikhs, Jews, homosexuals and women to their cause. Lake has stopped putting himself forward as an EDL spokesperson, but continues to direct their activities.

Organisation

The EDL is organised through a combination of both area-based divisions and specialist divisions such as EDL Youth, Jewish Divisions, Disabled Division and so on. Each region has its own regional organiser. The EDL is also partnered with Welsh, Scottish and Ulster Defence Leagues. As of October 2010 there were over 90 local divisions, and in July 2010 the EDL claimed 22,000 followers on Facebook. However, there is no official membership card or fee as such to prove a formal membership status. Communication is primarily carried out through Facebook and other online platforms. LGBT, Jewish and Sikh divisions attempt to draw in new recruits from a wider constituency. A particular difficulty for the EDL with regards to this is that many of its ‘foot soldiers’ cannot tell the
difference between a Muslim and a Sikh, which puts off Sikhs from attending EDL demonstrations. More widely the EDL views itself as a part of the broader ‘counter-jihad’ movement across Western Europe and North America, for example demonstrating at the time of the trial of Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom, for hate speech.

**Nature of EDL Street Protest**

The EDL claims to peacefully protest against militant Islam. The EDL is almost certainly spoiling for a backlash from its opponents, preferably from local Asians. Without such confrontations, the demonstrations are a damp squib and the EDL loses its appeal as an outlet for violence. Locations are chosen sometimes over local issues, for example homecoming parades by soldiers. In other cases, locations are chosen because they are multi-racial areas with significant Muslims communities. In the period July 2009 – August 2010 there were close to 450 reported arrests in connection with EDL demonstrations. In some cases the majority arrested were EDL supporters, whilst in others the majority were from their opposition. The overwhelming majority of EDL demonstrators are young, white, working-class males. Often the issues protested about are poorly defined, and frequently alcohol use precede the events. The demonstrations purport to be against ‘militant Islam’ but hostility is all too often directed against all Muslims. The growth of the EDL is in part rooted in a sense of alienation and disaffection felt by white, working-class youth. A stated concern is a lack of national cultural identity, a determination to preserve traditional ethno-national dominance and pessimism about the future. Demonstrations have a frequent hostility against Muslims articulated in a deeply offensive and deliberately provocative manner designed to encourage a violent response from opponents (preferably Muslim youth), and this encourages communal polarisation.

**Responding to the EDL**

The EDL was compared to Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts in 2009 by Labour Communities Secretary John Denham. One response by Denham was to counter white working-class resentment though a £12 million 'Connecting Communities' programme. It would be exceptionally difficult to ban the EDL: unlike Islamist groups like Islam4UK, the EDL does not glorify terrorism and thus could not be proscribed under existing counter-terrorism legislation. Counter protestors' tactics vary widely: small groups of militant anti-Fascists advocate direct physical confrontation whereas United Against Fascism’s official line is that protest should be peaceful. The report concludes with some recommendations:

- **Freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in democratic society. Opponents should not violently react, as this helps the EDL achieve its goal of a violent confrontation with the potential for radicalisation;**
- **Anti-Fascist organisations and community groups should focus efforts on getting marches banned rather than counter-mobilisation;**
- **A more pro-active approach to challenge hostile attitudes to Muslims minorities to promote understanding and tolerance of different cultures.**
The Community Security Trust – Anti-Semitic Incidents January to June 2016

Anti-Semitic Incident Numbers

CST recorded 557 anti-Semitic incidents across the UK in the first six months of 2016. This is an increase of 11% from the first six months of 2015. The total of 557 anti-Semitic incidents is the second-highest total CST has ever recorded in the January-June period of any year. There does not appear to be any specific ‘trigger events’ in this duration that caused identifiable, short-term spikes in incident levels such as the Israel/Gaza conflict in 2009. The report does suggest that there was sustained public debate about anti-Semitism, particularly in relation to the Labour Party, in April, May and June 2016. It is possible this may have contributed to the overall increase. The longer term trend shows that there have been sustained higher level of incidents since July and August 2014 during that summer’s Israel/Gaza conflict, which differs from previous ‘trigger events’ in 2009 and 2006 as the incidents have not fallen significantly following the end of the conflict. Social media has become an essential tool for these incidents, with 133 anti-Semitic incidents involving social media in the reported six months: this forms 24% of the total incidents in this period. This is an increase on the 89 social media incidents reported last year during the same time period.

Anti-Semitic Incident Categories

CST recorded 41 violent anti-Semitic assaults in the first six months of 2016, a 13% fall from the 47 recorded in the first six months of 2015. These 41 incidents comprised 7% of the overall total incidents in this time period. CST recorded 32 incidents of Damage and Desecration of Jewish property recorded in the first six months of 2016, a decrease of 11% from the 26 incidents recorded in the first six months of 2015. CST recorded 43 direct anti-Semitic threat during the first half of 2016, a 10% increase on the 39 recorded in the first 6 months of 2015. 31 of the 2016 threats were direct, face-to-face, verbal threats and 5 were recorded on social media. There were 431 anti-Semitic incidents reported to CST in the Abusive Behaviour category in 2016, an increase of 16% from the 373 recorded for the same period in 2015. These incidents ranged from graffiti, hate mail, verbal abuse and social media incidents that did not include threats. This is the highest number of Abusive Behaviour incidents recorded in the January to June period CST has ever recorded.

Anti-Semitic Incident Victims

195 of the anti-Semitic incidents reporting in the first six months of 2016 were by victims who were random Jewish individuals in public. In at least 87 of these incidents the victims were visible Jewish due to religious or traditional clothing, Jewish school uniforms or jewellery bearing religious symbols. The most common single type of anti-Semitic incidents is random, spontaneous, verbal abuse directed at people who look Jewish whilst they go about their lives in public places. Out of those cases where CST received a description of the gender of victims 64% were male, 27% were female and 9% involved mixed groups. 74% of victims were adult, 21% minors and 9% involved mixed groups.
Incident Offenders and Motives

Identifying ethnicity, gender and age of offenders is a difficult and imprecise task, often involving brief public encounters or incidents that are not face-to-face. Where descriptions were available 54% of offenders were described as white – north European, 5% described as white – south European, 13% described as black, 20% described as south Asian, 1% described as east or south-east Asian, and 7% described as Arab or north African. These proportions are broadly typical for a period when there is no trigger event from the Middle East. Where descriptions were available 84% of incidents involved male offenders, 12% female offenders and 4% mixed groups of males and females. Where descriptions were available 78% of incidents involved adult offenders and 22% involved offenders who were described as minors. Of the 557 anti-Semitic incidents reported in the first six months of 2016, the offender used some form of political discourse in 227 incidents (41%). 24% of incidents showed evidence of political motivation.

Geographical Locations

Of the 557 incidents recorded in the first six months of 2016, 441 (79%) were recorded in the main Jewish centres of Greater London and Greater Manchester. In Greater London there was a rise of 62% anti-Semitic incidents on the same period in the previous year, whereas in Greater Manchester there has been a fall of 62% from the same period in the previous year. There is no obvious explanation for these opposing trends. Outside London and Greater Manchester CST recorded 116 anti-Semitic incidents from around the UK in the first six months of 2016, compared to 131 incidents in the first half of 2015.

Reporting of Incidents

The CST’s classification of an anti-Semitic incident is any malicious act aimed at Jewish people, organisations or property, where there is evidence the victim or victims were targeted because they are (or are believed to be) Jewish. Anti-Semitic incidents are reporting in multiple ways but most commonly by telephone, email, via the CST website, CST social media profiles or in person to CST staff and volunteers.

Introduction

The purpose of this review is to examine the scholarly literature on the processes of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The report notes concern about the quality of academia studying terrorism, the lack of substantially new knowledge and frequent lack of primary research evidence and / or counterfactual samples to compare with.

Radicalisation as a Process

There are a number of studies that have identified distinct and identifiable phases of radicalisation from early involvement to being operationally active. Some examples are as follows:

- **The Prevent Pyramid:** This approach sees radicalisation as a progressive movement up a pyramid-type model, where higher levels are associated with increased levels of radicalisation and decreased numbers of those involved.
- **The NYPD 4-Step Radicalisation Process:** Used case studies to identify four phases comprised of pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination and jihadisation.
- **Marc Sageman’s 4-Stage Process:** Identifies 4 key factors which comprise of a sense of moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, resonance with personal experiences and mobilisation through networks.
- **Taarnby’s 8-Stage Recruitment Process:** Identifies 8 stages of a recruitment process growing from intent to action, with the operational phase being evidence in the last four phases.
- **Gill’s Pathway Model:** Charts a trajectory of individuals who become suicide bombers. The four key stages are a broad socialisation / propaganda process, a ‘catalyst’ event providing motivation, some pre-existing familial / friendship ties which facilitate recruitment and in-group radicalisation.
- **Wiktorowicz’s al-Muhajiroun Model:** Puts a greater emphasis on the role of social influence in radicalisation. The model identifies four key processes which are the individual having a ‘cognitive opening’, a religious seeking of meaning, a frame alignment to a radical group’s perspective, and socialisation where a person receives religious instruction that facilitates indoctrination, identity-construction and value changes.
- **Moghaddam’s ‘Staircase to Terrorism’:** This is a more sophisticated model that uses the metaphor of a staircase of increasingly narrow choices that occur on three levels: the individual, organisational and environmental.
- **McCauley and Moskalenko’s 12 Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation:** Identifies 12 ‘mechanisms’ or radicalisation which operate against three levels: individual, group and mass level. This does not chart specific pathways but aims to offer an overarching conceptual framework integrating all the different influences.
Theories of Radicalisation

The report identifies three main theories explaining radicalisation and extremism:

- **Biological theories** posit that higher levels of impulsivity, confidence, risk-taking and status needs play a partial role in making violent extremism attractive. The majority of people radicalised to the violence in the West are young and male.

- **Psychological theories** provide individual-level explanations for terrorism, largely focusing on a set of distinguishing characteristics that differentiate terrorists from the general population. These explanations centre on some form of pathology such as mental illness, repressed sexuality, or other personality traits. These attempts have been largely unsuccessful, and it appears many Islamist terrorists in the West are notable for their normality and ordinariness.

- Theories on **Muslim identity** look at ‘identity crises’ and ‘identity confusion’ where some young Muslims reject first generation ‘Muslim identity’ whilst also feeling not accepted within wider British society. The sense of conflict between being British and being Muslim is not inherent and one study found many Muslims experiencing no such contradiction.

- **Societal theories** are the most common form of explanation. These explanations look at issues such as deprivation, poor integration, political explanations, segregation / enclavisation, social networks and the role of religion. It may also look at radicalisation incubators i.e. prisons and internet as places where radicalisation occurs.

**Individual Risk Factors**

Most research on Islamic extremists has shown the lack of any consistent profile that can help identify a potential terrorist: recent studies show that the common characteristic is how ‘normal’ they are. MI5 could not identify either a uniform pattern by which the radicalisation process occurred, nor a particular type of person susceptible to it. This lack of recognisable set of characteristics suggests that the process of radicalisation will itself also be highly variable. Some studies have, however, identified certain risk factors or vulnerabilities: example of this include emotional vulnerability, identification with the suffering of Muslim victims globally, serious criminal pasts, and so on.

**Programmes Tackling Radicalisation**

The review identified two programmes aiming to address Islamic radicalisation: these were outreach and engagement projects running in London. These were the Muslim Contact Unit and the ‘Street’ Project. Studies find that empowering young people and challenging ideology with a focus on theology through education or training were the most successful interventions. A DCLG study highlighted the important of non-prescriptive education and training, to allow young people to develop independent thinking or research and leadership skills with which they could independently question and challenge a range of knowledge sources.

The report notes the important development in radical right activism of the turn toward anti-Muslim politics. An example of this is Nick Griffin, chairman at the time of the British National Party, when he urged activists to turn away from unhelpful anti-Semitism and embrace anti-Muslim politics in an attempt at populist, electoral-friendly campaigning. This represents a move from ‘traditional’ Judeophobic prejudice to a ‘cultural racism’ of implacable difference and intractable conflict with European Muslims.

Sections of the reactionary media have fanned these flames, providing an issue able to be shared by ideologues and right-wing talking heads. Populist prejudice, radical Islamist propaganda and right-wing cultural racism have together attempted to turn the notion of a clash of civilisations into a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The theory of cumulative extremism was put forward by Roger Eatwell, who theorised that opposing extremes rely on one another to validate their shared notion of a clash of civilisations, for example radical right activists and Jihadi Islamists. The most prominent example of this is multiple murderer Anders Breivik, who attempted to start a ‘European Civil War’ culminating in the end of Islam in Europe.

Amongst far right activists, and websites such as Gates of Vienna, there is no attempt to separate jihadi Islamists from the overwhelming majority of peaceful, law-abiding Muslim citizens in Europe: for them Islam itself is the enemy of western civilisation. The author notes the ways in which a plurality of illiberal right factions such as the British Freedom Party, the British National Party and the English Defence League collective share and advocate similar anti-Muslim rhetoric.

The report concludes that radical right ideologues and movements have reformulated into a ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse targeting the Islamic faith as a whole: this has the consequence not just of potentially contributing to radical right violence such as that carried out by Breivik, but also as a cumulative extremism increasing already-strained community tensions in Europe and the US.
Introduction

Since the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich on May 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2013, there has been increasing concern over escalating violence between Islamist and far-right groups in the UK, with this spiral being referred to be academics and experts as ‘cumulative’ or ‘reciprocal’ radicalisation / extremism. This essay tests four key assumptions of this concept, and concludes further research is required before it has practical application to policy-making.

Background

The term ‘cumulative extremism’ was coined by Professor Roger Eatwell. Eatwell’s argument is that extremist groups enter a cumulative process whereby the activity of one group leads the other to become more extreme or provocative, which in turn leads the original group to escalate, and so on. The most prominent recent example of this was the 2009 protest march by an Islamist group in Royal Wootton Bassett which led to the founding of the English Defence League.

Assumption 1: the activities of one side will result in an increase in the support for the other side (or the ‘recruiting sergeant’ argument)

This argument would suggest EDL demonstrations acts as ‘recruiting sergeant’ for Islamist extremists. However, since 2007 the size of the extreme Islamist movement in the UK has been either stable or declining. Equally between 2010 and 2011 there were a series of court convictions of UK Islamists, as well as increasing media attention of so-called ‘grooming gangs’, however these events did not provide a sustained increase in the EDL’s popularity. The report does, however, note that certain provocative actions may be more significant than general trends: for example in the six months after the ‘Poppy Burning’ by Muslims Against Crusades (MAC) the average number of participants in EDL demonstrations went up from 600 to 1000. Recent research also indicates support for the EDL amongst the population at large has fallen since the Woolwich attack.

Assumption 2: the activities of one side will ‘trigger’ a violent retaliation from the other (the ‘spiralling of violence’ argument)

This assumption is that even if overall levels of support for groups is not affected by the activities of other groups, the motives of those already involved may become more radical, perhaps making violence more likely. There was an increase in hate crimes, including violence, following the Woolwich attack. This included petrol bombs and assaults on mosques. Such spikes of hate crime can be seen in both the UK and the US. It can therefore be expected that an increase in ‘revenge’ attacks happens for a short period after an incident, however this does not mean a more general and sustained increase in violence. Instead, it will usually fall back rather than continue through a self-sustained cumulative processes.
Assumption 3: that the process affects both sides equally (the ‘they both need each other’ argument)

This assumption is that extremist groups exist in a symbiotic relationship whereby structure, size and violence of a group depends on the existence and actions of the other group. Research does appear to indicate that individuals recruited into organisations like the EDL consider Islamist extremism to be one of several factors. Equally members of Islamist groups join for a mixed and varied set of factors, with the size of the far-right not being a significant one of them. The authors’ suspicion is that the existence and activities of Islamists in the UK are a more significant factor in driving support for the EDL than vice versa.

Assumption 4: Tackling radicalisation on one side requires also tackling radicalisation on the other side (the ‘they are both as bad as each other’ argument)

Although the authors argue that it is important extremist groups are all analysed by the same measures, it does not follow that Islamists and the EDL are equally dangerous to society and should receive the same treatment. The report argues that the threat from Islamist terrorism remains the most significant in the UK. The EDL, in contrast to Islamists, are a chaotically organised street-based and online collective of individuals. However, this is not to say there is no threat from extreme far-right elements: The report notes that as of 2011 there were 17 individuals serving a prison sentence for far-right related terrorist or violent activities. The report notes that the UK Government’s Prevent agenda is aimed at stopping terrorism, not criminal behaviour or public disorder.

Conclusion

The report concludes that care is needed before accepting the ‘cumulative extremism’ theory, and that there may be countervailing trends. Rather than leading to great support for each group, it may be that the actions of extremist groups only serve to isolate them further. The report argues there is a need for further study in the area, more specifically how other aspects of the environment may be significant in shaping groups’ responses, for example policing tactics, political opportunities and socio-political positions of members. The report argues that more resources need to be dedicated to understanding ‘cumulative extremism’ before drastic changes are made to counter-radicalisation policies.
The Quilliam Foundation – Counter Extremism: A Decade on from 7/7. Produced by Jonathan Russell and Alex Theodosiou (2015)

Introduction

The report aims to present a series of policy recommendations in the new counter-extremism strategy. The report argues that despite changes in recruitment, communication and attack methods of terrorists, there is little evidence that the broader radicalisation process or associated Islamist ideology has changed. The report comes after six months of research into the Prevent strategy, and also considers what an ideal counter-extremism strategy might look like within boundaries of contemporary context. The report argues that for Prevent to have a meaningful long-term impact it should focus on the causes and ideological roots of extremism. The report argues that legal, non-violent Islamist organisations with extremist views must not be given the legitimacy of government sponsorship, and that in the past a failure to appreciate this has led to public funds going to organisations that add to the four main contributory factors of radicalisation: ideology, narrative, grievances and identity crisis. The report argues that local government needs more guidance and clearer strategic input on how to tackle extremism. The report aims to set out a vision for counter-extremism strategic direction.

The debate: what is non-violent extremism?

The report argues for the use of the term Islamism to describe a modernist approach to Islam that seeks to use religion for political ends. The report identifies four main points of belief:

- The belief that Islam is not a faith but a divine political ideology;
- The belief that sharia must be enforced as state law;
- That the Muslim ummah (people) are a political bloc;
- That the first three points should be brought together in the creation of an expansionist ‘Islamist state’.

Although Islamists broadly agree on these four points, they differ in tactics. The range of these tactical options are summarised below:

- **Entrist, political Islamists** use the current political system to advance the goal of an Islamist state. They target institutions such as schools, charities and prisons;
- **Revolutionary Islamists** reject engagement with the political system, but also renounce mass violence. They often attempt to build their support to eventually overthrow the system, often among members of the military;
- **Militant Islamists**, or Salafi-Jihadists, use violent tactics to create their ‘Islamic state’;
- Individuals or groups who move between these strands.

The report argues that banning non-violent Islamists is often neither desirable nor necessary. Rather, it argues that they should be challenged, particularly by other non-Islamist Muslims who participate in public life as citizens. The report argues that there are four key contributory factors that make an individual more likely to adopt an extreme ideology such as Islamism:
• Exposure to an ideology that seems to sanction, legitimise or require violence, often by providing a compelling but fabricated narrative of contemporary politics and recent history;
• Exposure to people, groups or material, who can directly and persuasively articulate that ideology and relate it to aspects of a person’s own background and life history;
• A crisis of identity, and often uncertainty, about belonging which might be triggered by a range of personal issues such as experiences of racism, discrimination, deprivation, family breakdown or separation;
• A range of perceived grievances, some real and some imagined, to which there may seem to be no credible and effective non-violent response.

The report clarifies that not all factors must be in place for individual to be radicalised, nor that any individual exposed to all four necessarily will be, but that risk of radicalisation is proportional to exposure to these factors. Radicalisation is a human process and therefore different for various individuals and their own experiences and motivations. The report criticises the over linear design of older models of radicalisation, and argues that Prochaska and Diclemente’s Transtheoretical Model of Change is more accurate; this model identifies states in ideational and behavioural change whilst also recognising that individuals can move up, down or stay still within this journey. The report argues that as a conclusion to this counter-extremism should intervene earlier than the action stages of radicalisation through efforts such as raising support for ‘British values’ and universal human rights but also through soft-end community cohesion and integration projects.

The debate: is Islamism Problematic?

The ideology of Islamism entails the creation of a theocracy that excludes those not deems adequately qualified to interpret ‘God’s Law’ from the decision-making process. Islamist groups without exception advocated the imposition of sharia as state law: this involves criminalising acts deemed as sinful such as dressing inappropriately, questioning religious orthodoxy and not observing religious rituals. Wherever Islamists have succeeded in gaining power, either through a violent or relatively non-violent process, widespread human rights abuses have followed. In the UK context specifically, Islamism is problematic because it preaches that a Muslim’s identity, religion and even personality are all incomplete unless he or she is living in an ‘Islamic state’. This undermines a Muslim-British identity in favour of a globalised and politicised Muslim identity which overrides loyalties based on citizenship, proximity or share humanity. In addition to this is the closely related problem of Wahhabism: a retrogressive and intolerant strand of Islam originating in 17th century Arabia. When Islamism combines with Wahhabism it can mutate into Salafi-Jihadism: a belief in revolutionary violence to establish an ‘Islamist state’ and that they have a divine obligation to enforce moral behaviour even before such a state has been created, which can result in violent acts. For these reasons and more, the report argues that Islamism is therefore a threat to secular, democratic and tolerant society.

Debate: does Prevent spy on Muslims?

There been a number of criticisms of Prevent. One of these is that Prevent is used for spying, especially in its original form, largely due to the fact that much of the information collected by Prevent works was passed on to police. Lost trust is another key criticism, with the concern that Prevent’s programmes damage people’s trust in the
police and therefore undermine cooperation between local authorities and communities, which is a vital instrument in the fight against terrorism. Consequentially, association with Prevent can be perceived by some workers as an obstacle due to the negative associations. The focus of resources on Muslims communities has had the dual effect of making Muslim communities feel stigmatised, and other communities feeling alienated and ignored. The report notes that the 2011 Prevent review did address some issues of the original Prevent programme, but that key terms such as ‘extremism’ or ‘Islamism’ are still poorly defined. The National Union of Students has also published its concerns about placing Prevent on a statutory basis: the NUS is critical of the government’s expectation that teachers will monitor and report on its students. There is concern about what the revised strategy will do to freedom speech on campuses and online: Matt Cavanagh argues that there is still little clarity as to whether non-violent extremist groups are being tackled as a matter of principle or to reduce the risk of terrorism. Of the measures of Prevent, Channel has been seen as a good example of counter-radicalisation efforts, whilst others have expressed concerns about in channel in relation to information sharing and intelligence gathering. The report argues that branding is important, and that if Muslim communities feel they are being targeted this is an issue that must be addressed. A roundtable event in 2015 organised by Hazel Blears identified what was referred to as the ‘Preventing Prevent Lobby’: an informal coalition that actively targets counter-extremism practitioners and smears all efforts to challenge extremism, regardless of the approach taken. The report argues there is little purpose in renaming or rebranding Prevent, and the negative connotations are the result of a consistent campaign to discredit the agenda which would be aimed at the programme no matter what it is called.

The debate: should we partner with non-violent extremists?

The report notes the difficulty of providing evidence of success within counter-radicalisation, as to do required proof of a negative i.e. proof that an individual was dissuaded or diverted from the path to extremism. As part of the government’s efforts to fight violent extremism was a policy where the state and police forged partnerships with non-violent extremists. Critics of this approach argue that all violent extremists are at one time non-violent extremists and that this strategy is short-termist. Supports of this policy would argue that there are cases where engagement has provided success stories. The report concludes on this issue that the ‘Lambertist’ strategy of engagement with non-violent extremist groups is particularly precarious since the rise of ISIL. A key goal of Islamists, violent or not, is the creation of a Caliphate. In this context government partnership with Islamist groups is a particularly risky tactic in preventing radicalisation, an approach in which the line between acceptability and prohibition is even closer than before.

Counter-extremism strategy: vision

The report argues that defining extremism in opposition to British values will result in legal ambiguity that policy should not be based on, and instead recommends a human rights-based definition. The report also notes that the majority of values described as ‘British’ in the government’s definition are defended by the Human Rights Act. A human rights-based definition would make it difficult for those branded extremist to argue they are victims of political intolerance and illiberalism. Regardless of which definition is used, suppressing an ideology’s expression often results in strengthening it. The report argues that the best counter to ideologies we find loathsome is to challenge them openly.
Counter-extremism strategy: what kind of extremism?

The report argues the counter-extremism strategy must tackle extremism of all kind. The report gives three main reasons for this. The first is that extremism should be seen as social ill more comparable to anti-Semitism of homophobia. The second is that far-right extremists’ ideas and behaviour encourage anti-Muslim attacks, and that anti-Muslim hatred is a key grievance exploited by recruiters to radicalise Muslims. Thirdly, a counter-extremism strategy must be seen by society to be fair and proportionate to be effective.

Counter-extremism strategy: what approach should we take?

The report outlines the two key approaches of government: the Department for Communities and Local Government has attempted to address or reduce grievances through initiatives such as Tell MAMA. The Home Office has worked in the pre-criminal Prevent space to prevent terrorism through a number of measures such as Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures, the Royal Prerogative, and the Channel Programme. However, the report argues that little is done between these two areas. The report argues that people who sympathise or empathise with extremist ideology or violent strategies are not committing a crime, and nor should thought be made a crime, but it is true that jihadist organisations recruitment from pools of people such as this. The report recommends strategies to engage with people who subscribe to extremist ideologies and who oppose human rights, even if they are opposed to violence. The report also recommends building resilience among key constituencies through early stages interventions. Finally the report, does suggest deradicalisation programmes to undo trends of extremism: the aim being to rehabilitate and reintegrate those incarcerated for terrorism-related offences.

Counter-extremism strategy: education

The report argues that universities and colleges are key partners in counter-extremism. The report commends materials produced by the National Union of Students on issues such as interfaith groups, external speakers and good campus relations, and recommends their use by student’s unions. Universities and colleges should provide pastoral support to students vulnerable to extremism, but where possibly should avoid responding to campus extremism with increased police presence if the extremism is non-violent. The report, instead, recommends the employment of a specific counter-extremist specialist who can draw up specific guidance for counter-extremist strategy at each university and liaise with appropriate staff. The report does recognise the government has a limited role in active counter-extremism on campuses, due to their status as institutions of free enquiry, but this does not negate the responsibility of government to provide leadership with guidance on safeguarding. The report argues that concern by staff at universities that they are being asked to ‘spy’ on students is misplaced: instead this is a case of safeguarding young people and empowering them to present a civic challenge to extremism. The report argues that more needs to be done to inform key university staff about the realities of extremism to dispel misconceptions of Prevent and to encourage ‘buy in’ from a wider range of people.
Conclusion and recommendations

The report concludes that the updated Prevent strategy was correct to separate sharp-end measures from soft-end measures, but remains incomplete as a strategy to tackle non-violent extremism, challenge ideology and counter-narratives was not forthcoming. The report advocates the creation of a new body between the sharp-end of counter-terrorism and the soft-end of community cohesion that can develop a clear, consistent and comprehensive counter-extremism strategy. The report recommends this body work with other government departments and bodies to challenge ideology, counter narratives, conduct comprehensive primary prevention, engage vulnerable people with targeted prevention, and pursue nuanced deradicalisation programmes. The report make a number of recommendations based on this conclusion.
Terrorism Research Initiative - Evaluating CVE: Understanding the Recent Changes to the United Kingdom's Implementation of Prevent. Produced by Caitlin Mastroe (2016)

Introduction

This research report highlights the changes of the Prevent Strategy under the 2011 review and the more recent 2015 Counterterrorism and Security Act. The report aims to review the actions taken by the UK to promote monitoring and evaluation of its countering violent extremism (CVE) initiative, and the related challenges that evaluating CVE programmes can pose. The research report is based on semi-structured interviews with individuals who with implement CVE strategy or experience the ramifications of implementation.

Evaluating CVE

The report outlines the challenges faced when CVE initiatives are evaluated:

- **Outcome Variable:** CVE literature often focuses on outputs such as how many individuals participate in a programme, what activities are implemented and so on. Part of the problem is that an ideal outcome variable requires proof of a counter-factual, for example identifying individuals who did not radicalise as a direct result of CVE initiatives, but would have otherwise: this is impossible. Scholars have used other proxies for success such as number of incidents, but their alternates have been highlight criticised.

- **Timeframe:** Terrorism prevention strategies are long-term strategies: this makes evaluation difficult. Often evaluations by scholars, due to resource constraints, only analyse the short-term implications of programmes that have long-term objectives.

- **Data availability:** CVE programmes are often conducted by governments, and they often do not make the data available to researchers. Limited data can make evaluations programmes difficult if not impossible.

- **Cross-case comparison:** An effective counterterrorism strategy is necessarily broad and incorporates numerous components due to the complex nature of radicalisation. This complexity, coupled with the involvement of multiple actors, results in CVE programmes that tackle different parts of the puzzle. Comparisons are therefore difficult between countries as their approaches are very different.

Overview of Prevent

The UK's counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, dates back to 2003. CONTEST consists of four components: Pursue (aiming to stop terrorist attacks), Protect (strengthening defence to protect against terrorist attack), Prepare (mitigating the impact of a terrorist attack should one occur) and Prevent (stopping individuals either becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism). These components have remained constant but have changed throughout the later iterations of the strategy. One such change was in 2011 when the process of deciding priority areas changed from using population statistics of Muslims to a largely secret process whereby intelligence services use measures to evaluate threat levels. There are two types of Prevent coordinators allocated to priority areas: the first type is an individual who assists a local authority to formulate and implement a Prevent action plan whereas the second is an individual who helps higher education institutions specifically.
Evaluating Prevent and the Subsequent Changes

The first formal government evaluation of the CONTEST strategy came in 2010, but there were previous evaluations. Concerns were raised that Prevent initiatives were stigmatising Muslim communities and leading to misperceptions that Prevent, in particular the Channel programme, were used for intelligence gathering. In 2011 review led to a significant change when it targeted both non-violent and violent forms of extremism. Prevent's funding of community cohesion activities was also ceased, as this associated community cohesion with counter-terrorism measures. In 2015 the Counterterrorism and Security Act made it mandatory for public institutions such as local authorities and universities to practice “due regards to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”

Why these changes?

The 2015 and associated changes have acted to push towards more standardisation. Also, the monitoring of local authorities by the Home Office has increase centralisation measures. The statutory duties being in place has meant that institutions and local authorities no longer have a choice not to comply with Prevent.

Unintended consequences

The report argues that these changes have led to four unintended consequences:

- **Marginalisation**: There was widespread concern for the potential marginalisation of different interpretations of Islam under the new expansion of the term extremism to include non-violent extremism.
- **Lack of community buy-in**: The increased standardisation and centralisation may reduce community buy-in, due to the reduced role of community organisations in developing custom projects for their particular areas.
- **Negative public perception of Prevent**: The perceive marginalisation and the centralised nature of Prevent has given rise to negative perception of community members. This may have broader implications for Prevent's effectiveness, potentially creating a reluctance to refer individuals.
- **Over-reporting**: The new statutory duties have increased concerns of over-reporting issues and undertraining. This can potentially lead to further alienation of individuals, in this case youth.

Academic and Policy Implications

The report argues that increased transparency around Prevent is needed to ensure it can be evaluated. The report also argues that increasing standardisation of Prevent across local authorities misses the local contextualised nature of violent extremism. Finally, the report argues that CVE should be reconceptualised, and CVE initiatives not sectioned off as security issue but rather treated more as a safeguarding issue in the way the issues such as domestic abuse and mental health issues currently are.
Introduction

The paper notes that academic literature and governmental strategies have shown consistent interest in the formula that a lack of cultural integration equals an increased threat of radicalisation. This paper reviews existing ideas and evidence on this issue, and argues that the assumption needs to be challenged.

The ‘Failed Integration’ Assumption

This paper argues that the concept of social integration has a long and well developed history in both academia and policy. Following the 9/11 attacks radicalisation was a conceptual tool for understanding the processes involved in acts of extremism and support for such acts. During this time explanatory models and preventative strategies emerged, often sharing the notion that poor integration and exclusion of Muslims in Western societies could be a significant foundation for radicalisation. Conversely successful integration has been stated as being an important part of the fight against terrorism by reducing the political and moral ammunition that radicals have to support their ideologies. Following this a number of Western nations adopted measures with a strong focus on integration: a number of Western governments have adopted social policy based on civil integration or ‘inclusive citizenship’ rather than multiculturalism.

Challenging the ‘Failed Integration’ Assumption

The paper notes there is a lack of consensus on both the operational definition and measurement of the concept of diversity: this means its use and application in policy is problematic. The diversity of definitions and explanations for radicalisation are even less consistent than that of integration. Furthermore, there is a distinction between radicalisation that leads to violence and radicalisation that does not. Attempts to profile extremists through looking at traits such as ethnicity, religion, economic background and education background are widely considered to have failed: indeed profiling studies have reveals that radicalised individuals are decidedly ‘unremarkable.’ The report argues that studies reveal a scepticism, if not outright rejection, of the ‘Failed Integration’ assumption.

Reconceptualising Frames of Reference

The paper argues for a change in emphasis from studies of individuals and individuals’ traits, which are a basic feature of most radicalisation theories. Instead it would be preferable to adopted more nuanced and holistic frameworks that sees understanding as socially, politically and historically embedded.

Conclusion

The paper argues that failed integration is at best a distant factor in radicalisation, and that explanations of radicalisation as a consequence of simple causes and direct pathways is naive and dangerous. The development of a clear and precise terminology and conceptual taxonomy is an urgent priority in this field.
Institute for Strategic Dialogue – The impact of Brexit on Far-Right Groups in the UK. Produced by Melanie Smith and Chloe Colliver (2016)

Introduction

The police recorded a fivefold increase in report of hate crime in the five days following the Brexit vote. This briefing utilised the social listening tool Crimson Hexagon to investigate how the Brexit campaign and the murder of MP Jo Cox impacted on far right political parties and movements, and whether the use of derogatory xenophobic terms on Twitter increase throughout the final two months of the referendum campaign.

Exposure and Visibility / Followship

Three of five far-right groups in the study showed a significant increase in total potential impressions: British Unity (11.943% increase), Britain First (291%) and the British National Party (127%). Bar charts showed a growth in followers of all five groups studied: Britain First saw the largest increase in followership (15%), followed by Aryan Revolution UK (13%) and the English Defence League (5%). These increases are often based around specific events, for example the murder of Jo Cox and the EU Referendum result.

Engagement Demographics and Geographies

Across all five far-right groups studied, the vast majority of contributors to the conversation around these movements are middle-aged males. Geographically, analysis showed that 82.34% of the conversation about British Unity is generated in the UK, particularly in the North West, Yorkshire & the Humber and Greater London. Meanwhile the EDL was concentrated mostly in the West Midlands.

‘Share of Voice’

The ‘share of voice’ is calculated by comparing each monitor’s share of total engagement by day between the five far-right accounts. This changed drastically in the period 18th May – 28th June, with Britain First gaining more of a share following Jo Cox’s murder, whilst British Unity gained a larger share the following week.

Usage of Xenophobic Terms

The use of derogatory xenophobic terms over two months studied (28th April 2016 – 28th June 2016) show a continued focus on anti-Muslim or Islamophobic sentiment, however other terms such as ‘gypsy’, ‘poles’ and ‘paki’ become more prominent towards the end of the data collection period, perhaps indicating a surge after Brexit.

Conclusion

The briefing argues that whilst the long-term effects of the Brexit vote on the activities of UK far-right groups, it is clear that key events between May and June have garnered support for online presence of these groups, and visibility. Meanwhile the escalation of hate crime targeting communities of European migrants, as well as increase in derogatory terms targeting this group, must be monitored closely.